An Experimental Study of Persuasion Bias and Social Influence in Networks

==Noted by yinung==
這篇和我之前的想法有點像, 不同處在於, 我是以小團體 (例如委員會) 中的資訊發表 (或擴散) 模式來探討, 並以多數決、一致決、不同意見發表能見度機率…來建構實驗; 這篇則是以連結數為主的設計 (比較適合一般網路世界)。
突然產生一個研究想法, 若 one of the committee members 想要增加他自已的影響力, 他才有過度發表 (宣傳) 他的意見的動機; 故在實驗設計中:
1. 每個 agent 有自已的 private signals (各有準確的機率), 或某些人還有 public reputation (比自己的 private signal 準確率高/低)
2. 每個 agent 動機都是為 group 好 / 加入 agent 自已的 utility, 認同他的人愈多, 則 utility 愈大)
3. 這個特別的 agent 可能是經理, 主席, 社團領袖, 只是普通的組員 (強調不同決策形成模式)
    經理: 獨裁但負全責
    主席: 多數決, 責任分擔
    社團領袖: 共識決, , 責任分擔
    普通組員: 非意見領袖
Date: 2014-10
By: Jordi Brandts (Institutd’AnalisiEconomica(CSIC))
Ayça Ebru Giritligil (Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies)
Roberto A. Weber (Department of Economics, University of Zurich)
In many areas of social life individuals receive information about a particular issue of interest from multiple sources. When these sources are connected through a network then proper aggregation of this information by an individual involves taking into account the structure of this network. The inability to aggregate properly may lead to various types of distortions. In our experiment a number of agents all want to find out the value of a particular parameter unknown to all. Agents receive private signals about the parameter and agents can communicate their estimates of the parameter repeatedly through a network, the structure of which is known by all players. We present results from experiments with four different networks. We find that the information of agents who have more outgoing links in a network gets more weight in the information aggregation of the other agents than it optimally should. Our results are consistent with the model of “persuasion bias” of De Marzo et al. (2003) and at odds with an alternative heuristic according to which the most influential agents are those with more incoming links.