|By:||Lana Friesen (School of Economics, The University of Queensland)
We study the role of economic versus intrinsic motivations for dishonesty in two different experimental tasks. In the theft task, participants have the opportunity to steal real physical money, by taking more than they have actually earned in the task. In the reporting task, we use a production task with self-reporting of accidents to study the fraudulent provision of information by individuals. Reporting was compulsory for some participants, but only voluntary for others. We find the incidence of dishonesty varies significantly across both the tasks and the type of reporting, demonstrating that intrinsic motivations can often override economic incentives.
|By:||Roe, Brian E.
Wyszynski, Timothy E.
We find sale prices and net revenues received by sellers in the Midwestern club pig market are higher at traditional face-to-face auctions than at comparable Internet auctions. The comparison overcomes adverse selection issues that commonly plague such analyses by using data from sellers that allocated pigs to both markets based solely on exogenous differences in dates between online and offline auctions. Furthermore, both auctions feature ascending price formats with âsoft-endingsâ and remaining quality variation is controlled by using detailed information on animal, seller and event characteristics. The results suggest that the higher prices and net revenues from traditional auctions are attributable to remaining differences in auction format and buyer pools. Furthermore, sellers may be willing to forgo higher revenues to capture the convenience and flexibility provided by Internet auctions, to reach buyers in other regions that face different seasonality in demand and to stimulate demand for privately negotiated sales.
|Keywords:||auctions, electronic commerce, two-sided markets, livestock marketing, hedonic models, Agribusiness, Industrial Organization, Livestock Production/Industries, Marketing, D44, Q13,|
Richard J. Arend and Darryl A. Seale (2005) “Modeling alliance activity: an iterated prisoners’ dilemma with exit option." Strategic Management Journal, 26: 1057–1074. Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/smj.491
We present and solve a new, more accurate model of behavior within alliance activity. The model is essentially an iterated prisoners’ dilemma with an exit option in each stage of the alliance. The proposed solution results in each partner receiving its opportunity cost as its expected average pay-off in the alliance. Managerial implications include: identification of where to focus efforts to improve alliance cooperation and performance; and an explanation for why more sophisticated partnership strategies than tit-for-tat are likely to be superior in this game.
4/1 Meeting 所提到的
實驗類Paper報告重點(第0.1版).doc (application/msword) 31K.doc