Ultimatum bargaining behavior: A survey and comparison of experimental results

Werner Güth, and Reinhard Tietz (1990) “Ultimatum bargaining behavior:: A survey and comparison of experimental results." Journal of Economic Psychology, Volume 11, Issue 3, September 1990, Pages 417–449. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-4870(90)90021-Z. (PDF from EconPaper)

==notes by yinung==

==original Abstract==

In an ultimatum bargaining game players 1 and 2 can distribute a positive amount of money in the following way: first, player 1 determines his demand which player 2 can then either accept or induce conflict, i.e. player 2 faces the ultimatum either to accept player 1’s proposal or to have no agreement at all. Experimentally observed ultimatum bargaining decisions with amounts ranging from 0.50 to 100 German marks are statistically analysed. The demands of player 1 are compared with the acceptance behavior of player 2 with the help of consistency tests in which a subject has to decide in the position of both players. Finally, we consider ultimatum bargaining games with more than just one round where, except for the final round, nonacceptance does not cause conflict but another round of ultimatum bargaining for a smaller cake.



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