An Experimental Study of Voting with Costly Delay

Date: 2015-09
By: Kwiek, Maksymilian (University of Southampton)
Marreiros, Helia (University of Southampton)
Vlassopoulos, Michael (University of Southampton)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9336&r=net
A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority is reached. We study experimentally welfare properties of simple three-voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs. The resulting game is a form of multiplayer war of attrition. Our key finding is that, consistent with theoretical predictions, when voters are ex ante heterogeneous in terms of the intensity of their preferences the conclave leads to efficiency gains relative to simple majority voting. We also compare welfare properties of a static versus a dynamic version of a conclave. When social cost of waiting is taken into account, the dynamic conclave is superior in terms of welfare than its static version.
Keywords: voting, supermajority, intensity of preferences, war of attrition
JEL: C78 C92 D72 D74

Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game

Date: 2015
By: Tjaša Bjedov (Université de Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, 93, Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France; University of Fribourg, Bd de Pérolles 90 CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland)
Thierry Madiès (University of Fribourg, Bd de Pérolles 90 CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland)
Marie Claire Villeval (Université de Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, 93, Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1507&r=net
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take-turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take-turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate.
Keywords: Coordination, communication, turn taking, conflict, experiment
JEL: C91 D74 L15 H71

Authority and Centrality: Power and Cooperation in Social Dilemma Networks

Date: 2015-03
By: Ramalingam, Abhijit
Rojo Arjona, David
Schram, Arthur
Van Leeuwen, Boris
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:29140&r=net
We investigate the effects of power on cooperation in repeated social dilemma settings. Groups of five players play either multi-player trust games or VCM-games on a fixed network. Power stems from having the authority to allocate funds raised through voluntary contributions by all members and/or from having a pivotal position in the network (centrality). We compare environments with and without ostracism by allowing players in some treatments to exclude others from further participation in the network. Our results show that power matters but that its effects hinge strongly on the type involved. Reminiscent of the literature on leadership, players with authority often act more cooperatively than those without such power. Nevertheless, when possible, they are quickly ostracized from the group. Thus, this kind of power is not tolerated by the powerless. In stark contrast, centrality leads to less cooperative behavior and this free riding is not punished; conditional on cooperativeness, players with power from centrality are less likely to be ostracized than those without. Hence, not only is this type of power tolerated, but so is the free riding it leads to.
Keywords: power, cooperation, networks, public goods
JEL: C91 D02 D03 H41

Whom are you talking with ? An experiment on credibility and communication structure

Date: 2014-11-05
By: GRANDJEAN, Gilles (CEREC, Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles)
MANTOVANI, Marco (CEREC, Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles; DEMS, University of Milan – Bicocca)
MAULEON, Ana (CEREC, Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles; Universit√© catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium)
VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent (CEREC, Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2014042&r=net
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication Рi.e. who is talking with whom Рon the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. According to our analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is public. When pair of agents exchange messages privately, the players should play the Pareto dominated equilibrium and disregard communication. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only when announcing to play it is credible. When private communication is allowed, lying is prevalent, and players converge to the Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Nevertheless, at the individual level, players’ beliefs and choices tend to react to messages even when these are non-credible.

Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game

Date: 2015-03
By: Bjedov, Tjaša (University of Fribourg)
Madies, Thierry (University of Fribourg)
Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8953&r=net
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take-turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take-turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate.
Keywords: coordination, communication, turn taking, conflict, experiment
JEL: C91 D74 L15 H71

Can Farmers Create Efficient Information Networks? Experimental Evidence from Rural India

Date: 2015
By: A. Stefano Caria
Marcel Fafchamps
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2015-07&r=net
We run an artefactual field experiment in rural India which tests whether farmers can create efficient networks in a repeated link formation game, and whether group categorization results in homophily and loss of network efficiency. We find that the efficiency of the networks formed in the experiment is significantly lower than the efficiency which could be achieved under selfish, rational play. Many individual decisions are consistent with selfish rationality and with a concern for overall welfare, but the tendency to link with the ‘most popular’ farmer in the network causes large efficiency losses. When information about group membership is disclosed, social networks become more homophilous, but not significantly less efficient. Networks play an important role in the diffusion of innovations in developing countries. If they are inefficiently structured, there is scope for development policies that support diffusion.

Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information

Date: 2013-07
By: Nicolas Jacquemet (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, BETA – Bureau d’économie théorique et appliquée – CNRS : UMR7522 – Université de Strasbourg – Université Nancy II)
Adam Zylbersztejn (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Paris I – Panthéon-Sorbonne)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00845123&r=net
We experimentally study an asymmetric coordination game with two Nash equilibria: one is Pareto-efficient, the other is Pareto-inefficient and involves a weakly dominated strategy. We assess whether information about the interaction partner helps eliminate the imperfect equilibrium. Our treatments involve three information-enhancing mechanisms: repetition and two kinds of individual signals: messages from partner or observation of his past choices. Repetition-based learning increases the frequencies of the most efficient outcome and the most costly strategic mismatch. Moreover, it is superseded by individual signals. Like previous empirical studies, we find that signals provide a screening of partners’ intentions that reduces the frequency of coordination failures. Unlike these studies, we find that the transmission of information between partners, either via messages or observation, does not suffice to significantly increase the overall efficiency of outcomes. This happens mostly because information does not restrain the choice of the dominated action by senders.
Keywords: coordination game; communication; cheap-talk; observation

Turf Wars

Date: 2014-10
By: Herrera, Helios (HEC Montreal)
Reuben, Ernesto (Columbia University)
Ting, Michael M. (Columbia University)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8585&r=net
Turf wars commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to share jurisdiction over a project with other agents. Agents with jurisdiction decide whether to exert effort and receive a reward based on their relative performance. Hence, sharing can increase joint production but introduces competition for the reward. We find that collaboration has a non-monotonic relationship with both productivity and rewards. The laboratory experiment confirms the model’s main predictions. We also explore extensions of the basic model, including one where each agent’s productivity is private information.
Keywords: turf war, bureaucracy, jurisdiction, competition, information withholding
JEL: D73 D74 D82

Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes

Watanabe, N., & Muto, S. (2008). Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes. International journal of game theory, 37(4), 505-523. [working paper 版]

JEL Classification Numbers: C71; D45; D43
Keywords: licensing, coalition structure, bargaining set, core

==noted by yi-nung==

有簡要的 patent licensing problem 的文獻回顧:

Patent licensing problems in oligopolistic markets had been studied only by non-cooperative mechanisms; upfront fee or royalty in Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986), and auction in Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986). After these seminal papers, the main concern of researchers was focused on the optimal licensing mechanism that maximizes the licensor’s revenue from a patented technology (See, e.g., Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992), Muto (1993), Sen (2005) and Sen and Tauman (2007)). On the other hand, licensing agreements are basically contract terms signed by licensors and licensees as negotiation results. This paper hence seeks into the original and practical viewpoint and studies patent licensing as bargaining outcomes.
On this agenda, Tauman and Watanabe (2007, hereafter TW) recently provided the licensor’s payoff in the non-cooperative auction game with an interpretation from a cooperative viewpoint. Their analysis was, however, limited to the asymptotic equivalence. In practice, however, each industry has a finite number of firms operating there. For such a finite industry, Driessen, Muto and Nakayama (1992, hereafter DMN) studied a cooperative game on information trading which is similar to patent licensing。

Commons as a risk-management tool: theoretical predictions and an experimental test

Date: 2014-04
By: Marielle Brunette (Laboratoire d’Economie Forestière, INRA – AgroParisTech)
Philippe Delacote (Laboratoire d’Economie Forestière, INRA – AgroParisTech)
Serge Garcia (Laboratoire d’Economie Forestière, INRA – AgroParisTech)
Jean-Marc Rousselle (INRA, UMR 1135 LAMETA)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lef:wpaper:2014-06&r=net
The impact of the safety-net use of Common-pool resources (CPR) on the individual investment into and extraction from the commons is analyzed in this paper. Agents of the community first choose to invest in their private project and in the CPR; second, they choose how much to extract from their private project and the commons. The model compares two types of risk management tool: CPR as risk-coping and risk-diversification mechanisms. It also compares two types of risk: risk on a private project and risk on CPR investment by other community members. The theoretical predictions are empirically tested with experimental economics. In this view, we propose an original CPR game composed of two periods, an investment one and an extraction one. Our result clearly shows that risk reduction in the private project unambiguously decreases investment in the CPR, while it does not impact CPR extraction. We also show that a risk-coping strategy is well understood as more flexible and influenced by the outcome in terms of private project yield.
Keywords: Common-pool resource, Common-pool resource game, deforestation, experimental economics.
JEL: Q15 Q23 D71 D81