Corruption in Committees: An Experimental Study of Information Aggregation through Voting

==noted by yinung==

這和我之前構想過的 committee (group) 決策行為之實驗有關
委員會中, 有專家和非專家。在專家公正的情況下,非專家棄權是正確的決定; 但若專家可能有 bias, 則非專家 (uninformed) 的投票可以抵消 biased 決策的形
Q1: 本文所提之 information efficiency 定義為何?
Individuals often vote in situations where they have less than perfect information about the choices before them. Moreover, information is typically asymmetrically distributed, where somevoters have better knowledge about the choices than others.

one norm is to delegate to the so-called experts, the individuals who are known to have better information
關鍵投票 vote is pivotal, either forces a tie or breaks a tie.
the uninformed voter’s participation has resulted in a worse outcome.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999), in a seminal set of papers, pointed out that voters with low information levels should avoid this “swing voter’s curse " and rationally abstain, delegating the choice to fully informed voters.
Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2008, 2010) Önd support for such “delegation through abstention."(以棄權方式來授權)
Using experiments, Morton and Tyran show that the equilibria with delegation through abstention are attractive to voters. Even when it is informationally efficient for all voters to participate, about half the time less informed voters abstain, delegating thedecision to more informed voters. (讓專業決定: let the experts decide)
Date: 2014-09-07
By: Rebecca Morton (Department of Politics, New York University)
Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, Copenhagen University)
We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that non-experts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention (棄權?) when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention, when the probability of corrupt experts is low, actually increases information efficiency in committee decision-making. However, if the probability of corrupt experts is large, the effect is not sufficient to offset the mechanical effect of decreased information efficiency due to corrupt experts. Our results demonstrate that the norm of “letting the expert decide” in committee voting is influenced by the probability of corrupt experts, and that influence can have, to a limited extent, a positive effect on information efficiency.
Keywords: Information aggregation, Voting, Asymmetric information, Swing voter’s curse
JEL: C92 D71 D72 D81 D82

When Ignorance is Bliss* : Information Asymmetries Enhance Prosocial Behavior in Dicator Games

Date: 2014
By: Winschel, Evguenia
Zahn, Philipp
In most laboratory experiments concerning prosocial behavior subjects are fully informed how their decision influences the payoff of other players. Outside the laboratory, however, individuals typically have to decide without such detailed knowledge. To asses the effect of information asymmetries on prosocial behavior, we conduct a laboratory experiment with a simple non-strategic interaction. A dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We observe subjects with heterogenous social preferences. While under symmetric information only individuals with the same type of preferences transfer, under asymmetric information different types transfer at the same time. As a consequence and the main finding of our experiment, uninformed dictators behave more prosocially than informed dictators.
Keywords: Asymmetric Information , Prosocial Behavior , Efficiency Concern , Inequality Aversion , Dictator Game
JEL: D82 C91

Information and consumer fraud in a signalling model

Date: 2014-01
By: Silvia Martínez-Gorricho (Dpto. Análisis Económico Aplicado)
This article considers a two-sided private information model. We assume that two exogenously given qualities are offered in a monopolistic market. Prices are fixed. A low quality seller chooses to be either honest (by charging the lower market price) or dishonest (by charging the higher price). We discuss the signaling role of the consumer’s private information on the equilibrium level of dishonesty, incidence of fraud and trade. We demonstrate that the equilibrium incidence of fraud is nonmonotonic in the buyer’s private information when the prior belief favors the low-quality seller strongly enough. This result holds as long as information is noisy and regardless of its private or public nature. Welfare consequences are ambiguous.
Keywords: Consumer Fraud; Asymmetric Information; Price Signalling
JEL: D42 D82 G14 L15 L51