A Fine Rule From a Brutish World? An Experiment on Endogenous Punishment Institution and Trust

==notes by yinung==

想法: 集體懲罰 (連坐法, 本文稱之為 collective punishment mechanism) versus 集體獎勵 對集體決策和個體決策之影響?

可以適用在小朋友身上? 或球隊成員身上 ==> 對幼童教育、企業組織、軍隊等不同主體之影響?

Q: 作者說, 連坐法顯著 increase trustworthiness, 且 to a lesser extent also trust; 不知 trustworthiness 和 trust 之間定義有何差異?

Date: 2015-09
By: H. Sun
M. Bigoni
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1031&r=net
By means of a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment mechanism within a one-shot binary trust game. The experiment comprises three games. In the first one, the only equilibrium strategy is not to trust, and not to reciprocate. In the second we exogenously introduce a sanctioning rule that imposes on untrustworthy second-movers a penalty proportional to the number of those who reciprocate trust. This generates a second equilibrium where everybody trusts and reciprocates. In the third game, the collective punishment mechanism is adopted through majority-voting. In line with the theory, we find that the exogenous introduction of the punishment mechanism significantly increases trustworthiness, and to a lesser extent also trust. However, in the third game the majority of subjects vote against it: subjects seem to be unable to endogenously adopt an institution which, when exogenously imposed, proves to be efficiency enhancing.
JEL: C72 C92 D72

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