新經濟學範式告別曼昆?

yinung: 終於有新式經濟學教科書問世了… 用三個觀點重新描述「數據時代」的經濟學。

原文網址:https://kknews.cc/finance/nnxg8.html

…有一本全新的《經濟學》面世,曼昆《經濟學原理》突然面臨強有力的挑戰。這就是阿西莫格魯、萊布森與李斯特合著的《經濟學》。這三人都是當下紅得發紫的經濟學家,也都已在多個領域做出突出貢獻,被認為是未來數年諾貝爾經濟學獎理所當然的候選人…

三人版《經濟學》比曼昆的《經濟學原理》還薄了許多。仔細一讀,《經濟學》確實增添了大量三人自身的研究成果,但同時也刪減了大量經典內容。也就是說,三人都認為那些內容不再是探索未來經濟學所必須掌握的知識。刪去教科書里的經典內容,比補充內容需要更多的勇氣。

他們三人沒有拋出曼昆式的「十大原理」,但也開宗明義地提出了「三個渾然一體的主題」,分別是優化(optimization)、均衡(equilibrium)和經驗主義(empiricism)

 

 

廣告

Expert Information and Majority Decisions

==notes by yinung==
又出現有關 group decision 的研究:
* 專家意見的影響 (在人數多的委員會不佳)
*多數決
Date: 2015-09-23
By: Kohei Kawamura
Vasileios Vlaseros
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:esedps:261&r=net
This paper shows theoretically and experimentally that hearing expert opinions can be a double-edged sword for collective decision making. We present a majoritarian voting game of common interest where committee members receive not only private information, but also expert information that is more accurate than private information and observed by all members. In theory, there are Bayesian Nash equilibria where the committee members’ voting strategy incorporates both types of information and access to expert information enhances the efficiency of the majority decision. However, there is also a class of potentially inefficient equilibria where a supermajority always follow expert information and the majority decision does not aggregate private information. In the laboratory, the majority decisions and the subjects’ voting behaviour were largely consistent with those in the class of inefficient equilibria. We found a large efficiency loss due to the presence of expert information especially when the committee size was large. We suggest that it may be desirable for expert information to be revealed only to a subset of committee members.
Keywords: committee decision making, voting experiment, expert information, strategic voting
JEL: C92 D72 D82

Licensing Royalty Rates (a book)

Battersby, Gregory J., and Charles W. Grimes. Licensing royalty rates. Aspen Publishers Online, 2012. link to amazon; link to goole book;

(APA form)
Battersby, G. J., & Grimes, C. W. (2012). Licensing royalty rates. Aspen Publishers Online.

 

Book Description

Publication Date: February 21, 2011 | ISBN-10: 1454801581 | ISBN-13: 978-1454801580
Knowing the “going" royalty rate for virtually any product is as simple as reaching for the newly published Licensing Royalty Rates, 2011 Edition . This information-packed report details the royalty rates for over 1,500 products and services in ten lucrative licensed product categories;art, celebrity, character and entertainment, collegiate, corporate, designer, event, sports, nonprofit and music.Setting a royalty rate too high can scare away potential licensees, while accepting a lower rate can cost licensors hundreds of thousands of dollars. Licensing Royalty Rates, 2011 Edition provides all the information you need to calculate the right rate every time.

The data in Licensing Royalty Rates is compiled using information from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. After careful review by a blue-ribbon panel of expert licensing consultants uniquely qualified to know what the appropriate rate range is for specific properties in each licensing category, the information is organized into four time-saving sections that give researchers fast access to comprehensive statistical and analytical data:

  • Royalty rate listing alphabetically by licensed product provides a detailed alphabetical listing of products and their suggested rate range across all product categories.
  • Royalty rate listing by international trademark class lets you quickly identify subtle royalty rate differences between similar products within specific international trademark classes.
  • Checklist of licensed products and services offers a quick-reference to products with a high potential for licensing.
  • Comprehensive list of licensed products and services presents a detailed list of all surveyed products and services within a trademark class for preparing intent-to-use trademark applications.

This detailed information gives both beginning and more experienced licensing professionals the confidence needed to negotiate the maximum allowable rate regardless of the product, the market and the parameters of the specific deal itself.

Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction

Camerer, Colin. Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton University Press, 2003.

==notes by yinung==

Camerer  (Caltech ) 的書

===有關 beauty contest===

在這個遊戲中,每一個人要猜一個介於 0 – 100 的數字。
誰猜的數字,最接近所有數字之「平均數 x p 」者獲勝

在文獻中 p = 2/3, 或 0.7  。

理論 (p.210), 以 p=2/3 例 (p=0.7 下之點為 100, 70, 49, 34, 24, 17,12,8, 5.76 , 4.03

如果每一個人的選擇, 是均等分配於 0-100, 則平均數 = 50

因此 level-1 thinking 者應該選 50*2/3 = 33 (one-step of reasoning)

因此 level-2 thinking 者應該選 33*2/3 = 22 (two-step of reasoning)

因此 level-3 thinking 者應該選 22*2/3 = 14.8

… 以此類推

選的數字 (67, 100]  (表示預期其它所有人皆選 100) violate first-order iterated dominance

選 (45,67] 符合 a player obeying one step of dominance, but not two.

選 (29,44] 符合 a player obeying two step of dominance, but not three.

Slonim (2001) 有 new player 進來的實驗:

引文
… It turns out that the experienced players use their experience wisely… they choose higher numbers when the new players arrive, and win almost all the time. But their edge disappears after one period.

References

最早的實驗 Nagel (1995, AER)

第一篇重覆實驗 Ho, Camerer and Weigelt (1998, AER)

很聰明地將 p<1, 再加上 p>1 的實驗進行比對, 難怪可以上 AER (當然不只如此)

文獻回顧類 Nagel (1999) (yinung: 在一本書中)

  • Ho, Teck-Hua, Colin Camerer, and Keith Weigelt. “Iterated dominance and iterated best response in experimental" p-beauty contests"." The American Economic Review 88.4 (1998): 947-969. caltech.edu 提供的 [PDF]
==

Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?

Alvin E. Roth (2010) “Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?" Forthcoming in Fréchette, Guillaume and Andrew Schotter (editors) The Methods of Modern Experimental Economics, Oxford University Press. harvard.edu 提供的 [PDF]

 

Introduction

The question that is the title of this essay already suggests that experimental economics has at least reached a sufficient state of maturity that we can try to take stock of its progress, and consider how that progress matches the anticipations we may have had for the field several decades ago, when it and we were younger. So it will help to begin by reconstructing what some of those anticipations were.

When I surveyed parts of experimental economics in Roth (1986-7,1988), I hoped that experimentation would facilitate and improve three kinds of work in economics, which I called Speaking to Theorists, Searching for Facts, and Whispering in the Ears of Princes. By speaking to theorists I meant testing the empirical scope and content of theories (including especially formal theories that might depend on factors hard to observe or control outside the lab), and in particular testing how well and on what domains their quantitative and qualitative predictions might serve as (at least) useful approximations. By searching for facts I meant exploring empirical regularities that may not have been predicted by existing theories, and might even contradict them, but whose contours, once they had begun to be mapped by experiments, could form the basis for new knowledge and new theories. And by whispering in the ears of princes I meant formulating reliable advice, as well as communicating, justifying, and defending it.

Of course, whether experimental economics is living up to its promise could also be a question about how experimental economists are doing at developing a body of experimental methods … (see harvard.edu 提供的 [PDF])

Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle

Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler  (1995) “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, No. 1 (Feb., 1995), pp. 73-92. ; doi: 10.2307/2118511 ;nyu.edu 提供的 [PDF]

==notes by yinung==

Prospect theory, myopic loss aversion (MLA) 和 equity premium puzzle 的重要文獻

==original Abstract==

The equity premium puzzle refers to the empirical fact that stocks have outperformed bonds over the last century by a surprisingly large margin. We offer a new explanation based on two behavioral concepts. First, investors are assumed to be “loss averse,” meaning that they are distinctly more sensitive to losses than to gains. Second, even long-term investors are assumed to evaluate their portfolios frequently. We dub this combination “myopic loss aversion.” Using simulations, we find that the size of the equity premium is consistent with the previously estimated parameters of prospect theory if investors evaluate their portfolios annually.

經濟和心理學實驗之一般差異

引自: Daniel Friedman and Alessandra Cassar, Economics Lab: An Intensive Course in Experimental Economics, Routledge, London and New York (2004) pp. 248

原始文獻:

Hertwig, R. and Ortman, A. (2001) “Experimental practices in economics: a challenge for psychologist? ” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24:383–403. link to PDF

兩學門間有4 種主要之差異 (p.18)

  1. Script versus open-ended

  2. Repeated trials versus one-shot

  3. Salient pay

  4. Deception

主要差異項目 經濟實驗 心理實驗
實驗說明 script 強調完整之角色定義, 互動模式, 報酬如何決定
Economists (drawing on Siegel’s tradition) almost always include detailed formal written instructions for subjects defining their roles, interactions, and payoffs. Psychologists in recent decades seldom use written instructions and usually are quite casual about describing the task to the subjects.
比較敘述性
Psychologists in recent decades seldom use written instructions and usually are quite casual about describing the task to the subjects
實驗進行 受試者重覆試驗相同之情境 repeated trials
Economists since Smith (1962) typically have subjects repeat the task or interactions several times, and focus on data from later repetitions when they are sure that the subjects are fully adjusted to the environment.
受試者只進行一次實驗 one-shot Psychologists more commonly just give the subjects one shot at any particular task.
受試者報酬 以實驗參與之表現優劣支付現金
Economists almost always pay subjects in cash based on performance.
很少支付現金, 且是固定金額
Psychologists seldom pay cash, and when they do, they usually pay a flat amount unrelated to performance.
資訊真實性 幾乎不會採用誤導
Deception of any kind is taboo among experimental economists.
常故意誤導
A large fraction of social psychology experiments attempt to mislead the subjects as to the true nature of the task.

兩學門本質上之不同

Role of theory

Economics has a core theory that assumes self-interest, rationality, and equilibrium. Theory in psychology is more descriptive and eclectic. Hence, psychologists are less concerned with salient rewards, repeated trials, etc. that give economic theory a better shot.

Role of institutions

Following a suggestion by Sunder in Friedman and Sunder (1994), Figure 2.2 presents a spectrum of economic situations based on the institutional constraints. Personal preferences are the dominant influence in individual choice tasks but play a minor role for firms in strong institutions such as markets. Cognitive psychologists prefer to work at the weak institution end of the spectrum, while social psychologists study quite different social constraints. By contrast, economic analysis emphasizes the institutional constraints, as we will see in Chapter 3.

實驗說明 script open-ended
實驗進行 r r

對實驗經濟方法之批評與辯護

以下幾篇文章引自 Al Roth網頁

各種對實驗與行為經濟之批評:

幾下的文章, 待閱讀、消化與整理

原始網頁見

Various critiques of experimental and behavioral economics:

… to be continued

對實驗與行為經濟之辯護:

Falk, Armin and James J. Heckman (2009), “Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences," Science , 326, 23 October, 535-8. (詳見本站另一頁之注; 按: Heckman 為 2000年諾貝爾經濟學獎得主)

==references==

  • Ken Binmore and Avner Shaked (2010) “Experimental economics: Where next?" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 73 (2010) 87–100. link to PDF
    此篇是利用 inequality aversion 為案例來批評實驗方法,並提及 public good game、auctioning game、contract gamez。

Alvin E. Roth (艾文‧羅斯)

實驗經濟學的大師級人物: 艾文‧羅斯

艾文‧羅斯 (Alvin E. Roth) 是美國哈佛大學經濟系教授

史丹佛大學博士。著作等身,並編有 Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995), Princeton University Press. 研究專長為賽局理論、實驗經濟、和市場機制設計 (market design)。

近年主要教授課程:

Spring 2012 course in Experimental Economics (Ec 2040/HBS 4160)

Fall 2011 Market Design course (supplemented by a Market Design Blog)