Tell Me How to Rule: Leadership, Delegation, and Voice in Cooperation

Date: 2016
By: Marco Faillo
Federico Fornasari
Luigi Mittone
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpce:1604&r=net
Following some recent studies, we experimentally test the effect of intra-group leadership in a public good experiment. Specifically, individuals taking part in our experiment are randomly assigned either the role of leader or the role of follower. Leaders take part in a public good game, aware of the fact that every decision they make directly affects their followers. In this sense, our experimental setting combines the dimension of leadership in cooperation with the one of delegated agents. In our experiment, we find that leadership produces two main effects: subjects contribute more, and tend to punish more frequently. In spite of the presence of higher contributions, we observe lower payoffs; these are caused by an aggressive behavior that push leaders to mane an undue use of punishment. Allowing one-sided communication between followers and leaders provide a different effect: communication reduces decision makers’ aggressiveness, leading to lower contributions and punishment, but better results in terms of final payoffs. The same welfare can be reached when leadership is not implemented at all; this suggests that the presence of a dictatorial leader in public goods with punishment can be beneficial only when there is communication.
Keywords: Voluntary contribution experiment, Leadership, Punishment
JEL: C72 C92 H41 O12
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Leaders as Role Models for the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

Date: 2014-10
By: Gächter, Simon (University of Nottingham)
Renner, Elke (University of Nottingham)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8580&r=net
We investigate the link between leadership, beliefs and pro-social behavior. This link is interesting because field evidence suggests that people’s behavior in domains like charitable giving, tax evasion, corporate culture and corruption is influenced by leaders (CEOs, politicians) and beliefs about others’ behavior. Our framework is an experimental public goods game with a leader. We find that leaders strongly shape their followers’ initial beliefs and contributions. In later rounds, followers put more weight on other followers’ past behavior than on the leader’s current action. This creates a path dependency the leader can hardly correct. We discuss the implications for understanding belief effects in naturally occurring situations.
Keywords: leadership, beliefs, experiments, public goods, path dependency, public policy, management
JEL: C72 C90 H41 Z13