AJAE 農經貢獻之回顧文獻

==noted by yinung==

2010年, vol. 92, 2, AJAE 回顧了過去百年以來農經學者的貢獻, 方向含括:

生產與農場管理、農產市場、農業政策、農產貿易、農業發展、自然資源與保育、環境經濟、食品與消費經濟、鄉村發展、農企業經濟與管理、計量方法之發展。值得細閱了解。

農企業研究含食品鏈的水平和垂直參與者之協調 (agribusiness economics)、與食品鏈內的決策 (agribusiness management)

1950s 出現的研究主題:on cooperatives, farm supply markets, industrial organization, vertical integration, market power of food processing and farm supply firms,antitrust decisions, and bargaining

1960s 中: marketing structure’ of the food industry, efficiency; services to consumers; market power; regulatory activities; services such as market news;and the effects of imports; Key papers on cooperative theory and agricultural finance also appeared during the 1960s
1970-80: teaching program serving the needs of the rapidly growing nonfarm segments of the food system. Work on food system structure and performance.
===有關供應鏈===
價格傳遞機能 Wohlgenant (1989, AJAE) 或者是食品供應鏈管理和制度設計、風險移轉分擔、契約設計、體系之收入成本利潤在供應鏈成員間之分配等 ,特別供應鏈體系面臨外部需求成長及風險變動增加下的相關議題 Hendrikse and Bijman (2002, AJAE)

==AJAE 該期相關目錄如下==

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The Economics of Internet Media

Date: 2014
By: Peitz, Martin
Reisinger, Markus
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnh:wpaper:37116&r=net
We survey the economics literature on media as it applies to the Internet. The Internet is an important driver behind media convergence and connects information and communication technologies. While new Internet media share some properties with traditional media, several novel features have appeared: On the content side, aggregation by third parties that have no editorial policy and user-generated content have become increasingly important. On the advertiser side, fine-tuned tailoring and targeting of ads based on individual user characteristics are common features on many Internet media and social networks. On the user side, we observe increased possibilities of time-shifting, multi-homing, and active search. These changes have gone hand-in-hand with new players entering media markets, including search engines and Internet service providers. Some of these players face novel strategic considerations, such as how to present search results. In response to these changes, an emerging economics literature focuses on the allocative and welfare implications of this new media landscape. This paper is an attempt to organize these contributions and provide a selective account of novel economic mechanisms that shape market outcomes of Internet media. A large body of work has focused on the advertising part of the industry, while some studies also look at content provision and the interaction between the two.
Keywords: Internet , media economics , digital media , targeting , news aggregation , search advertising , display advertising , two-sided markets
JEL: L82 L86 M37 L13 D21 D22

The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories

Schmidt, K. M. (2009). The role of experiments for the development of economic theories. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 10(s1), 14-30. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2516.2009.00304.x;  uni-muenchen.de 提供的 [PDF] ;

Abstract:

Economic experiments interact with economic theories in various ways. First of all they are used to test economic theories. However, they can neither confirm nor falsify them in a strict sense. They rather inform us about the range of applicability, the robustness and the predictive power of a theory. Furthermore, economic experiments discover and isolate phenomena and challenge economic theorists to explain them. Finally, many economic experiments are “material” models. They are used to analyze and predict how changes in the environment affect economic outcomes. However, they cannot offer an explanation for what we observe. This has to be provided by economic theory.

Laboratory Evidence on Face-to-Face: Why Experimental Economics is of Interest to Regional Economists*

Björn Frank (2012) “Laboratory Evidence on Face-to-Face: Why Experimental Economics is of Interest to Regional Economists." International Regional Science Review, June 13, 2012. doi: 10.1177/0160017612449017. working paper PDF; Journal Web. **

Notes by yinung

此文提及 death of distance" (Cairncross, 2001) or “death of geography" 意思是

…the shrinking costs for transportation, especially transportation of messages’ pure in formation content.

必需有 face-to-face 溝通的原因是

… widely agreed that communication often must be face-to-face in order to be effective. But why?

1. nonverbal 和 verbal 同時發生,減少誤解(Storper and Venables, 2004; Winger, 2005, sections 4 – 6; and Hildrum, 2007, p. 469 with further references).

2. 比較有意義 (???待了解)

3. 發現想看到的,也發現原來沒想看到的隱含事務

4. buzzing (流言???)

5. face-to-face 溝通成本高,可視為建立長期關係之投資

6. 建立互信的必要條件

以上是理論,經濟實驗 (不含心理實驗)之證據為此文之回顧重點

匿名實驗結果有時不具參考性,此文同意此觀點 (至少用 email 溝通知道名字)

幾個與 face-to-face 相關因素

  1. 即時回應之效果 and 冷淨作用 Cooling effects: effect of spontaneity (decision time)  in Sec. 2
  2. trust 和合作受到 face-to-face 之影響 in Sec. 3
  3. 細節因素,如 smiling 和 eye contact  在 f2f 中之角色

冷靜效果

..experiment on the effect of a substantive cooling off period in an experiment was invented by Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz (2008).

在 ultimatum game 中,8:2 和 5:5 的分餅被提出,看對手是否接受。24小時後,接受的決定可以被修改。餅獎金大小分別有 2,5,8 euros. Cooling off period 並未導致拒絕率大幅降低 (from 42.6% to 39.4%) ,且不顯著。但將 reward 變大 (期望值相同,用 lottery 方式),則拒絕率顯著大幅下降 fom 27.7% to 20.5%.

增加決策時間之壓力也有同樣的效果 (提高拒絕率) increased time pressure might well increase the rejection rate by Sutter, Kocher and Strauß (2003). 決策時間減少 (100秒 mm> 10 秒),拒絕率增加從 40.3 to 78.2%。 Cappelletti, Güth and Ploner (2008) 也有類似的發現 (180秒 vs 30 秒)。情感區 (affective system) 和 (deliberative system) 在大腦中並不相同。

Implications:

在 UG 中,拒絕率上升,代表效率下降。出價者將會喜歡拒絕率降低 (因此可降低 offer); 反之,回應者將喜歡拒絕率上升。故,出價者將偏好 face-to-face 溝通。不過要注意的是 UG 是單向一次 negotiation, 一般的談判會有雙向回應

建立互信 & 合作

Valley, Moag and Bazerman (1998)

(註: 有時互信和合作很難區分 see

兩人買賣股票,出價B

只有 seller 知道 V; Seller 會接受 if B>V; seller 得到 (B-V);

Buyer 只知 V~uniform(0,100), 真實 V 要等 Buyer 買到以後才知道。真實價值 = 1.5V; buyer 得到 (1.5V-B);

Buyer 問 seller V=?, 但 seller 可以 lie; 不過 face-to-face 之下,seller 顯著地比較不可能 lie (face-to face 只有 1 of 14, 7% lie; 電話 55% lie; 不匿名witten 33% lie). 有些 face-to-face 的 buyer 並沒有問 seller V;

結果發現 face-to-face 導致比較多的 Pareto improving deals.

Pareto deals (雙方皆獲益)

face-to-face: 51.7% (out of n=21) 成交; 顯著大於 written comm. 但不顯著大於 telephone comm.

written comm.: 22.2% (未成交 52% 接近理論值)

telephone comm.: 38.1%

Non-Pareto deals (buy’s loss):

face-to-face: 23.8%

written comm.: 25.9%

telephone comm.: 47.6%

Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) PD game (應是 public good game)

5人一組玩多人 PD game 共 15 回合; 前 8 回合用 (a) 事先沒有 comm.; (b) email (c) face-to-face;

每人在每回合決定貢獻 0~10 給 group, 留下其餘。

S=5人貢獻之加總; 每人皆領回 0.4S

理論:每人皆貢獻 10, 則 S = 50,每人皆領回 0.4S = 20; 若每人皆貢獻 0, 則每人只得 10

實驗結果

各 treatment 之平均貢獻 (前 8回合

(a) 沒有 comm: 2.9

(b) email: 7.6

(c) face-to-face: 9.99

9回合以後(皆沒有 comm.)

Contributions in groups with previous face-to-face communication quickly collapse to the level of the e-mail-groups.

face-to-face 效果持續多久

一回合就夠了? (Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann, 2003; Bochet et al., 2006)

Rocco (1998).

6人一組玩28回合的 public good game;在第 10,15,20加入 face-to-face comm.;

每一回合貢獻 x of 13 tokens; 全部人之貢獻加總= S; 每人之 Payoffs = ???

face-to-face comm. 有助於 maximize group welfare 在後半段實驗; Email comm. 並沒有較高的合作;但實驗前一天 email comm. 的人 face-to-face 之後,卻有類似的效果。

Bochet et al. (2006)

4人10回合的 PG game;比較 5分鐘的實驗前 face-to-face vs 第 1,4,7回合 online 討論 in a chat room;

實驗結果

兩者差異沒有後大, 其平均貢獻:

chat room: 81.4%

face-to-face: 96.2%

但在第10回合有 drop, chat romm ->52.1%; face-to-face -> 78.1

Naquin, Kurtzberg and Belkin (2008),

玩 threshold PG game; 4 人一組;若至少有 3人 捐出 1 張餐券,則每人獲兩張 ¥7餐券 2 張;

比較 非匿名之 email 和 face-to-face 決策:

email: 35.8% of the participants 捐出

face-to-face: 69.9%

其它溝通媒介

Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003)

4人一組,10回合 PG game; 其貢獻 of endowment

audio comm.: 48%

anonymous: 57%

video comm: 93%

face-to-face: 97% (後兩者顯著高於前兩者)

照片 出現 10 秒: 貢獻率低於 anonymous

Face-to-face 可能隱含的影響因素

Smiling

Scharlemann et al. (2001) 在 trust game 中,發現微笑有助於合作

 Player 1 — [$1, 0.5]
|
Player 2 — [0.8, 1.25]
|
Player 1 — [1.20, 1.20]

Player 1 是受試者,Player 2 是電腦但 show 照片 (treatment 是否微笑,取自相片資料庫),只要 Player 1 選擇 trust 策略,則電腦 (Player 2) 必定也用 trust 回應。結果發現, Player 1 之回應

沒有微笑: 55.0% 選擇 trust 策略
有微笑:     68.3%
(是否顯著待查)

eye contact

Burnham and Hare (2007)

4人一組,6回合 PG game (對手不重覆); 其貢獻 of endowment ~ (0, 10,相當於 2 美金), 總貢獻*2 均分給 4 人.

實驗組看到金屬臉但具有人類眼睛的影像 (MIT 發明的 “Kismet” robot), 實驗結果:

所有人和6回合平均
看到眼睛:5.39
匿名:        4.17

Haley and Fessler (2005)
玩 dictator game, 分$10美金, 實驗組看到眼睛圖片,對照組看到 label, 結果

Player 1 分給 Player 2
看到眼睛:3.79
沒有看到眼睛:2.45

Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006)現地實驗中也發現,eye contact 會讓貢獻較多錢

在48位大學職員喝咖啡處貼眼睛海報 or 花海報各幾週,自願投幣奉獻 (honesty box) 金額

在貼眼睛海報的時候,自願投幣奉獻金額顯著較高

Frey and Bohnet (1995) 在 PD game 中讓受試者選擇合作和背叛,合作率

visual contact + talking : 78%
visual contact + no talking : 23%
匿名:12%

Wichman (1970) 在 PD game 中讓受試者選擇合作和背叛; 70回合,固定對手,合作率

無限制的 face-to-face: 87%
互聽到聲音: 72.1%
只有 visual contact: 47.7%
匿名40.7%

Abstract

The notion of face-to-face contacts has recently become very popular as a reason why firms still locate in proximity to others after the “death of distance.” Controlled laboratory experiments provide direct and reliable evidence on the importance of face-to-face contacts. It is the purpose of this article to survey and to organize new and developing string of literature with a special focus on its importance for regional economics. However, the article might also serve to alert more experimentalists to the importance of their work for current regional science, of which they seem not to be aware.

References (部份)

  • 冷卻效果
    Oechssler, Jörg, Andreas Roider and Patrick Schmitz (2008), Cooling-Off in Negotiations – Does It Work?, mimeo: http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/6807.html
  • 決策時間長短 in Ultimatum game
    Sutter, Matthias, Martin Kocher and Sabine Strauß (2003), Bargaining under time pressure in an experimental ultimatum game, Economics Letters 81, 341–347.
  • Cappelletti, Dominique, Werner Güth and Matteo Ploner (2008), Being of two minds: an ultimatum experiment investigating affective processes, mimeo.
  • 其它
    Bateson, Melissa, Daniel Nettle and Gilbert Roberts (2006), Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting, Biology Letters 2, 412–414.
  • Bochet, Olivier, Talbot Page, and Louis Putterman (2006), “Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60, 11-26.
  • Bohnet, Iris and Bruno S. Frey (1999), The sound of silence in prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 38, 43-57.
  • Brosig, Jeannette, Axel Ockenfels and Joachim Weimann (2003), The effect of communication media on cooperation, German Economic Review 4, 217-241.
  • Burnham, Terence C. and Brian Hare (2007), Engineering Human Cooperation. Does Involuntary Neural Activation Increase Public Goods Contributions?, Human Nature 18, 88-108.
  • Frey, Bruno S. and Iris Bohnet (1995), Institutions Affect Fairness: Experimental Investigations, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151, 286-303.
  • Frohlich, Norman and Joe Oppenheimer (1998), Some consequences of e-mail vs. face-to-face communication in experiment, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 35, 389-403.
  • Haley, Kevin J. and Daniel M.T. Fessler (2005), Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game, Evolution and Human Behavior 26, 245–256.
  • Naquin, Charles E., Terri R. Kurtzberg and Liuba Y. Belkin (2008), E-Mail Communication and Group Cooperation in Mixed Motive Contexts, forthcoming: Social Justice Research,
  • Rocco, Elena (1998), Trust Breaks Down in Electronic Contexts but Can Be Repaired by Some Initial Face-to-Face Contact, Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems 1998, 496-502.
  • Scharlemann, Jörn P.W., Catherine C. Eckel, Alex Kacelnik and Rick K. Wilson (2001), The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face, Journal of Economic Psychology 22, 617-640.
  • Valley, Kathleen L., Joseph Moag and Max H. Bazerman (1998), ‘A matter of trust’: Effects of communication on the efficiency and distribution of outcomes, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, 211-238.
  • Valley, Kathleen, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max H. Bazerman (2002), How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games, Games and Economic Behavior 38, 127-155.
  • Wichman, Harvey (1970), Effects of Isolation and Communication on Cooperation in a Two-Person Game, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,16, 114-120. http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/16/1/114/; DOI;

暫記

PD game
Frey and Bohnet (1995) J Inst. & Theo. Econ.
(合作率)
visual contact + talking : 78%
visual contact + no talking : 23%
匿名:12%
Wichman (1970) J Per & Soc Psy
(合作率)
無限制的 face-to-face: 87%
互聽到聲音: 72.1%
只有 visual contact: 47.7%
匿名40.7%
UG
Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz (2008)
時間減少
Sutter, Kocher and Strauß (2003) EL
Cappelletti, Güth and Ploner (2008) mimeo

dictator game
Haley and Fessler (2005)

Trust game
Valley, Moag and Bazerman (1998) JEBO
Scharlemann et al. (2001) (smiling 在 trust game 中) JEPsy

Public good game
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) JEBO
Rocco (1998) Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference
Bochet et al. (2006) JEBO
Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003) GER
Burnham and Hare (2007) (眼睛 contact) Human Nature

Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006) 在現地實驗(自助咖啡投幣)

Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle

Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler  (1995) “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, No. 1 (Feb., 1995), pp. 73-92. ; doi: 10.2307/2118511 ;nyu.edu 提供的 [PDF]

==notes by yinung==

Prospect theory, myopic loss aversion (MLA) 和 equity premium puzzle 的重要文獻

==original Abstract==

The equity premium puzzle refers to the empirical fact that stocks have outperformed bonds over the last century by a surprisingly large margin. We offer a new explanation based on two behavioral concepts. First, investors are assumed to be “loss averse,” meaning that they are distinctly more sensitive to losses than to gains. Second, even long-term investors are assumed to evaluate their portfolios frequently. We dub this combination “myopic loss aversion.” Using simulations, we find that the size of the equity premium is consistent with the previously estimated parameters of prospect theory if investors evaluate their portfolios annually.

Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions

Gary Charness and Matthias Sutter (2012) “Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(3): 157-76. DOI: 10.1257/jep.26.3.157; URL: AEAWeb. PDF1; PDF2

==Notes by yinung==

集體決策和個人決策之差異:

從賽局理論的角度看, 集體決策較個人決策來得理性 (rational), 因其可避免認知錯誤與限制。

不過集體決策也因此不見得會提高社會福利 (集體決策比較 self-interest)

待研究問題:

the optimal size of the group ( A useful starting point here is Forsyth’s (2006) work)

==original Abstract==

In this paper, we describe what economists have learned about differences between group and individual decision-making. This literature is still young, and in this paper, we will mostly draw on experimental work (mainly in the laboratory) that has compared individual decision-making to group decision-making, and to individual decision-making in situations with salient group membership. The bottom line emerging from economic research on group decision-making is that groups are more likely to make choices that follow standard game-theoretic predictions, while individuals are more likely to be influenced by biases, cognitive limitations, and social considerations. In this sense, groups are generally less “behavioral" than individuals. An immediate implication of this result is that individual decisions in isolation cannot necessarily be assumed to be good predictors of the decisions made by groups. More broadly, the evidence casts doubts on traditional approaches that model economic behavior as if individuals were making decisions in isolation.

==References==

  • Forsyth, Donelson R. 2006. Group Dynamics, 4th edition. Belmont, CA: Thomson Higher Education.
  • Camerer, Colin F.  2003.  Behavioural Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press.
  • Charness, Gary, Edi Karni, and Dan Levin. 2007. “Individual and Group Decision Making under Risk: An Experimental Study of Bayesian Updating and Violations of First-Order Stochastic Dominance.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 35(2): 129–48.
  • Charness, Gary, Edi Karni, and Dan Levin. 2010. “On the Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment: New Experimental Evidence Regarding Linda.” Games and Economic Behavior 68(2): 551–56.
  • Charness, Gary, and Dan Levin. 2005. “When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect.” American Economic Review 95(4): 1300–1309.
  • Charness, Gary, Luca Rigotti, and Aldo  Rustichini. 2007. “Individual Behavior and Group Membership.”  American Economic Review 97(4):  1340–52.
  • Chen, Yan, and Xin Li. 2009. “Group Identity and Social Preferences.” American Economic Review 99(1): 431–57.
  • Cooper, David J., and John H. Kagel. 2005. “Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games.” American Economic Review 95(3): 477–509.
  • Fahr, René, and Bernd Irlenbusch. 2011. “Who Follows the Crowd—Groups or Individuals?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 80(2): 200–209.
  • Feri, Francesco, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Matthias Sutter.  2010. “Efi  ciency  Gains  from Team-Based Coordination—Large-Scale Experimental Evidence.”  American Economic Review 100(4): 1892–1912.
  • Holmstrom, Bengt.  1982. “Moral Hazard in Teams.” Bell Journal of Economics 13(2): 324–40.
  • Kocher, Martin G., Sabine Strauss, and Matthias Sutter.  2006. “Individual or Team Decision-Making— Causes and Consequences of Self-Selection.” Games and Economic Behavior 56(2): 259–70.
  • Kocher, Martin G., and Matthias Sutter.  2005. “The Decision Maker Matters: Individual versus Group Behavior in Experimental Beauty-Contest Games.” Economic Journal 115(500): 200–223.
  • Kugler, Tamar, Gary Bornstein, Martin G. Kocher, and Matthias Sutter. 2007. “Trust between Individuals and Groups: Groups are Less Trusting Than Individuals But Just as Trustworthy.” Journal of Economic Psychology 28(6): 646–57.
  • Laughlin, Patrick R., Bryan L. Bonner, and Andrew G. Miner. 2002. “Groups Perform Better Than the Best Individuals on Letter-to-Numbers Problems.”  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 88(2): 606–620.
  • Levitt, Steven, and John A. List.  2007. “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal about the Real World?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2): 153–74.
  • Mas, Alexandre, and Enrico Moretti.  2009. “Peers at Work.” American Economic Review 99(1): 112–45.
  • Michaelson, Larry K., Warren E. Watson, and Robert H. Black.  1989. “A Realistic Test of Individual versus Group Consensus Decision Making.” Journal of Applied Psychology 74(5): 834–39.
  • Schopler, John, Chester A. Insko, Jennifer Wieselquist, Michael Pemberton, Betty Witcher, Rob Kozar, Chris Roddenberry, and Tim Wildschut.  2001. “When Groups Are More Competitive Than Individuals: The Domain of the Discontinuity Effect.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80(4): 632–44.
  • Sheremeta, Roman M., and Jingjing Zhang. 2010. “Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-bidding in Contests?”  Social Choice and Welfare 35(2): 175–97.
  • Song, Fei. 2008. “Trust and Reciprocity Behavior and Behavioral Forecasts: Individuals versus Group-Representatives.”  Games and Economic Behavior 62(2): 675–96.
  • Surowiecki, James. 2004. The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations. Doubleday.
  • Sutter, Matthias. 2005. “Are Four Heads Better Than Two? An Experimental Beauty-Contest Game with Teams of Different Size.”  Economics Letters 88(1): 41–46.
  • Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman.  1983. “Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment.” Psychological Review 90(40): 293–315.

==cited by==

1. Ananish Chaudhuri, Tirnud Paichayontvijit, Lifeng Shen. 2012. Gender differences in trust and trustworthiness: Individuals, single sex and mixed sex groups. Journal of Economic Psychology.

 

經濟和心理學實驗之一般差異

引自: Daniel Friedman and Alessandra Cassar, Economics Lab: An Intensive Course in Experimental Economics, Routledge, London and New York (2004) pp. 248

原始文獻:

Hertwig, R. and Ortman, A. (2001) “Experimental practices in economics: a challenge for psychologist? ” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24:383–403. link to PDF

兩學門間有4 種主要之差異 (p.18)

  1. Script versus open-ended

  2. Repeated trials versus one-shot

  3. Salient pay

  4. Deception

主要差異項目 經濟實驗 心理實驗
實驗說明 script 強調完整之角色定義, 互動模式, 報酬如何決定
Economists (drawing on Siegel’s tradition) almost always include detailed formal written instructions for subjects defining their roles, interactions, and payoffs. Psychologists in recent decades seldom use written instructions and usually are quite casual about describing the task to the subjects.
比較敘述性
Psychologists in recent decades seldom use written instructions and usually are quite casual about describing the task to the subjects
實驗進行 受試者重覆試驗相同之情境 repeated trials
Economists since Smith (1962) typically have subjects repeat the task or interactions several times, and focus on data from later repetitions when they are sure that the subjects are fully adjusted to the environment.
受試者只進行一次實驗 one-shot Psychologists more commonly just give the subjects one shot at any particular task.
受試者報酬 以實驗參與之表現優劣支付現金
Economists almost always pay subjects in cash based on performance.
很少支付現金, 且是固定金額
Psychologists seldom pay cash, and when they do, they usually pay a flat amount unrelated to performance.
資訊真實性 幾乎不會採用誤導
Deception of any kind is taboo among experimental economists.
常故意誤導
A large fraction of social psychology experiments attempt to mislead the subjects as to the true nature of the task.

兩學門本質上之不同

Role of theory

Economics has a core theory that assumes self-interest, rationality, and equilibrium. Theory in psychology is more descriptive and eclectic. Hence, psychologists are less concerned with salient rewards, repeated trials, etc. that give economic theory a better shot.

Role of institutions

Following a suggestion by Sunder in Friedman and Sunder (1994), Figure 2.2 presents a spectrum of economic situations based on the institutional constraints. Personal preferences are the dominant influence in individual choice tasks but play a minor role for firms in strong institutions such as markets. Cognitive psychologists prefer to work at the weak institution end of the spectrum, while social psychologists study quite different social constraints. By contrast, economic analysis emphasizes the institutional constraints, as we will see in Chapter 3.

實驗說明 script open-ended
實驗進行 r r

Economics in the Laboratory

Vernon L. Smith (1994) “Economics in the Laboratory." Journal of Economic Perspectives ,Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter, 1994 , pp. 113-131. (link to JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138154) (AEAWeb:JEP (PDF))

==Summary by yinung==

Smith 在此文回顧了實證經濟學的重要貢獻 (其題為 “為何經濟學家要做實驗?" (why do economists conduct experiments?)), 他列舉以下 7 大理由,其實就是經濟實驗的主要功能:

經濟實驗的主要功能

1. Test a theory,or discriminate between theories

2. Explore the causes of a theory’sfailure.

3. Establish empirical regularities as a basis for new theory

4. Compare environments.

5. Compare institutions

6. Evaluate policy proposals.

7. The laboratory as a testing ground for institutional design.

經濟實驗的主要貢獻

Smith 並總結了經濟實驗多年來所發現之重要結論 (基於 制度 (institutions)、環境 (environments)、與行為 (behaviors) 之架構; 不過我認為還要加上「資訊」(information) 和 「預期之形成」(expectations formation) ):

1. Institutions Matter

2. Unconscious Optimization in Market Interactions

3. Information: Less Can Be Better

4. Common Information is Not Sufficient to Yield Common Expectations or “Knowledge"

5. Dominated Strategies Are for Playing, Not Eliminating

6. Efficiency and Underrevelation Are Compatible

7. The Endowment Effect

8. Fairness: Taste or Expectation?

實驗法在研究方法論之辨證

水星運行之軌道未遵循牛頓運動定律之預測,並沒有讓科學家認為該運動定律是錯誤的,反而是斷定水星和太陽中間,必定有一個未知的行星 (甚至被命名為火神星 (Vulcan) [註 1] ) 干擾了水星應該運行之路徑… (Smith, 1994, p.127)

Smith 指出,任何對理論的驗證 (test),都避免不了必要的輔助假設 (auxiliary hypotheses),如此才能將觀察的結果解釋為對該理論的驗證結果。這些「輔助假設」常有很多不同的名詞,諸如: 啟始條件 (initial conditions) 、其它條件相同 (ceteris paribus clauses)、背景資訊 (background information)、… 等。

因此可以說,所有對理論的驗證,都隱含是一種聯合檢定 (joint tests) ; 亦即,對理論的驗證皆是條件式檢定,其皆建立在輔助假設 (auxiliary hypotheses) 成立的前提之下。

這就為何實驗文獻之發現,常被批評的原因, 如同「杜恩─奎因論題」(Duhem-Quine Thesis) 所述之「指任何理論儘管出現推翻它的證據,我們只要在我們的信念網絡中作一點改變,便可以繼續接受該理論」 (see 淺談「杜咸-奎因論旨」與非充分決定性論證)

Smith 在此文並對一些對實驗經濟研究法之批評,提出反駁。例如 Harrison (1992) 認為經濟實驗所得到的錯誤觀是因為受試者的實驗報酬之機會成本太低,所以才會偏離理論之預測。Smith and Walker (1993) 的 近 30 年文獻回顧說明了受試者所獲之「貨幣報酬的確可以改善受試者之表現 (在某些條件之下)」,但其它除了「受試者報酬」之條件也同樣重要,因為增加受試者報酬並沒有讓那些偏離理論所預測的觀察消失 (many anomalies do not disappear by escalating payoffs, p.127)

… 未完成, 待續…

===3. Information: Less Can Be Better===

這是個有趣的現象:競爭者知道對手的資訊愈多,反而不利市場機𠛻運作 (TBD: 指哪些?)
Providing subjects with complete information, far from improving market competition, tends to make it worse.
市場運作:CDA 實驗發現 private info. 收歛較快 (Smith, 1991, 6); 在寡佔市場 Fouraker and Siegel (1963) for Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly; 還有 Noussair and Porter (1992) and Brown-Kruse (1992, 未出版);
Roth (1987, 一本書) 也提到Nash bargaining game 的實驗:不知道對手的 prize 比較會符合 Nash 的預測 (YNY:嫉妒?)。但Schelling (1957) 和 Siegel and Fouraker (1960) 卻提出知道別人,反而會「諒解」(more forgiving) 的看法。 Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) 把它稱做 curse of knowledge
YNY:Smith 認為
1. 更多資訊讓參與者可找到更多自利的機會,或者懲罰別人的策略 (p.119, sec 1),
2. 也有人用 folk theorem 來解釋 (多回合交手後,傾向合作而非競爭)
3. 嫉妒別人
4. 諒解別人

==References==

  • Smith, Vernon L., and James M. Walker, “Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics," Economic Inquiry,April 1993, 31, 245-61.
註 1: 水星偏離軌道 (水星的軌道偏離正圓程度很大,近日點距太陽僅四千六百萬千米,遠日點卻有7千萬千米,在軌道的近日點它以十分緩慢的速度按歲差圍繞太陽向前運行, see 背景資料:神秘的水星) 的真正原因,普遍相信可以由爱因斯坦所提出的广义相对论所解釋,即由于太阳质量较大,水星受它的引力作用也较大,在其附近的空间发生了较大的“弯曲” 所致。
  • Noussair, Charles and David Porter, “Allocating Priority with Auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, October 1992, 19, 169-195.
  • Roth, Alvin E., “Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory," in A. E. Roth (ed.)
    Laboratory Experimentation in Economics. Cambridge University Press, 1987
  • Schelling, T. C., “Bargaining, Communication and Limited War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1957, 1, 19-36.
  • Siegel, Sidney and Lawrence E. Fouraker, Bargaining and Group Decision Making:
    Experiments in Bilateral Monopoly. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.
  • Camerer, Colin F., George Loewenstein and Martin Weber, “The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: Experimental Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, October 1989, 97, 1232-1254.

 

Networks in Economics

Date: 2012-06
By: Zenou, Yves
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9021&r=net
We provide an overview on networks in economics. We first look at the theoretical aspects of network economics using a game-theoretical approach. We derive some results on games on networks and network formation. We also study what happens when agents choose both links and actions. We then examine how these models can be used to address some applied and empirical-relevant questions by mainly focusing on labor-market networks and crime networks. We provide some empirical evidence on these two types of networks and address some policy implications of the models.
Keywords: criminal networks; games on networks; labor networks; network formation; Social networks
JEL: A14

總體經濟學實驗文獻回顧 by Duffy

John Duffy (forthcoming) “Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research." Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume 2, Princeton University Press. link to PDF. (本站複本)

Notes by yinung

終於找到文獻回顧了! (哈, 其實以前已經找過了,… 人的記憶力真的很脆弱…)

總體經濟實驗之貢獻分類:

1) 總體經濟之個體基礎評估
an assessment of the micro-assumptions underlying macroeconomic models,

2) 總體模型中預期形成之理解
a better understanding of the dynamics of expectations which play a critical role in macroeconomic models,

3)解決多重均衡下的均衡選擇問題
a means of resolving equilibrium selection (coordination) problems in environments with multiple equilibria,

4) 驗證沒有現地之料之總體模型預測結果
validation of macroeconomic model predictions for which field data are not available and

5) 各種總體政策干預對個人形為之影響
the impact of various macroeconomic policy interventions on individual behavior.

1) 總體經濟之個體基礎評估 (to be done)

主題例如: intertemporal consumption and savings decisions, inflation and unemployment, economic growth, bank runs, monetary exchange, monetary or fiscal policy

本文主要內容 (to be done)

2. Dynamic, Intertemporal Optimization

Optimal Consumption/Savings Decisions, Exponential discounting and infinite horizons

3. Coordination Problems

Poverty Traps, Bank Runs, Resolving Coordination Problems: Sunspots, Resolving Coordination Problems: The Global Game Approach

4. Sectoral Macroeconomics

5. Macroeconomic Policies

Ricardian equivalence, Commitment versus discretion, Monetary policy decision-making, Fiscal and tax policies, Exponential or Hyperbolic Discounting, Expectation Formation,