Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma: Experimental evidence

Andreoni, J, Miller JH (1993) Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma: experimental evidence. Econ J 103: 570–585.  CrossRef

==from Google==
In the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, it is well known that defection in every game is the unique dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium. This follows from the familiar backward-induction arguments. Kreps et al. (i 982), however, show that if there is incomplete information …
被引用 386 次相關文章全部共 14 個版本;   dklevine.com 提供的 [PDF]

==notes by yinung==

此文沒有提及全部平均合作率, 只有 Figure 3 講到最後 2個 10 回合 PD game 結果

partners => 86% (1st round), above 50% (4-6 round), 0% (最後)

4 種情境 (皆玩 20 個 10回合之 PD game

  • Partners (14人, 兩人一組)

每回合對手皆相同 (電腦隨機決定配對之對手, 此後…)

  • Strangers (14人, 兩人一組)

每回合都換對手

  • Computer50

電腦報復 (tit-for-tat) 機率 50%

  • Computer0

電腦報復機率 1/1000

Matrix of the game

=========================
          合作     背叛
 合作     (7, 7)   (0, 12)
 背叛     (12,0)   (4, 4)
 =========================