有關 moral hazard and adverse selection 的實驗文獻

整理中…

Keser, C., & Willinger, M. (2002). Experiments on moral hazard and incentives: Reciprocity and surplus sharing. The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications, 293-312.

Testing for adverse selection in insurance markets

Cohen, A., & Siegelman, P. (2010). Testing for adverse selection in insurance markets. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 77(1), 39-84. uc3m.es 提供的 [PDF]
這一篇是回顧實證文獻, 有含 natural experiments 或 randomized experiments, 例如 RAND Health Insurance Experiment

A Model of Moral Hazard with Inequity Aversion: An Experimental Test

Chernomaz, K. (2011). A Model of Moral Hazard with Inequity Aversion: An Experimental Test. Available at SSRN 1801006.

An experimental study of insurance decisions

Schoemaker, P. J., & Kunreuther, H. C. (1979). An experimental study of insurance decisions. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 603-618.

Exaggerated risk: Prospect theory and probability weighting in risky choice.

Kusev, P., van Schaik, P., Ayton, P., Dent, J., & Chater, N. (2009). Exaggerated risk: Prospect theory and probability weighting in risky choice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35(6), 1487.

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