Causes, Consequences, and Cures of Myopic Loss Aversion – An Experimental Investigation*

Fellner, G., & Sutter, M. (2009). Causes, Consequences, and Cures of Myopic Loss Aversion–An Experimental Investigation*. The Economic Journal, 119(537), 900-916. (Volume 119, Issue 537, ) DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02251.x; uibk.ac.at 提供的2008年版 [PDF]; hu-berlin.de 提供的 2005年版[PDF]; ***

==notes by yinung==

這篇有讓 subject 內生決定 H1 或 H3
(投資1期/3期)

==主要實驗結果圖表==

實驗基本設定

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符號意義:

H1/3: investment 1/3 period
F1: Feedback, 1 period

 

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第1期決定以後不能更能 H1/3

No-profit: 沒有給 profit 資訊
Profit:有給「告訴 subject, 選 3期, 其平均 profit 較高 」資訊

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內生決定 feedback: F1/3, 但每期都可投資

Profit: 和前述相同

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第1期被指定 H1/3; 第3期開始可以自訂(每3期一次), 轉換成本 40ECU (約報酬的 2.6%)

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==original abstract==

We use an experiment to examine the causes, consequences and possible cures of myopic loss aversion (MLA) for investment behaviour under risk. We find that both investment horizons and feedback frequency contribute almost equally to the effects of MLA. Longer investment horizons and less frequent feedback lead to higher investments. However, when given the choice, subjects prefer on average shorter investment horizons and more frequent feedback. Exploiting the status quo bias by setting a long investment horizon or low feedback frequency as a default turns out to be a successful behavioural intervention to increase investment levels.
廣告

Alternative damage rules and probabilistic intellectual property rights: Unjust enrichment, lost profits, and reasonable royalty remedies*

Jay Pil Choi (2009) “Alternative damage rules and probabilistic intellectual property rights: Unjust enrichment, lost profits, and reasonable royalty remedies." Information Economics and Policy, Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2009, Pages 145–157. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2008.11.001

==original Abstract==

This paper investigates how alternative damage rules in patent infringement cases shape competition when intellectual property rights are probabilistic. More specifically, I develop a simple model of oligopolistic competition to compare two main liability doctrines that have been used in the U.S. to assess infringement damages – the unjust enrichment rule and the lost profit rule. I show that the lost profit rule provides more protection to the patent holder than the unjust enrichment rule if the patent holder and infringer are equally efficient. When the lost profits from the infringement cannot be proved, the court accepts a “reasonable royalty rate” that would have been negotiated in a hypothetical bargaining situation as an alternative measure of damage. However, I point out that the concept of “reasonable” royalty rates lacks logical consistency when intellectual property rights are probabilistic.

Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences

Falk, Armin and James J. Heckman (2009), “Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences," Science , 326, 23 October, 535-8.

==Notes by yinung==

這篇在 Science 刊出的文章, 簡要地回顧實驗經濟之貢獻, 和對此一研究方法質疑之答辯。

FAQ of 經濟與行為實驗

1. 經濟實驗室之實驗脫離現實 (realism)

一般人認為,相對於現地實驗 (field experiment) 而言,實驗室之經濟實驗脫離現實,但 Falk 和 Heckman (2009) 認為,各種研究法的重點在於是否能有效區隔不同因素之影響,以能明白確定因果關係。Lab 實驗可以對其它條件有更多的控制,然而 field 實驗提供更多接近現實的其它條件之變異程度。兩者應該是互補關係,而非替代。

2. 實驗室之實驗報酬太低,使得受試者之誘因不足

Colin F. Camerer and Robin M. Hogarth (1999) 的 survey 文章回顧 74 篇實驗文獻,其中包含給予受試者低或高、甚至是零報酬的實驗。他們的結論是實驗中實際報酬對受試者的動機影響不一且複雜。兩種對給予受試者報酬的極端論點: (1) 貨幣報酬 (monetary rewards) 動機對受試者絕無影響; (2) 貨幣報酬可以完全消除受試者不理性之行為,皆是不正確的。而且許多實驗, 貨幣動機大小並不影響受試者的平均表現 (特別是市場交易的實驗),有些是毫無影響,甚至有些反而有反效果 (即貨幣報酬動機愈大,受試者反而表現愈不好)。

3. 受試者或觀察值過少

4. 受試者在被觀察之下的行為異於實驗室外的行為 (又稱 「Hawthorne 效果」)

如同在實驗室中的人決策行為, 一般人在真實世界的許多行為也是可被觀察的。lab 實驗反而可以研究 不同"被觀察程度" 對實驗結果之影響,例如 (以影像紀錄, single-blind, double-blind 等不同實驗進行方式)

5. 受試者是志願報名,故樣本有自我選擇之偏誤

這個問題同樣存在於 field 和 social experiment s, 並非只存在於 lab experiment。lab 實驗反而可以篩選控制受試者的背景,甚至研究不樣本篩選下,對實驗結果之影響。

==original Abstract==

Laboratory experiments are a widely used methodology for advancing causal knowledge in the physical and life sciences. With the exception of psychology, the adoption of laboratory experiments has been much slower in the social sciences, although during the past two decades the use of lab experiments has accelerated. Nonetheless, there remains considerable resistance among social scientists who argue that lab experiments lack “realism” and generalizability. In this article, we discuss the advantages and limitations of laboratory social science experiments by comparing them to research based on nonexperimental data and to field experiments. We argue that many recent objections against lab experiments are misguided and that even more lab experiments should be conducted.