Social Capital to Induce a Contribution to Environmental Collective Action in Indonesia: An Experimental Method

Date: 2014
By: Alin Halimatussadiah
Budy P. Resosudarmo
Diah Widyawati
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pas:papers:2014-03&r=net
Social capital is considered to be an important factor in economic development. It is argued that it generates a flow of (economic) benefits through collective action, by reducing free riding and increasing individual contribution. This study examines whether social capital increases individual contribution in a collective action situation. Using a classroom experiment, two games are played in a sequential manner: a trust game to measure level of trust–as a proxy for social capital–and a public goods game to measure individual contribution to collective action. In the public goods game, we apply some treatments to look at the impact of partial disclosure of a group member’s behaviour in the trust game on contributions in the public goods game. In general, the result shows that the level of social capital positively impacts individual contribution to collective action. However, we found no significant evidence to support the impact of partial disclosure of a group member’s behaviour in the trust game on contributions in the public goods game.
Keywords: Social Capital, Collective Action, Trust Game, Public Goods Game
JEL: A14 C91 C92
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A comparison of endogenous and exogenous timing in a social learning experiment

Date: 2013
By: Meub, Lukas
Proeger, Till
Hüning, Hendrik
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:167&r=net
This paper experimentally investigates social learning in a two-agent prediction game with both exogenous and endogenous ordering of decisions and a continuous action space. Given that individuals regularly fail to apply rational timing, we refrain from implementing optimal timing of decisions conditional on signal strength. This always renders it optimal to outwait the other player regardless of private signals and induces a gamble on the optimal timing and action. In this setting, we compare exogenous and endogenous ordering in terms of informational efficiency, strategic delay and social welfare. We find that more efficient observational learning leads to more accurate predictions in the endogenous treatments and increases informational efficiency compared to the benchmark exogenous treatment. Overall, subjects act sensitively to waiting costs, with higher costs fostering earlier decisions that reduce informational efficiency. For a simple implementation of waiting costs, subjects more successfully internalize information externalities by adjusting their timing according to signal strength. Simultaneous decisions in endogenous ordering avoid observational learning and compensate the higher degree of rational decisions. Overall, endogenous timing has no net effect on social welfare, as gains in accuracy are fully compensated by waiting costs. Our results hold relevance for social learning environments characterized by a continuous action space and the endogenous timing of decisions. —
Keywords: Endogenous Timing,Information Externalities,Laboratory Experiment,Social Learning,Strategic Delay
JEL: C91