Literature on Experiemnts on Ultimatum Game in Google scholar

Information in ultimatum games: An experimental study

RTA Croson – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1996 – Elsevier
Author Keywords: Experiment; Ultimatum game; Fairness; Uncertainty; Framing;
Contingent weighting. JEL classification codes: C9; C72. Article Outline. • References.
Journal of Economic Behavior Organisation ELSEVIER Vol.

Ultimatums in two-person bargaining with one-sided uncertainty: Offer games

A Rapoport… – International Journal of Game Theory, 1996 – Springer
demand games, our main purpose is to assess the effects of the amount of uncertainty that the
Receiver has about the size of the pie on both the Sender’s offers and the Receiver’s replies.
For this purpose, we designed a between-subject ultimatum game experiment with three

Ultimatums in two-person bargaining with one-sided uncertainty: Demand games

A Rapoport, JA Sundali… – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 1996 – Elsevier
and the previous investigation of offer games by Rapoport and Sundali (RS) is to assess the effects
of Receiver’s uncertainty about the A recent experiment by Eckel and Grossman (1992) uncovered
gender differences in a variant of the ultimatum game with complete

Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games

R Croson, T Boles… – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2003 – Elsevier
In most ultimatum game experiments, offers are much larger than predicted and not all offers
are accepted. In addition to giving responders outside options, our experiment deviates from the
traditional ultimatum game by incorporating two-sided imperfect information.

Two-level ultimatum bargaining with incomplete information: An experimental study

W Güth, S Huck… – The Economic Journal, 1996 – JSTOR
Acceptance means that Y and Z proceed as in a usual ultimatum game with Y proposing how
to used a ‘continuum’ of cake sizes4 to study the effects of the amount of uncertainty. In the
experiment of Mitzkewitz and Nagal both amounts were equal, namely 2. ( Royal Economic

2012.11.09 新增

Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study

W Güth, E Van Damme – Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1998 – Elsevier
This paper reports on an experimental study of ultimatum bargaining situations in which an
inactive third player is present. The proposerXsuggests an allocation (x, y, z) on how to
divide a cake betweenX, Y, andZ. A messagemthat (partially) reveals this proposal is sent …

Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games

R Croson, T Boles, JK Murnighan – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2003 – Elsevier
In most models of bargaining, costless and unverifiable lies about private information and
incredible threats about future actions are considered cheap talk and do not impact
outcomes. In practice, however, this type of talk is often an integral part of bargaining. This

Two-level ultimatum bargaining with incomplete information: An experimental study

W Güth, S Huck, P Ockenfels – The Economic Journal, 1996 – JSTOR
In a two-level ultimatum game one player offers an amount to two other players who then, in
the case of acceptance, divide this amount by playing an ultimatum game. The first offer has
to be accepted by the second proposer. Only the first proposer knew the true cake size

Strategy and fairness in social decision making: Sometimes it pays to be powerless

E Van Dijk, R Vermunt – Journal of experimental social psychology, 2000 – Elsevier
Building on the social utility model, the present article investigates the importance of
absolute and comparative payoffs in social decision making. In two experimental studies, we
compared offers in Ultimatum games with offers in Dictator games. Results suggest that

From ultimatum bargaining to dictatorship—An experimental study of four games varying in veto power

W Güth, S Huck – Metroeconomica, 1997 – Wiley Online Library
ABSTRACT Inspired by Bolton and Zwick (1995) we study four different games, namely the
ultimatum and dictator game as well as the two games in which a veto (non-acceptance) of
the responder implies that only one of the two players does not receive the proposed

Strategy and fairness in social decision making: Sometimes it pays to be powerless

E Van Dijk, R Vermunt – Journal of experimental social psychology, 2000 – Elsevier
Building on the social utility model, the present article investigates the importance of
absolute and comparative payoffs in social decision making. In two experimental studies, we
compared offers in Ultimatum games with offers in Dictator games. Results suggest that

Responder behavior in ultimatum offer games with incomplete information

S Huck – Journal of Economic Psychology, 1999 – Elsevier
In ultimatum offer games with incomplete information a chance move determines a monetary
amount which has to be distributed. In the games studied here the proposer always learns
the outcome of the chance move whereas the responder only knows the priors. The

On perceptions of fairness: The role of valuations, outside options, and information in ultimatum bargaining games

PM Schmitt – Experimental Economics, 2004 – Springer
This study examines fairness perceptions in ultimatum bargaining games with asymmetric
payoffs, outside options, and different information states. Fairness perceptions were
dependent on treatment conditions. Specifically, when proposers had higher chip values,

Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power

T Gehrig, W Güth, V Levati, R Levinsky… – Journal of Economic …, 2007 – Elsevier
We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when
accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers
are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by

Fairness considerations when I know more than you do: Developmental comparisons

S Overgaauw, B Güroğlu, EA Crone – Frontiers in Psychology, 2012 – frontiersin.org
The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a valuable paradigm to study fairness considerations. Here, we
tested developmental differences between altruistic and strategic motivations in fairness
considerations using a version of the UG with hidden conditions. Participants were

Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information on the Side of the Prosper: An experimental Study

R Nagel, R Harstad – … Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, 2004 – dialnet.unirioja.es
Resumen: In this paper we study ultimatum games with incomplete information on the side
of the proposer, which are repeated against changing opponents. The games have the
same subgame equilibrium outcome as its complete information version. A proposer has

以下為回顧性文章:

Anomalies: The ultimatum game

RH Thaler – The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1988 – JSTOR
Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) ran an experiment which is very similar to the ultimatum game.
(‘What would happen in an ultimatum game with c = $1000, or $100,000? None of us have
the research funds to run this experiment, so we can only guess.
被引用 509 次相關文章全部共 27 個版本

Anomalies: Ultimatums, dictators and manners

C Camerer… – The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995 – JSTOR
Context Effects Subjects in interpersonal experiments like the ultimatum game may be influenced
by all kinds of factors: the wording of the instructions, the identity of the experimenters, whether
the experiment is thought to be “economics" or “psychology," and so forth.

An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining

W Güth, R Schmittberger… – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 1982 – Elsevier
By a special experiment it was investigated how the demands of subjects as player 1 are related
to their acceptance decisions as player 2. Econometrica, 17 (1948), pp. 101–104. Stone, 1958
JJ Stone, An experiment in bargaining games. Econometrica, 26 (1958), pp.
GIlth, W., 1993, On ultimatum bargaining games – A personal review, (Tilburg University, Center for Economic
Research, Germany) Report No. 9317.
Gihb, WSchmittberger,
R. and B. Schwarze, 1982, An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 367-388.
Giith, W.Tietz, R., 1990, Ultimatum bargaining behavior: A survey and comparison of experimental results,
Journal of Economic Psychology, 11,417449.

An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining

W Güth, R Schmittberger… – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 1982 – Elsevier
Abstract There are many experimental studies of bargaining behavior, but suprisingly
enough nearly no attempt has been made to investigate the so-called ultimatum bargaining
behavior experimentally. The special property of ultimatum bargaining games is that on

Ultimatum bargaining behavior:: A survey and comparison of experimental results

W Guth… – Journal of Economic Psychology, 1990 – Elsevier
Abstract In an ultimatum bargaining game players 1 and 2 can distribute a positive amount
of money in the following way: first, player 1 determines his demand which player 2 can then
either accept or induce conflict, ie player 2 faces the ultimatum either to accept player 1’s

On ultimatum bargaining experiments–A personal review

W Güth – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1995 – Elsevier
This review of ultimatum bargaining experiments concentrates on studies in which the
author was actively involved. The basic game situation is either the ultimatum game or
multiperiod-ultimatum bargaining. We outline a behavioral theory of ultimatum bargaining

2012.11.09 新增

The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons

J Brandts, G Charness – Experimental Economics, 2011 – Springer
Abstract In this paper, we present a first survey of the literature regarding whether the
strategy method, in which a responder makes conditional decisions for each possible
information set, leads to different experimental results than does the more standard direct-
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