Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment

yinung: 哈哈… 怠工 (工作偷懶) 行為被標籤化, 可以降低怠工?
Christine Harbring and Bernd Irlenbusch (2011) “Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment," Management Science, 57, 4 :611-627.; DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1296 ; (full PDF)

==original Abstract==

Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations, reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior are almost nonexistent. We study sabotage (怠工,破壞活動,破壞(vi.)從事破壞活動(vt.)妨害,破壞) in repeated tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and observe that effort and sabotage are higher for higher wage spreads. Additionally, we find that also in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name “sabotage.” Communication among principal and agents can curb sabotage when they agree on flat prize structures and increased output. If sabotage is not possible, the principals choose tournament incentives more often.

 ==cited by==

(2012) “Competition Between Organizational Groups: Its Impact on Altruistic and Antisocial Motivations." Management Science May 2012 vol. 58 no. 5 948-960.

 ==maybe related==

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