Ordering effects and strategic response in discrete choice experiments

Ordering effects and strategic response in discrete choice experiments

Date: 2010-03
By: Scheufele, Gabriela
Bennett, Jeff
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eerhrr:107743&r=net
This study explores ordering effects and response strategies in repeated binary discrete choice experiments (DCE). Mechanism design theory and empirical evidence suggest that repeated choice tasks per respondent introduce strategic behavior. We find evidence that the order in which choice sets are presented to respondents may provide strategic opportunities that affect choice decisions (âstrategic responseâ). The findings propose that the âstrategic responseâ does not follow strong cost-minimization but other strategies such as weak cost-minimization or good deal/ bad deal heuristics. Evidence further suggests that participants, as they answer more choice questions, not only make more accurate choices (âinstitutional learningâ) but may also become increasingly aware of and learn to take advantage of the order in which choice sets are presented to them (âstrategic learningâ).
Keywords: discrete choice experiments, incentive compatibility, mixed logit models, ordering effects, repeated binary choice task, response strategies, Environmental Economics and Policy,