This paper experimentally investigates individual information acquisition and decisions in ambiguous situations in which the degree of ambiguity can endogenously and individually be decreased by the subjects. In particular, I analyze how risk aversion, ambiguity attitude and personality traits are related to an individual’s information acquisition prior to a decision and to the decision itself based on this information. I focus on urn decisions and conduct treatments that consider the loss and gain domain separately and that vary the amount of available information and the probabilistic structure.
|Keywords:||Ambiguity aversion; risk aversion; experiment; decision making; information acquisition; personality traits|
|JEL:||C91 D03 D81|
Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations, reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior are almost nonexistent. We study sabotage (怠工,破壞活動,破壞(vi.)從事破壞活動(vt.)妨害,破壞) in repeated tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and observe that effort and sabotage are higher for higher wage spreads. Additionally, we find that also in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name “sabotage.” Communication among principal and agents can curb sabotage when they agree on flat prize structures and increased output. If sabotage is not possible, the principals choose tournament incentives more often.
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