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5G 競標第 5 天，第 42 回合暫總標金 346.86 億元
Economists have lately been called upon not only to analyze markets, but to design them. Market design involves a responsibility for detail, a need to deal with all of a market’s complications, not just its principle features. Designers therefore cannot work only with the simple conceptual models used for theoretical insights into the general working of markets. Instead, market design calls for an engineering approach. Drawing primarily on the design of the entry level labor market for American doctors (the National Resident Matching Program), and of the auctions of radio spectrum conducted by the Federal Communications Commission, this paper makes the case that experimental and computational economics are natural complements to game theory in the work of design. The paper also argues that some of the challenges facing both markets involve dealing with related kinds of complementarities, and that this suggests an agenda for future theoretical research.
KEYWORDS:Market design, game theory, experimental economics, computational economics
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. “Mindful economics: The production, consumption, and value of beliefs." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30.3 (2016): 141-64. [PDF] aeaweb.org
人類的 heuristics and biases (Tversky and Kahneman 1974)
(as discussed in a “Symposium on Overconfidence” in the Fall 2015 issue of this journal)
YNY: moderate overconfidence can be helpful to enhance people’s ability to do things and interact with others successfully. Overoptimistic individuals often work more, save more, expect to retire later, and much healthier.
- confirmation bias,
- distorted probability weighting
本文回顧 growing literature on motivated beliefs and reasoning
==cited by Bruno S. Frey==
[This article] provides a most useful survey of recent insights of psychology but also makes a successful effort to integrate them into economics. They deal with heuristics and biases inconsistent with the standard homo oeconomicus such as over-confidence, confirmation bias, distorted probability weighting, and other cognitive mistakes.
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. “Incentives and prosocial behavior." American economic review 96.5 (2006): 1652-1678. [PDF] princeton.edu
What is, therefore, the broader set of motives that shape people’s social conduct, and how do these motives interact with each other and the economic environment?
At a local Best Buy, a child places a new Sony PlayStation 3 on the cashier’ scounter while the parents dig out their Visa card. The gaming system and the payment card may appear to have little connection other than this purchase. However, these two items share an important characteristic that is generating a series of economic insights and has important implications for strategic decision making and economic policy making. Both video game systems and payment cards are examples of two-sided markets.
1. 請連線Master Journal List網頁：http://mjl.clarivate.com/
SCIE 全稱為 Science Citation Index Expanded
SSCI 全稱為 Social Sciences Citation Index
以 Agricultural Finance Review 為例, 蒐尋結果如下
Smith 提到了 OPM (other person’s money) 問題，可以用以下的方式解決
We could give the constant positive sum ultimatum game economic content as follows: Each player provides $M of his own money. Some procedure is used for pairing the subjects, and determining who is to be Player 1 and who Player 2; this procedure in some variations might incorporate an earned and/or investment feature. It is understood that their pairing has economic significance in the sense that there are synergistic gains from the interaction equal to some fixed sum y > 2M. The experimenter provides only the surplus above 2M which represents the gains from specialization and exchange, as this is the one reliable source of a “free lunch” that converts economic systems into non-zero sum games. Hence, the total to be shared under the property right rules of the game is 2M + y, making it feasible for each to receive a share of the jointly created net gain above their pooled initial contribution, 2M.