Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes

Watanabe, N., & Muto, S. (2008). Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes. International journal of game theory, 37(4), 505-523. [working paper 版]

JEL Classification Numbers: C71; D45; D43
Keywords: licensing, coalition structure, bargaining set, core

==noted by yi-nung==

有簡要的 patent licensing problem 的文獻回顧:

Patent licensing problems in oligopolistic markets had been studied only by non-cooperative mechanisms; upfront fee or royalty in Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986), and auction in Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986). After these seminal papers, the main concern of researchers was focused on the optimal licensing mechanism that maximizes the licensor’s revenue from a patented technology (See, e.g., Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992), Muto (1993), Sen (2005) and Sen and Tauman (2007)). On the other hand, licensing agreements are basically contract terms signed by licensors and licensees as negotiation results. This paper hence seeks into the original and practical viewpoint and studies patent licensing as bargaining outcomes.
On this agenda, Tauman and Watanabe (2007, hereafter TW) recently provided the licensor’s payoff in the non-cooperative auction game with an interpretation from a cooperative viewpoint. Their analysis was, however, limited to the asymptotic equivalence. In practice, however, each industry has a finite number of firms operating there. For such a finite industry, Driessen, Muto and Nakayama (1992, hereafter DMN) studied a cooperative game on information trading which is similar to patent licensing。
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