PD game 相關文獻回顧 (以合作為觀點)

Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma

DM Kreps, P Milgrom… – Journal of Economic Theory, 1982 – Elsevier
A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the single-period dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in
被引用 1659 次相關文章全部共 11 個版本;   edegan.com 提供的 [PDF]

Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma: Experimental evidence

J Andreoni… – The Economic Journal, 1993 – JSTOR
In the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, it is well known that defection in every game is the unique dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium. This follows from the familiar backward-induction arguments. Kreps et al. (i 982), however, show that if there is incomplete information
被引用 386 次相關文章全部共 14 個版本;   dklevine.com 提供的 [PDF]

Notes by Yi-Nung

Kreps et al. (1982) 提出了一個引發許多後續研究的有趣模型,他們證明在有限重覆的 PD 賽局中,如果賽局雙方對其對手之行為模式有某種的不完全資訊的話,則在此有限重覆的賽局之早期中,雙方皆採合作策略是符合理性的。…(待續)

Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner’s dilemma games

R Cooper, DV DeJong, R Forsythe… – Games and Economic …, 1996 – econ.ucsd.edu 0013 Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner’s Dilemma Games*
knowledge of rationality does not hold in this theoretical structure.
被引用 218 次
相關文章全部共 13 個版本
; ucsd.edu 提供的 [PDF]

Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner’s dilemma game

J Brosig – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2002 – Elsevier
that individuals with a cooperative disposition experience strong emotions that prevent them from cheating, then it should also be observed that, after communicating, these individuals will not exploit the expected cooperation of their partner in prisoner’s dilemma games.
被引用 88 次相關文章全部共 12 個版本;   usc.edu 提供的 [PDF]

The evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games: Experimental evidence

PD Bo… – The American Economic Review, 2011 – ingentaconnect.com
criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not pro- vide solution has been provided to the problem of equilibrium selection: when both cooperation and defection Previous experimental evidence has shown that subjects often fail to coordinate on a spe- cific
被引用 43 次相關文章全部共 34 個版本;    brown.edu 提供的 [PDF]

Tacit Cooperation, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence from Repeated Dominance Solvable Games

JB Van Huyck, JM Wildenthal… – Games and Economic …, 2002 – Elsevier
R. Cooper, DV DeJong, R. Forsythe and TW Ross, Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoners P. Milgrom, J. Roberts and R. Wilson, Rational Cooperation in the and JK Murnighan, Equilibrium Behavior and Repeated Play of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
被引用 24 次相關文章全部共 11 個版本;    psu.edu 提供的 [PDF]

Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

G Charness, GR Fréchette… – Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 – Elsevier
We wished to not only test the general effectiveness of endogenous payments for cooperation We noted earlier that mutual cooperation is the unique action pair consistent with SPE As controls, we conducted one session for each game without the possibility of transfer payments
被引用 25 次相關文章全部共 18 個版本;      escholarship.org 提供的 [PDF]

The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment

HT Normann, B Wallace – University of London Royal Holloway …, 2006 – papers.ssrn.com
unknown horizon would be. Empirically, however, it is well known that stable cooperation does occur also in finitely repeated games. – A related concern is to avoid endgame effects. Morehous (1966) observed that defection
被引用 31 次相關文章全部共 6 個版本; uni-duesseldorf.de 提供的 [PDF]

Cooperation in infinitely repeated games: Extending theory and experimental evidence

M Blonski, P Ockenfels… – JW Goethe Universität Frankfurt, …, 2007 – luiss.it
A proper understanding of the determinants of cooperation is crucial for the social sciences.  In this paper we propose a novel theoretical tool that enhances this understanding. Accordingly we present experimental evidence designed to differentiate clearly among the prevailing
被引用 7 次相關文章HTML 版全部共 2 個版本   ;   luiss.it 提供的 [PDF]

Notes by Yi-Nung

這篇談及了讓人們之合作較容易形成的四個條件 (Mailath G. and L. Samuelson, 2006):
(i) 合作利得相對大於不合作
(ii) 對手採合作下, 不合作利得相對小
(iii) 因不合作而預期被報復 (或懲罰) 的恐懼或嚴重性高
(iv) 較有耐心或較重視未來價值者

AE Roth… – Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1978 – Elsevier
Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoner’s dilemma. Two equilibrium indices are derived and are compared with two cooperation indices proposed by Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people’s behavior in a commons dilemma situation.
被引用 100 次相關文章全部共 4 個版本; harvard.edu 提供的 [PDF]

Notes by Yi-Nung

這篇是 PD game ending-rule 設成 q = (1-p) 的原始文獻 (其中也有實驗)

其中其實已經提到 ‘Tit-for-Tat’ 策略 (不只是從 Kreps et al. 1982, JET 來的):

… a player  to  play  his  cooperative  choice  in  the  first  period,  and  in  every  other period  to  play  the  same  choice  that  his  opponent  made  in  the  previous  period.

The [experimental] findings  also  indicated  that  the  last  play  of  an  n-period  game  may  result  in  a  reduction in  cooperative  choices.

應該把 ending-rule 設成機率的原因:

It  is  often  contended  in  the  literature  that  if  subjects  are  not  informed  of  the  number  periods  to  be played,  the  resulting  game yields  the  same  equilibria  as  the  infinite  game, since  no period  is  known  to  be  the  last.  However,  this  is  a considerable  oversimplification.  Since  it  is  apparent  that  the  game  must  eventually  terminate,  subjects  must  form  subctive  probabilities  greater  than  zero  that  a given  period  might  be  the  last.  Although  such obabilities  have  neither  been  observed  nor  controlled  by  experimenters,  we  shall  see that  they  play  a critical  role  in  determining  the  nature  of  equilibrium  outcomes.  (原因何在?)

P. 195

Morehous’s  (1966)  results  for  a game  with  a fixed duration  of  1, 2,  5,  or  10 periods  are  an  important  comparison.  He  reports  no  significant difference  in  the  amount  of  cooperation  evidenced  in  these  games,  although  the  results were  in  the  same  direction  as  our  results.

有關 face-to-face

E Williams – Psychological Bulletin, 1977 – psycnet.apa.org
1971) again used the Prisoner’s Dilemma, though only one of the pair was a subject, the other being a confederate. At certain points in the game, the confederate gave standardized friendly or unfriendly mes- sages in written form, by audio only, by audio-video, or face to face.
被引用 354 次相關文章全部共 4 個版本

The sound of silence in prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games

I Bohnet… – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1999 – Elsevier
exchanged in facetoface interactions which induces individuals to change their behavior, but rather the participants’ identification. While mutual identification allows for reciprocity, one-way identification excludes future social sanctions. In the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game
被引用 243 次相關文章全部共 12 個版本; psu.edu 提供的 [PDF]

Collective action and the evolution of social norms

E Ostrom – The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000 – JSTOR
To the surprise of the experimenters, a higher level of cooperation occurred in the control groups that played the regular prisoner’s dilemma in both phases, especially for those who communicated on a facetoface basis. The
被引用 946 次相關文章全部共 35 個版本, 提供的 [PDF]

Some consequences of e-mail vs. facetoface communication in experiment

N Frohlich… – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 1998 – Elsevier
be that when there is substantial substance to communicate and debate because subjects face a complex decision, facetoface interaction helps establish what both individual and group interests dictate. The act of talking with one another may reveal the underlying dilemma.
被引用 78 次相關文章全部共 11 個版本;  jku.at 提供的 [PDF]

Do economists make bad citizens?

RH Frank, TD Gilovich… – The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1996 – JSTOR
In naturally occurring social dilemmas, facetoface promises are sometimes an option, sometimes not. But when combined with our survey of charitable giving and the results of our prisoner’s dilemma experiments-as well as parallel findings reported by Marwell and Ames (1981
被引用 181 次相關文章全部共 13 個版本unimc.it 提供的 [PDF]

M Shubik – Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1970 – JSTOR
interaction. Third parties and writ- ten documents, as well as the avoidance of individual facetoface confrontation, are often used to remove sociopsychological factors. Let us return to our specific analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. When
被引用 86 次相關文章全部共 6 個版本auth.gr 提供的 [PDF]

The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face

yinung: 看一些 smile 的照片後, 再進行實驗

JPW Scharlemann, CC Eckel, A Kacelnik… – Journal of Economic …, 2001 – Elsevier
Choosing the cooperative strategy is risky, because cheaters can always take advantage of the cooperator. In a prisoner’s dilemma game, defecting leaves the cheater better off and makes the cooperator worse off. In an exchange relationship the same is true.
被引用 139 次相關文章全部共 14 個版本; psu.edu 提供的 [PDF]


A prisoner’s dilemma experiment on cooperation with people and human-like computers.

S Kiesler, L Sproull… – Journal of Personality and Social …, 1996 – psycnet.apa.org
Andreoni and Miller (1993) obtained moderately high coop- eration rates by having participants play a prisoner’s dilemma game with an acquaintance of the 3 As would be expected in the absence of visibility and facetoface communication, cooperation rates are lower in these
被引用 106 次相關文章全部共 11 個版本nagoya-u.ac.jp 提供的 [PDF]

與 end-game effect 有關

Normann and Wallace (2012, IJGT) The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment

此文提到其它 end-game 的文獻:(最早?) Morehous (1966), Axelrod (1984), Murnighan and Roth (1983), Holt (1985)

Andreoni and John H. Miller (1993) Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

已注意到 end-game 但避談 (用刪去最後樣本來處理)

Wichman, Harvey. 1970. ‘‘Effects of Isolation and Communication on Cooperation in a Two-Person Game.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 16:114–20.


One comment on “PD game 相關文獻回顧 (以合作為觀點)

  1. 引用通告: The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment | 行為 & 經濟實驗文獻注 (備忘) by 楊奕農



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