The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication – i.e. who is talking with whom – on the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. According to our analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is public. When pairs of agents exchange messages privately, the players should play the Pareto dominated equilibrium and disregard communication. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only when announcing to play it is credible. When private communication is allowed, lying is prevalent, and players converge to the Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Nevertheless, at the individual level, players’ beliefs and choices tend to react to messages even when these are non-credible.
|Keywords:||cheap talk, coordination, coalitions, experiment|
|JEL:||C72 C91 D03 D83|
In most laboratory experiments concerning prosocial behavior subjects are fully informed how their decision influences the payoff of other players. Outside the laboratory, however, individuals typically have to decide without such detailed knowledge. To asses the effect of information asymmetries on prosocial behavior, we conduct a laboratory experiment with a simple non-strategic interaction. A dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We observe subjects with heterogenous social preferences. While under symmetric information only individuals with the same type of preferences transfer, under asymmetric information different types transfer at the same time. As a consequence and the main finding of our experiment, uninformed dictators behave more prosocially than informed dictators.
|Keywords:||Asymmetric Information , Prosocial Behavior , Efficiency Concern , Inequality Aversion , Dictator Game|
Reynolds, Stanley S. “Durable-goods monopoly: laboratory market and bargaining experiments." The RAND Journal of Economics (2000): 375-394. arizona.edu 提供的 [PDF]
Results from single-period monopoly experiments (nondurable environment) are compared with results from multiperiod monopoly experiments that have features of a durable-goods environment. Average prices were below the static monopoly benchmark price in all settings. Observed initial prices were higher in multiperiod experiments than in single-period experiments, in contrast to equilibrium predictions. Prices in multiperiod experiments tended to fall over time; there was less price cutting in market experiments than in bargaining experiments. There was substantial demand withholding by buyers in multiperiod experiments. A version of bounded rationality is a promising candidate for explaining deviations from equilibrium predictions.
Björn Frank (2012) “Laboratory Evidence on Face-to-Face: Why Experimental Economics is of Interest to Regional Economists." International Regional Science Review, June 13, 2012. doi: 10.1177/0160017612449017. working paper PDF; Journal Web. **；
Notes by yinung
此文提及 death of distance" (Cairncross, 2001) or “death of geography" 意思是
…the shrinking costs for transportation, especially transportation of messages’ pure in formation content.
必需有 face-to-face 溝通的原因是
… widely agreed that communication often must be face-to-face in order to be effective. But why?
1. nonverbal 和 verbal 同時發生，減少誤解(Storper and Venables, 2004; Winger, 2005, sections 4 – 6; and Hildrum, 2007, p. 469 with further references).
2. 比較有意義 （？？？待了解）
4. buzzing (流言???)
5. face-to-face 溝通成本高，可視為建立長期關係之投資
匿名實驗結果有時不具參考性，此文同意此觀點 （至少用 email 溝通知道名字）
幾個與 face-to-face 相關因素
- 即時回應之效果 and 冷淨作用 Cooling effects: effect of spontaneity (decision time) in Sec. 2
- trust 和合作受到 face-to-face 之影響 in Sec. 3
- 細節因素，如 smiling 和 eye contact 在 f2f 中之角色
..experiment on the effect of a substantive cooling off period in an experiment was invented by Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz (2008).
在 ultimatum game 中，8:2 和 5：5 的分餅被提出，看對手是否接受。24小時後，接受的決定可以被修改。餅獎金大小分別有 2，5，8 euros. Cooling off period 並未導致拒絕率大幅降低 (from 42.6% to 39.4%) ，且不顯著。但將 reward 變大 （期望值相同，用 lottery 方式），則拒絕率顯著大幅下降 fom 27.7% to 20.5%.
增加決策時間之壓力也有同樣的效果 （提高拒絕率） increased time pressure might well increase the rejection rate by Sutter, Kocher and Strauß (2003). 決策時間減少 (100秒 mm> 10 秒)，拒絕率增加從 40.3 to 78.2％。 Cappelletti, Güth and Ploner (2008) 也有類似的發現 （180秒 vs 30 秒）。情感區 (affective system) 和 (deliberative system) 在大腦中並不相同。
在 UG 中，拒絕率上升，代表效率下降。出價者將會喜歡拒絕率降低 (因此可降低 offer); 反之，回應者將喜歡拒絕率上升。故，出價者將偏好 face-to-face 溝通。不過要注意的是 UG 是單向一次 negotiation, 一般的談判會有雙向回應
建立互信 ＆ 合作
Valley, Moag and Bazerman (1998)
（註： 有時互信和合作很難區分 see ）
只有 seller 知道 V； Seller 會接受 if B>V; seller 得到 (B-V);
Buyer 只知 V～uniform(0,100), 真實 V 要等 Buyer 買到以後才知道。真實價值 ＝ 1.5V; buyer 得到 (1.5V-B);
Buyer 問 seller V=?, 但 seller 可以 lie; 不過 face-to-face 之下，seller 顯著地比較不可能 lie （face-to face 只有 1 of 14, 7% lie; 電話 55％ lie; 不匿名witten 33% lie). 有些 face-to-face 的 buyer 並沒有問 seller V；
結果發現 face-to-face 導致比較多的 Pareto improving deals.
Pareto deals (雙方皆獲益)：
face-to-face: 51.7% (out of n=21) 成交; 顯著大於 written comm. 但不顯著大於 telephone comm.
written comm.: 22.2% (未成交 52％ 接近理論值）
telephone comm.: 38.1%
Non-Pareto deals (buy’s loss):
written comm.: 25.9%
telephone comm.: 47.6%
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) PD game （應是 public good game)
5人一組玩多人 PD game 共 15 回合; 前 8 回合用 (a) 事先沒有 comm.; (b) email (c) face-to-face;
每人在每回合決定貢獻 0～10 給 group, 留下其餘。
S=5人貢獻之加總； 每人皆領回 0.4S
理論：每人皆貢獻 10， 則 S ＝ 50，每人皆領回 0.4S = 20; 若每人皆貢獻 0， 則每人只得 10；
各 treatment 之平均貢獻 (前 8回合）
(a) 沒有 comm: 2.9
(b) email: 7.6
(c) face-to-face: 9.99
Contributions in groups with previous face-to-face communication quickly collapse to the level of the e-mail-groups.
一回合就夠了？ (Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann, 2003; Bochet et al., 2006)
6人一組玩28回合的 public good game；在第 10，15，20加入 face-to-face comm.;
每一回合貢獻 x of 13 tokens; 全部人之貢獻加總= S; 每人之 Payoffs = ？？？
face-to-face comm. 有助於 maximize group welfare 在後半段實驗； Email comm. 並沒有較高的合作；但實驗前一天 email comm. 的人 face-to-face 之後，卻有類似的效果。
Bochet et al. (2006)
4人10回合的 PG game；比較 5分鐘的實驗前 face-to-face vs 第 1，4，7回合 online 討論 in a chat room；
chat room: 81.4%
但在第10回合有 drop, chat romm ->52.1%; face-to-face -> 78.1
Naquin, Kurtzberg and Belkin (2008),
玩 threshold PG game; 4 人一組；若至少有 3人 捐出 1 張餐券，則每人獲兩張 ￥7餐券 2 張；
比較 非匿名之 email 和 face-to-face 決策：
email: 35.8% of the participants 捐出
Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003)
4人一組，10回合 PG game; 其貢獻 of endowment
audio comm.: 48%
video comm: 93%
face-to-face: 97% (後兩者顯著高於前兩者)
照片 出現 10 秒： 貢獻率低於 anonymous
Scharlemann et al. (2001) 在 trust game 中，發現微笑有助於合作
Player 1 — [$1, 0.5]
Player 2 — [0.8, 1.25]
Player 1 — [1.20, 1.20]
Player 1 是受試者，Player 2 是電腦但 show 照片 (treatment 是否微笑，取自相片資料庫)，只要 Player 1 選擇 trust 策略，則電腦 (Player 2) 必定也用 trust 回應。結果發現， Player 1 之回應
沒有微笑： 55.0% 選擇 trust 策略
Burnham and Hare (2007)
4人一組，6回合 PG game (對手不重覆); 其貢獻 of endowment ~ (0, 10，相當於 2 美金), 總貢獻*2 均分給 4 人.
實驗組看到金屬臉但具有人類眼睛的影像 (MIT 發明的 “Kismet” robot), 實驗結果：
Haley and Fessler (2005)
玩 dictator game, 分$10美金, 實驗組看到眼睛圖片，對照組看到 label, 結果
Player 1 分給 Player 2
Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006) 在現地實驗中也發現，eye contact 會讓貢獻較多錢
在48位大學職員喝咖啡處貼眼睛海報 or 花海報各幾週，自願投幣奉獻 (honesty box) 金額
Frey and Bohnet (1995) 在 PD game 中讓受試者選擇合作和背叛，合作率
visual contact + talking : 78%
visual contact + no talking ： 23%
Wichman (1970) 在 PD game 中讓受試者選擇合作和背叛; 70回合，固定對手，合作率
無限制的 face-to-face: 87%
只有 visual contact: 47.7%
The notion of face-to-face contacts has recently become very popular as a reason why firms still locate in proximity to others after the “death of distance.” Controlled laboratory experiments provide direct and reliable evidence on the importance of face-to-face contacts. It is the purpose of this article to survey and to organize new and developing string of literature with a special focus on its importance for regional economics. However, the article might also serve to alert more experimentalists to the importance of their work for current regional science, of which they seem not to be aware.
Oechssler, Jörg, Andreas Roider and Patrick Schmitz (2008), Cooling-Off in Negotiations – Does It Work?, mimeo: http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/6807.html
- 決策時間長短 in Ultimatum game
Sutter, Matthias, Martin Kocher and Sabine Strauß (2003), Bargaining under time pressure in an experimental ultimatum game, Economics Letters 81, 341–347.
- Cappelletti, Dominique, Werner Güth and Matteo Ploner (2008), Being of two minds: an ultimatum experiment investigating affective processes, mimeo.
Bateson, Melissa, Daniel Nettle and Gilbert Roberts (2006), Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting, Biology Letters 2, 412–414.
- Bochet, Olivier, Talbot Page, and Louis Putterman (2006), “Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60, 11-26.
- Bohnet, Iris and Bruno S. Frey (1999), The sound of silence in prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 38, 43-57.
- Brosig, Jeannette, Axel Ockenfels and Joachim Weimann (2003), The effect of communication media on cooperation, German Economic Review 4, 217-241.
- Burnham, Terence C. and Brian Hare (2007), Engineering Human Cooperation. Does Involuntary Neural Activation Increase Public Goods Contributions?, Human Nature 18, 88-108.
- Frey, Bruno S. and Iris Bohnet (1995), Institutions Affect Fairness: Experimental Investigations, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151, 286-303.
- Frohlich, Norman and Joe Oppenheimer (1998), Some consequences of e-mail vs. face-to-face communication in experiment, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 35, 389-403.
- Haley, Kevin J. and Daniel M.T. Fessler (2005), Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game, Evolution and Human Behavior 26, 245–256.
- Naquin, Charles E., Terri R. Kurtzberg and Liuba Y. Belkin (2008), E-Mail Communication and Group Cooperation in Mixed Motive Contexts, forthcoming: Social Justice Research,
- Rocco, Elena (1998), Trust Breaks Down in Electronic Contexts but Can Be Repaired by Some Initial Face-to-Face Contact, Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems 1998, 496-502.
- Scharlemann, Jörn P.W., Catherine C. Eckel, Alex Kacelnik and Rick K. Wilson (2001), The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face, Journal of Economic Psychology 22, 617-640.
- Valley, Kathleen L., Joseph Moag and Max H. Bazerman (1998), ‘A matter of trust’: Effects of communication on the efficiency and distribution of outcomes, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, 211-238.
- Valley, Kathleen, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max H. Bazerman (2002), How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games, Games and Economic Behavior 38, 127-155.
- Wichman, Harvey (1970), Effects of Isolation and Communication on Cooperation in a Two-Person Game, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology，16, 114-120. http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/16/1/114/; DOI;
Frey and Bohnet (1995) J Inst. & Theo. Econ.
visual contact + talking : 78%
visual contact + no talking ： 23%
Wichman (1970) J Per & Soc Psy
無限制的 face-to-face: 87%
只有 visual contact: 47.7%
Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz (2008)
Sutter, Kocher and Strauß (2003) EL
Cappelletti, Güth and Ploner (2008) mimeo
Haley and Fessler (2005)
Valley, Moag and Bazerman (1998) JEBO
Scharlemann et al. (2001) (smiling 在 trust game 中) JEPsy
Public good game
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) JEBO
Rocco (1998) Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference
Bochet et al. (2006) JEBO
Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003) GER
Burnham and Hare (2007) (眼睛 contact) Human Nature
Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006) 在現地實驗(自助咖啡投幣)
Shin Kishimoto, Shigeo Muto (2012) “Fee Versus Royalty Policy in Licensing Through Bargaining: An Application of the Nash Bargaining Solution." Bulletin of Economic Research， Volume 64, Issue 2, pages 293–304. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00356.x. 220.127.116.11 [PDF]
==notes by yinung==
這是理論文章，證明 Royalty licensing 比 fixed fee licensing 來得好 for firms and social veiw.
裡頭有 licensing patents 的理論文獻
理論證明 fixed 比 royalty 好 in Kamien and Tauman (1986)
…Despite the fact that a royalty is often observed, theoretical analyses including Kamien and Tauman (1986) showed that a
ﬁxed fee was superior to a royalty for both the patent holder and consumers.
但 Kamien and Tauman (2002) and Wang (1998) 證明 royalty 比 fixed 好
…Kamien and Tauman (2002) extended the model of Wang (1998) to a Cournot oligopoly market, and showed that if the patent holder competed in the product market with a suﬃciently large number of ﬁrms, then a royalty is superior to a ﬁxed fee for
談判方式： “take-it-or-leave-it“ (像 ultimatum game)
…These studies basically assumed a “take-it-or-leave-it” licensing manner; that is, the patent holder ﬁrst announces a level of a ﬁxed fee (or a royalty), and then ﬁrms decide whether or not to buy the patent. Analyses were done in terms of noncooperative game theory.
也有用合作賽局為理論架構來研究 for licensing the patent
…Tauman and Watanabe (2007) applied the Shapley value and showed that the patent holder’s proﬁt in the Shapley value approximated his/her equilibrium proﬁt in the noncooperative model of Kamien and Tauman (1986) as the number of ﬁrms became large. Watanabe and Muto (2008) characterized the upper bound and the lower bound of the patent holder’s proﬁts in the bargaining set.
In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent-holding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing a cost-reducing innovation. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. Our results are as follows. Royalty licensing is better than fixed fee licensing for both firms if the innovation is not drastic. So, royalty licensing is always carried out. Moreover, though there exists a case in which consumers prefer fixed fee licensing, royalty licensing is always superior to fixed fee licensing from the social point of view.
Kamien, M.I., Tauman, Y. (1986). Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 471-491.
Kamien, M.I., Tauman, Y. (2002). Patent Licensing: The Inside Story. The Manchester School, 70, 7-15.
 Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica, 50, 97-109.
 Sen, D. (2005). Fee Versus Royalty Reconsidered. Games and Economic Behavior, 53, 141-147.
 Sen, D., Tauman, Y. (2007). General Licencing Schemes for a Cost-reducing Innovation. Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 163-186.
 Sempere-Monerris, J.Jos´ e., Vannetelbosch, V.J. (2001). The Relevance of Bargaining for the Licensing of a Cost-reducing Innovation. Bulletin of Economic Research, 53, 101-115.
 Tauman, Y .,Watanabe, N. (2007). The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results. Economic Theory, 30, 135-149.
 Wang, X.H. (1998). Fee Versus Royalty Licensing in a Cournot Duopoly Model. Economics Letters, 60, 55-62.
 Watanabe, N.,Muto, S. (2007). Stable Proﬁt Sharing in Patent Licensing: General Bargaining Outcomes. Int. Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming.
Vernon Lomax Smith (born January 1, 1927) is professor of economics at Chapman University’s Argyros School of Business and Economics and School of Law in Orange, California, a research scholar at George Mason University Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, and a Fellow of the Mercatus Center, all in Arlington, Virginia. Smith shared the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Daniel Kahneman. He is the founder and president of the International Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington D.C.. In 2004 Smith was honored with an honorary doctoral degree at Universidad Francisco Marroquín, the institution that named the Vernon Smith Center for Experimental Economics Research after him.
Werner Güth∗, and Reinhard Tietz (1990) “Ultimatum bargaining behavior:: A survey and comparison of experimental results." Journal of Economic Psychology, Volume 11, Issue 3, September 1990, Pages 417–449. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-4870(90)90021-Z. (PDF from EconPaper)
==notes by yinung==
In an ultimatum bargaining game players 1 and 2 can distribute a positive amount of money in the following way: first, player 1 determines his demand which player 2 can then either accept or induce conflict, i.e. player 2 faces the ultimatum either to accept player 1’s proposal or to have no agreement at all. Experimentally observed ultimatum bargaining decisions with amounts ranging from 0.50 to 100 German marks are statistically analysed. The demands of player 1 are compared with the acceptance behavior of player 2 with the help of consistency tests in which a subject has to decide in the position of both players. Finally, we consider ultimatum bargaining games with more than just one round where, except for the final round, nonacceptance does not cause conflict but another round of ultimatum bargaining for a smaller cake.
Hidden Information, Bargaining Power, And Efficiency: An Experiment
|By:||Antonio Cabrales (Departamento de Economía – Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Gary Charness (Department of Economics, University of California – University of California, Santa Barbara)
Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – CNRS : UMR5824 – Université Lumière – Lyon II – École Normale Supérieure de Lyon)
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on the design and the selection of contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two principals. We first show theoretically how different ratios of principals and agents affect outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies may disappear, but they are insensitive to the number of principals. In contrast, when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment. There is, however, a tendency to choose more ‘generous’ (and more efficient) contract menus over time. We find that competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade, and that, overall, competition between agents generates the most efficient outcomes.
|Keywords:||experiment; hidden information; bargaining power; competition; efficiency|
Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2006) “Behavioral economics comes of age: A review essay on advances in behavioral economics."
Journal of Economic Literature,Volume 44, Number 3, September 2006 , pp. 712-721(10).
被引用 53 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 15 個版本
Noted by Yi-Nung
Behavioral economics is organized around experimental findings that suggest inadequacies of standard economic theories.
行為 (指以實驗為主的研究) 經濟主要的發現是指出標準經濟理論之不適當處;
主要可分為 4 點
(1) failures of expected utility theory;
(2) the endowment effect;
(3) hyperbolic discounting and
(4) social preferences.
… the experimenter may frame a lottery L as (i) x with probability p and y with probability 1 − p; or, alternatively, as (ii) a payment of z and a subsequent lottery of x − z > 0 with probability p and the lottery y − z < 0 with probability 1 − p. The difference in the two lotteries is interpreted as a manipulation of the reference point.
first-order risk aversion
people place a higher value on objects they own than objects that they do not
Hyperbolic Discounting (immediacy effect)
subjects have a tendency to choose earlier, smaller rewards over later, larger rewards
Advances in Behavioral Economics contains influential second-generation contributions to behavioral economics. Building on the seminal work by Kahnemann, Strotz, Thaler, Tversky, and others, these contributions have established behavioral economics as an important field of study in economics. In this essay, I discuss aspects of the research strategy and methodology of behavioral economics, as exemplified by the contributions to Advances.