Social Capital to Induce a Contribution to Environmental Collective Action in Indonesia: An Experimental Method

Date: 2014
By: Alin Halimatussadiah
Budy P. Resosudarmo
Diah Widyawati
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pas:papers:2014-03&r=net
Social capital is considered to be an important factor in economic development. It is argued that it generates a flow of (economic) benefits through collective action, by reducing free riding and increasing individual contribution. This study examines whether social capital increases individual contribution in a collective action situation. Using a classroom experiment, two games are played in a sequential manner: a trust game to measure level of trust–as a proxy for social capital–and a public goods game to measure individual contribution to collective action. In the public goods game, we apply some treatments to look at the impact of partial disclosure of a group member’s behaviour in the trust game on contributions in the public goods game. In general, the result shows that the level of social capital positively impacts individual contribution to collective action. However, we found no significant evidence to support the impact of partial disclosure of a group member’s behaviour in the trust game on contributions in the public goods game.
Keywords: Social Capital, Collective Action, Trust Game, Public Goods Game
JEL: A14 C91 C92
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Social capital dynamics and collective action: the role of subjective satisfaction

Social capital dynamics and collective action: the role of subjective satisfaction

Date: 2011-06
By: Leonardo Becchetti (Department of Economics, Universitˆ Tor Vergata)
Stefano Castriota (Department of Economics, Universitˆ di Perugia)
Pierluigi Conzo (Università di Roma Tor Vergata & EIEF)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp29&r=net
In low income countries grass-root collective action is a well known substitute for government provision of public goods. In our research we wonder what is its effect on the law of motion of social capital, a crucial microeconomic determinant of economic development. To this purpose we structure a ?sandwich? experiment in which participants play a public good game (PGG) between two trust games (TG1 and TG2). Our findings show that the change in trustworthiness between the two trust game rounds generated by the PGG treatment is crucially affected by the subjective satisfaction about the PGG rather than by standard objective measures related to PGG players? behavior. These results highlight that subjective satisfaction after collective action has relevant predictive power on social capital creation providing information which can be crucial to design successful self-organized resource regimes.
Keywords: trust games, public good games, randomized experiment, social capital, subjective wellbeing
JEL: O12