Roth, Alvin E. “The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics." Econometrica 70.4 (2002): 1341-1378. [PDF] [**]
Economists have lately been called upon not only to analyze markets, but to design them. Market design involves a responsibility for detail, a need to deal with all of a market’s complications, not just its principle features. Designers therefore cannot work only with the simple conceptual models used for theoretical insights into the general working of markets. Instead, market design calls for an engineering approach. Drawing primarily on the design of the entry level labor market for American doctors (the National Resident Matching Program), and of the auctions of radio spectrum conducted by the Federal Communications Commission, this paper makes the case that experimental and computational economics are natural complements to game theory in the work of design. The paper also argues that some of the challenges facing both markets involve dealing with related kinds of complementarities, and that this suggests an agenda for future theoretical research.
KEYWORDS:Market design, game theory, experimental economics, computational economics
Harrison, G. W., Johnson, E., McInnes, M. M., & Rutström, E. E. (2005). Risk aversion and incentive effects: Comment. American Economic Review, 95(3), 897-901. [PDF] ucsd.edu ; [PDF] ucsd.edu;[本站PDF]
==noted by yinung==
這是 Harrison et al. (2005) 對 Holt and Laury (Risk aversion and incentive effects ,2002, AER) 這一篇的挑戰:
Harrison et al. (2005, AER) 對 Holt and Laury (2002, AER) 質疑有「order effects」(An order effect occurs when prior experience with one task affects behavior in a subsequent task., p.897) 並重新做實驗，比較1x10x 和只有 10x 的結果，如下圖。
不過，Harrison et al. (2005) 在畫下圖的時候，不是用實際的數字，而是用 ordered probit 預測結果畫的
Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury. “Risk aversion and incentive effects: New data without order effects." American Economic Review 95.3 (2005): 902-912. source: PDF [本站]
這篇是 Holt 回應 Harrison et al. (2004) 對先前發表(Holt and Laury, 2002, AER)，有無 order effects 的質礙。
payment 愈高，risk averse 愈明顯，但沒有 order effects。
==notes by yinung==
- 用這來判斷 risk averse: The average number of safe choices(查細設定?)
- 此新實驗改用 a single lotterychoice menu?
- 1st treatment(odered choices): low-pay -> high-payment (20X)
- 另外4個 (unordered) TM
- Harrison, G. W., Johnson, E., McInnes, M. M., & Rutström, E. E. (2005). Risk aversion and incentive effects: Comment. American Economic Review, 95(3), 897-901.
- HOLT, Charles A.; LAURY, Susan K. Risk aversion and incentive effects. American economic review, 2002, 92.5: 1644-1655.
Wu, Yujia; Gao, Li; Wan, Yan; Wang, Fang; Xu, Sihua; Yang, Zijing; Rao, Hengyi; Pan, Yu (2018). Effects of facial trustworthiness and gender on decision making in the Ultimatum Game. Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal
(3), 499-516. (DOI: https://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.6966
As little is yet known about the influence of facial trustworthiness and gender on fairness consideration in decision making, we examined whether a proposer’s facial trustworthiness and gender would influence a responder’s willingness to accept the proposer’s monetary offer. Participants in our study were 79 Chinese undergraduate students (responders) who played the Ultimatum Game with 4 proposers (2 male and 2 female) with different facial trustworthiness. As predicted, responders were more willing to accept offers from trustworthy-looking proposers. We found that facial trustworthiness was a more salient cue when proposers were men than when they were women and, furthermore, that the students’ emotional response to faces was correlated with their fairness consideration. Considering the implicit influence of facial trustworthiness and gender on decision making, potentially there are broader implications of our findings for certain business activities, such as negotiation and bargaining.
Crawford, Vincent P. “New directions for modelling strategic behavior: Game-theoretic models of communication, coordination, and cooperation in economic relationships." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30.4 (2016): 131-50.
In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory’s principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking" and “learning" rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments
S. Palan, GIMS-Software for asset market experiments. J. Behav. Exp. Finance 5, 1–14, (2015). Medline doi:10.1016/j.jbef.2015.02.001 (可免費閱讀)
GIMS 是架在 z-Tree 上，專門用來跑財務資產市場 (又稱 double auction asset market) 的實驗平台軟體，採開放源碼 (open source) 授權。
此文亦介紹、比較了其它相關的財務市場實驗平台軟體，參見文中的 Table 1。
- EconPort MarketLink(based on Java and experiments can be run over the internet)
- Flex-E-Markets(not open source)
- GIMS(based on z-Tree)
- jMarkets (open-source software based on Java)
- Rotman Interactive Trader (非免費)
- SoPHIE Labs (非免費)
C. F. Camerer, A. Dreber, E. Forsell, T.-H. Ho, J. Huber, M. Johannesson, M. Kirchler, J. Almenberg, A. Altmejd, T. Chan, E. Heikensten, F. Holzmeister, T. Imai, S. Isaksson, G. Nave, T. Pfeiffer, M. Razen, H. Wu. Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics. Science, 2016; DOI: 10.1126/science.aaf0918
終於有人系統性地檢視經濟實驗, 雖然只挑 AER 和 QJE 所發表的, 但經得起「重覆實驗」來驗證結果的研究, 才符合科學的精神…