On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information

Schmitz, Patrick W. “On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information." Journal of Economic Theory 106.1 (2002): 177-189.uni-muenchen.de 提供的 [PDF]


Consider a research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot develop a marketable final product based on the new technology. There are two downstream firms that might successfully develop the new product. If the downstream firms’ benefits from being the sole supplier of the new product are private information, the research lab will sometimes sell two licenses, even though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive license. This is in contrast to the standard result that a monopolist will sometimes serve fewer, but never more buyers when there is private information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L12, D45, D82


  • licenses;
  • innovation;
  • monopoly;
  • private information

On the aggregation of information in competitive markets

Martin F Hellwig (1980) “On the aggregation of information in competitive markets." Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 22, Issue 3, June 1980, Pages 477–498. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90056-3,