Corruption in Committees: An Experimental Study of Information Aggregation through Voting

==noted by yinung==

這和我之前構想過的 committee (group) 決策行為之實驗有關
委員會中, 有專家和非專家。在專家公正的情況下,非專家棄權是正確的決定; 但若專家可能有 bias, 則非專家 (uninformed) 的投票可以抵消 biased 決策的形
Q1: 本文所提之 information efficiency 定義為何?
Individuals often vote in situations where they have less than perfect information about the choices before them. Moreover, information is typically asymmetrically distributed, where somevoters have better knowledge about the choices than others.

one norm is to delegate to the so-called experts, the individuals who are known to have better information
關鍵投票 vote is pivotal, either forces a tie or breaks a tie.
the uninformed voter’s participation has resulted in a worse outcome.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999), in a seminal set of papers, pointed out that voters with low information levels should avoid this “swing voter’s curse " and rationally abstain, delegating the choice to fully informed voters.
Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2008, 2010) Önd support for such “delegation through abstention."(以棄權方式來授權)
Using experiments, Morton and Tyran show that the equilibria with delegation through abstention are attractive to voters. Even when it is informationally efficient for all voters to participate, about half the time less informed voters abstain, delegating thedecision to more informed voters. (讓專業決定: let the experts decide)
Date: 2014-09-07
By: Rebecca Morton (Department of Politics, New York University)
Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, Copenhagen University)
We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that non-experts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention (棄權?) when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention, when the probability of corrupt experts is low, actually increases information efficiency in committee decision-making. However, if the probability of corrupt experts is large, the effect is not sufficient to offset the mechanical effect of decreased information efficiency due to corrupt experts. Our results demonstrate that the norm of “letting the expert decide” in committee voting is influenced by the probability of corrupt experts, and that influence can have, to a limited extent, a positive effect on information efficiency.
Keywords: Information aggregation, Voting, Asymmetric information, Swing voter’s curse
JEL: C92 D71 D72 D81 D82


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