Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate

Kessler, Judd B., and Alvin E. Roth. 2012. “Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate." American Economic Review, 102(5): 2018–47. DOI:10.1257/aer.102.5.2018; Download Data Set

==noted by yinung==

哇! 器管捐贈也可以進行 lab 行為實驗來評估等候名單優先序之政策。

又見 Alvin Roth 的新作。不過除了實驗之外, 此文還建立了一個 simple model 理論模型來討論, 難怪可以上 AER…

器管捐贈註冊 (registry) 可以視為公共財 (因為 no medically eligible candidate can be excluded under present US law), …In other words, registering to be an organ donor resembles a public good ex ante that is a private good ex post. … the allocation rules allow for nondonors to be excluded (or to have a smaller probability of receiving an organ), effectively turning the registry into a club good…

分配法則將 public good 轉為 club good, 故可提高捐贈之意願…

==Abstract==

Organ donations from deceased donors provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor and investigate how changes in the management of organ waiting lists might impact donations. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration. (JEL C91, D64, I11)

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