Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma
DM Kreps, P Milgrom… – Journal of Economic Theory, 1982 – Elsevier
A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the single-period dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in …
被引用 1659 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 11 個版本; edegan.com 提供的 [PDF]
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma: Experimental evidence
J Andreoni… – The Economic Journal, 1993 – JSTOR
In the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, it is well known that defection in every game is the unique dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium. This follows from the familiar backward-induction arguments. Kreps et al. (i 982), however, show that if there is incomplete information …
被引用 386 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 14 個版本; dklevine.com 提供的 [PDF]
Notes by Yi-Nung
Kreps et al. (1982) 提出了一個引發許多後續研究的有趣模型，他們證明在有限重覆的 PD 賽局中，如果賽局雙方對其對手之行為模式有某種的不完全資訊的話，則在此有限重覆的賽局之早期中，雙方皆採合作策略是符合理性的。…(待續)
Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner’s dilemma games
R Cooper, DV DeJong, R Forsythe… – Games and Economic …, 1996 – econ.ucsd.edu… 0013 Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner’s Dilemma Games*
knowledge of rationality does not hold in this theoretical structure. …
被引用 218 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 13 個版本 ; ucsd.edu 提供的 [PDF]
Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner’s dilemma game
J Brosig – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2002 – Elsevier
… that individuals with a cooperative disposition experience strong emotions that prevent them from cheating, then it should also be observed that, after communicating, these individuals will not exploit the expected cooperation of their partner in prisoner’s dilemma games. …
被引用 88 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 12 個版本; usc.edu 提供的 [PDF]
The evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games: Experimental evidence
PD Bo… – The American Economic Review, 2011 – ingentaconnect.com
… criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not pro- vide … solution has been provided to the problem of equilibrium selection: when both cooperation and defection … Previous experimental evidence has shown that subjects often fail to coordinate on a spe- cific …
被引用 43 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 34 個版本; brown.edu 提供的 [PDF]
Tacit Cooperation, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence from Repeated Dominance Solvable Games
JB Van Huyck, JM Wildenthal… – Games and Economic …, 2002 – Elsevier
… R. Cooper, DV DeJong, R. Forsythe and TW Ross, Cooperation with–out Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoners … P. Milgrom, J. Roberts and R. Wilson, Rational Cooperation in the … and JK Murnighan, Equilibrium Behavior and Repeated Play of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. …
被引用 24 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 11 個版本; psu.edu 提供的 [PDF]
Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination
G Charness, GR Fréchette… – Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 – Elsevier
… We wished to not only test the general effectiveness of endogenous payments for cooperation … We noted earlier that mutual cooperation is the unique action pair consistent with SPE … As controls, we conducted one session for each game without the possibility of transfer payments …
被引用 25 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 18 個版本; escholarship.org 提供的 [PDF]
The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment
HT Normann, B Wallace – University of London Royal Holloway …, 2006 – papers.ssrn.com
… unknown horizon would be. Empirically, however, it is well known that stable cooperation does occur also in finitely repeated games. – A related concern is to avoid end–game effects. Morehous (1966) observed that defection …
被引用 31 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 6 個版本; uni-duesseldorf.de 提供的 [PDF]
Co–operation in infinitely repeated games: Extending theory and experimental evidence
M Blonski, P Ockenfels… – JW Goethe Universität Frankfurt, …, 2007 – luiss.it
A proper understanding of the determinants of co–operation is crucial for the social sciences. In this paper we propose a novel theoretical tool that enhances this understanding. Accordingly we present experimental evidence designed to differentiate clearly among the prevailing …
被引用 7 次 – 相關文章 – HTML 版 – 全部共 2 個版本 ; luiss.it 提供的 [PDF]
Notes by Yi-Nung
這篇談及了讓人們之合作較容易形成的四個條件 (Mailath G. and L. Samuelson, 2006):
(i) 合作利得相對大於不合作
(ii) 對手採合作下, 不合作利得相對小
(iii) 因不合作而預期被報復 (或懲罰) 的恐懼或嚴重性高
(iv) 較有耐心或較重視未來價值者
AE Roth… – Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1978 – Elsevier
… Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoner’s dilemma. … Two equilibrium indices are derived and are compared with two cooperation indices proposed by … Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people’s behavior in a commons dilemma situation. …
被引用 100 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 4 個版本; harvard.edu 提供的 [PDF]
Notes by Yi-Nung
這篇是 PD game ending-rule 設成 q = (1-p) 的原始文獻 (其中也有實驗)
其中其實已經提到 ‘Tit-for-Tat’ 策略 (不只是從 Kreps et al. 1982, JET 來的):
… a player to play his cooperative choice in the first period, and in every other period to play the same choice that his opponent made in the previous period.
The [experimental] findings also indicated that the last play of an n-period game may result in a reduction in cooperative choices.
應該把 ending-rule 設成機率的原因:
It is often contended in the literature that if subjects are not informed of the number periods to be played, the resulting game yields the same equilibria as the infinite game, since no period is known to be the last. However, this is a considerable oversimplification. Since it is apparent that the game must eventually terminate, subjects must form subctive probabilities greater than zero that a given period might be the last. Although such obabilities have neither been observed nor controlled by experimenters, we shall see that they play a critical role in determining the nature of equilibrium outcomes. (原因何在?)
P. 195
Morehous’s (1966) results for a game with a fixed duration of 1, 2, 5, or 10 periods are an important comparison. He reports no significant difference in the amount of cooperation evidenced in these games, although the results were in the same direction as our results.
有關 face-to-face
E Williams – Psychological Bulletin, 1977 – psycnet.apa.org
… 1971) again used the Prisoner’s Dilemma, though only one of the pair was a subject, the other being a confederate. At certain points in the game, the confederate gave standardized friendly or unfriendly mes- sages in written form, by audio only, by audio-video, or face to face. …
被引用 354 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 4 個版本
The sound of silence in prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games
I Bohnet… – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1999 – Elsevier
… exchanged in face–to–face interactions which induces individuals to change their behavior, but rather the participants’ identification. While mutual identification allows for reciprocity, one-way identification excludes future social sanctions. In the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game …
被引用 243 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 12 個版本; psu.edu 提供的 [PDF]
Collective action and the evolution of social norms
E Ostrom – The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000 – JSTOR
… To the surprise of the experimenters, a higher level of cooperation occurred in the control groups that played the regular prisoner’s dilemma in both phases, especially for those who communicated on a face–to–face basis. The …
被引用 946 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 35 個版本, 192.12.12.16 提供的 [PDF]
Some consequences of e-mail vs. face–to–face communication in experiment
N Frohlich… – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 1998 – Elsevier
… be that when there is substantial substance to communicate and debate because subjects face a complex decision, face–to–face interaction helps establish what both individual and group interests dictate. The act of talking with one another may reveal the underlying dilemma. …
被引用 78 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 11 個版本; jku.at 提供的 [PDF]
Do economists make bad citizens?
RH Frank, TD Gilovich… – The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1996 – JSTOR
… In naturally occurring social dilemmas, face–to–face promises are sometimes an option, sometimes not. … But when combined with our survey of charitable giving and the results of our prisoner’s dilemma experiments-as well as parallel findings reported by Marwell and Ames (1981 …
被引用 181 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 13 個版本; unimc.it 提供的 [PDF]
M Shubik – Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1970 – JSTOR
… interaction. Third parties and writ- ten documents, as well as the avoidance of individual face–to–face confrontation, are often used to remove sociopsychological factors. … Let us return to our specific analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. When …
被引用 86 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 6 個版本; auth.gr 提供的 [PDF]
The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face
yinung: 看一些 smile 的照片後， 再進行實驗
JPW Scharlemann, CC Eckel, A Kacelnik… – Journal of Economic …, 2001 – Elsevier
… Choosing the cooperative strategy is risky, because cheaters can always take advantage of the cooperator. In a prisoner’s dilemma game, defecting leaves the cheater better off and makes the cooperator worse off. In an exchange relationship the same is true. …
被引用 139 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 14 個版本; psu.edu 提供的 [PDF]
和電腦互動的文獻
A prisoner’s dilemma experiment on cooperation with people and human-like computers.
S Kiesler, L Sproull… – Journal of Personality and Social …, 1996 – psycnet.apa.org
… Andreoni and Miller (1993) obtained moderately high coop- eration rates by having participants play a prisoner’s dilemma game with an acquaintance of the … 3 As would be expected in the absence of visibility and face–to–face communication, cooperation rates are lower in these …
被引用 106 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 11 個版本; nagoya-u.ac.jp 提供的 [PDF]
與 end-game effect 有關
Normann and Wallace (2012, IJGT) The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment
此文提到其它 end-game 的文獻：(最早?) Morehous (1966), Axelrod (1984), Murnighan and Roth (1983), Holt (1985)
Andreoni and John H. Miller (1993) Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence
已注意到 end-game 但避談 (用刪去最後樣本來處理)
Wichman, Harvey. 1970. ‘‘Effects of Isolation and Communication on Cooperation in a Two-Person Game.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 16:114–20.
行為 & 經濟實驗文獻注 (備忘) by 楊奕農 