[link to elsevier]
==noted by yinung==
這是 Harrison et al. (2005) 對 Holt and Laury (Risk aversion and incentive effects ,2002, AER) 這一篇的挑戰:
Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury. “Risk aversion and incentive effects: New data without order effects." American Economic Review 95.3 (2005): 902-912. source: PDF [本站]
這篇是 Holt 回應 Harrison et al. (2004) 對先前發表(Holt and Laury, 2002, AER)，有無 order effects 的質礙。
payment 愈高，risk averse 愈明顯，但沒有 order effects。
==notes by yinung==
- 用這來判斷 risk averse: The average number of safe choices(查細設定?)
- 此新實驗改用 a single lotterychoice menu?
- 1st treatment(odered choices): low-pay -> high-payment (20X)
- 另外4個 (unordered) TM
- Harrison, G. W., Johnson, E., McInnes, M. M., & Rutström, E. E. (2005). Risk aversion and incentive effects: Comment. American Economic Review, 95(3), 897-901.
- HOLT, Charles A.; LAURY, Susan K. Risk aversion and incentive effects. American economic review, 2002, 92.5: 1644-1655.
As little is yet known about the influence of facial trustworthiness and gender on fairness consideration in decision making, we examined whether a proposer’s facial trustworthiness and gender would influence a responder’s willingness to accept the proposer’s monetary offer. Participants in our study were 79 Chinese undergraduate students (responders) who played the Ultimatum Game with 4 proposers (2 male and 2 female) with different facial trustworthiness. As predicted, responders were more willing to accept offers from trustworthy-looking proposers. We found that facial trustworthiness was a more salient cue when proposers were men than when they were women and, furthermore, that the students’ emotional response to faces was correlated with their fairness consideration. Considering the implicit influence of facial trustworthiness and gender on decision making, potentially there are broader implications of our findings for certain business activities, such as negotiation and bargaining.
Crawford, Vincent P. “New directions for modelling strategic behavior: Game-theoretic models of communication, coordination, and cooperation in economic relationships." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30.4 (2016): 131-50.
In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory’s principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking" and “learning" rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments
S. Palan, GIMS-Software for asset market experiments. J. Behav. Exp. Finance 5, 1–14, (2015). Medline doi:10.1016/j.jbef.2015.02.001 (可免費閱讀)
GIMS 是架在 z-Tree 上，專門用來跑財務資產市場 (又稱 double auction asset market) 的實驗平台軟體，採開放源碼 (open source) 授權。
此文亦介紹、比較了其它相關的財務市場實驗平台軟體，參見文中的 Table 1。
- EconPort MarketLink(based on Java and experiments can be run over the internet)
- Flex-E-Markets(not open source)
- GIMS(based on z-Tree)
- jMarkets (open-source software based on Java)
- Rotman Interactive Trader (非免費)
- SoPHIE Labs (非免費)
C. F. Camerer, A. Dreber, E. Forsell, T.-H. Ho, J. Huber, M. Johannesson, M. Kirchler, J. Almenberg, A. Altmejd, T. Chan, E. Heikensten, F. Holzmeister, T. Imai, S. Isaksson, G. Nave, T. Pfeiffer, M. Razen, H. Wu. Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics. Science, 2016; DOI: 10.1126/science.aaf0918
終於有人系統性地檢視經濟實驗, 雖然只挑 AER 和 QJE 所發表的, 但經得起「重覆實驗」來驗證結果的研究, 才符合科學的精神…
|By:||Avi Weiss (Bar-Ilan University)
The theory of money typically ignores the fact that the mode of market interaction arises endogenously, and simply assumes a decentralized, bilateral exchange process. However, endogenizing the organization of trade is critical for understanding the conditions that lend themselves to the development of money as a mode of exchange. To study this, we develop a “travelling game” to study the spontaneous emergence of different systems of exchange theoretically and experimentally. Players located on separate “islands” can either stay and trade on their island, or pay a cost to trade elsewhere. Earnings rise with the frequency of trade but fall with the frequency of travel. Decentralized and centralized markets can both emerge in equilibrium. The latter maximize consumption frequencies and are socially efficient; the former minimize travel cost and require the use of a medium of exchange. In the laboratory, a centralized market more frequently emerges when subjects perform diversified economic tasks, and when they interact in large groups and cannot be sure whether they will meet the same counterpart in later periods. The experiment shows that to understand the emergence of monetary systems it is important to amend the theory of money such that the market structure is endogenized.
|Keywords:||endogenous institutions, macroeconomic experiments, matching, coordination, markets, money.|
|By:||Tiziana Medda (University of Cagliari)
Vittorio Pelligra (University of Cagliari)
Tommaso Reggiani (LUMSA University)
One of the most common criticisms about the external validity of lab experiments in economics concerns the representativeness of participants usually considered in these studies. The ever-increasing number of experiments and the prevalent location of research centers in university campuses produced a peculiar category of subjects: Students with high level of laboratory experience built through repeated participations in experimental sessions. We investigate whether the experience accumulated in this way biases subjects’ behaviour in a set of simple games widely used to study social preferences (Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, and Prisoner’s Dilemma Game). Our main finding shows that subjects with a high level of experience in lab experiments do not behave in a significantly different way from novices.
|Keywords:||Experimental Methodology, External Validity, Experience, Lab Experiment|
|JEL:||D03 D83 C91 C92|