An Experimental Study on the Effect of Ambiguity in a Coordination Game

An Experimental Study on the Effect of Ambiguity in a Coordination Game
Date: 2014
By: David Kelsey (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)
Sara le Roux (Department of Economics, Oxford Brookes University)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exe:wpaper:1410&r=net
We report an experimental test of the influence of ambiguity on behaviour in a coordination game. We study the behaviour of subjects in the presence of ambiguity and attempt to determine whether they prefer to choose an ambiguity safe option. We fi?nd that this strategy, which is not played in either Nash equilibrium or iterated dominance equilibrium, is indeed chosen quite frequently. This provides evidence that ambiguity aversion infl?uences behaviour in games. While the behaviour of the Row Player is consistent with randomising between her strategies, the Column Player shows a marked preference for avoiding ambiguity and choosing his ambiguity-safe strategy.
Keywords: Ambiguity; Choquet expected utility; coordination game; Ellsberg urn, experimental economics.
JEL: C72 C91 D03 D81

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