A Fine Rule From a Brutish World? An Experiment on Endogenous Punishment Institution and Trust

==notes by yinung==

想法: 集體懲罰 (連坐法, 本文稱之為 collective punishment mechanism) versus 集體獎勵 對集體決策和個體決策之影響?

可以適用在小朋友身上? 或球隊成員身上 ==> 對幼童教育、企業組織、軍隊等不同主體之影響?

Q: 作者說, 連坐法顯著 increase trustworthiness, 且 to a lesser extent also trust; 不知 trustworthiness 和 trust 之間定義有何差異?

Date: 2015-09
By: H. Sun
M. Bigoni
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1031&r=net
By means of a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment mechanism within a one-shot binary trust game. The experiment comprises three games. In the first one, the only equilibrium strategy is not to trust, and not to reciprocate. In the second we exogenously introduce a sanctioning rule that imposes on untrustworthy second-movers a penalty proportional to the number of those who reciprocate trust. This generates a second equilibrium where everybody trusts and reciprocates. In the third game, the collective punishment mechanism is adopted through majority-voting. In line with the theory, we find that the exogenous introduction of the punishment mechanism significantly increases trustworthiness, and to a lesser extent also trust. However, in the third game the majority of subjects vote against it: subjects seem to be unable to endogenously adopt an institution which, when exogenously imposed, proves to be efficiency enhancing.
JEL: C72 C92 D72
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Ignorance and bias in collective decision:Theory and experiments

Ignorance and bias in collective decision:Theory and experiments
Date: 2014
By: Alexander Elvitar (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, (CIDE))
Andrei Gomberg (Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM))
César Martinelli (Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM))
Thomas R. Palfrey (California Institute of Technology)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cie:wpaper:1401&r=net
We consider a committee with common interests. Committee members do not know which of two alternatives is the best, but each member may acquire privately a costly signal before casting a vote under either majority or unanimity rule. In the lab, as predicted by Bayesian equilibrium, voters are more likely to acquire information under majority rule, and attempt to counter the bias built in favor of one alternative under unanimity rule. As opposed to Bayesian equilibrium predictions, however, some committee members vote for either alternative when uninformed. Moreover, uninformed voting is correlated with a lower disposition to acquire information. We show that an equilibrium model of subjective prior beliefs may account for this correlation, and provides a good fit for the observed patterns of behavior both in terms of rational ignorance and biases.
Keywords: Condorcet jury theorem, rational ignorance, homemade priors
JEL: D72 D83