Experimental Economics, Vol. 21, Issue 2 – New Issue Alert

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New Issue Alert
04/27/2018
Dear Reader,

We are pleased to deliver your requested table of contents alert for Experimental Economics. Volume 21 Number 2 is now available online.

In this issue
Original Paper

Measuring higher order ambiguity preferences

Aurélien Baillon, Harris Schlesinger & Gijs van de Kuilen

» Abstract » Full text PDF
Original Paper

Experimental study of cursed equilibrium in a signaling game

Nichole Szembrot

» Abstract » Full text PDF
Original Paper

Loss aversion and the quantity–quality tradeoff

Jared Rubin, Anya Samek & Roman M. Sheremeta

» Abstract » Full text PDF
Original Paper

Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects

Charles Bellemare, Alexander Sebald & Sigrid Suetens

» Abstract » Full text PDF
Original Paper

Does the paradox of plenty exist? Experimental evidence on the curse of resource abundance

Andreas Leibbrandt & John Lynham

» Abstract » Full text PDF
Original Paper

Peer effects in computer assisted learning: evidence from a randomized experiment

Marcel Fafchamps & Di Mo

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Original Paper

The BCD of response time analysis in experimental economics

Leonidas Spiliopoulos & Andreas Ortmann

» Abstract » Full text PDF
Original Paper

Higher-order risk preferences in social settings

Timo Heinrich & Thomas Mayrhofer

» Abstract » Full text PDF
Original Paper

Focusing on volatility information instead of portfolio weights as an aid to investor decisions

Christian Ehm, Christine Laudenbach & Martin Weber

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廣告

Causal Effects Model 的估計

==Causal Effects 估計範例==

in Angrist and Pischke (2017, JEP, p130-132),主要提出觀念的是 Dale and Kruger (2002, QJE)

他們想估計美國唸私立大學和唸公立大學的差異,用較明確的因果關係為主的估計法。

Casusal Effect: 在申請入學時,同時接到私大和州大入學許可,但最後後選擇唸私大、或州大的學生為樣本:

Yi: 全部的樣本的畢業生所得,可觀察的,其中又分為兩類

Y1i : 第 i 個樣本的「受私校教育後」所得

Y0i : 第 i 個樣本的「受州校教育後」所得

以上兩個,令

Pi: =1 if 第 i 個樣本唸私立,=0 otherwise 唸州立大學

合理的假設是,每個人在受大學教育之前,原本就有一定的能力

Y10 : 第 i 個樣本的原來能力
重點:美國私立大學教學效果,是否來自教學,還是學生的本質。

因為好學生集中去唸名私校,所以畢業後收入高,不見得是私校的努力。這個稱為 selection bias 樣本選擇偏誤。

私校的教學效果 (用大概畢業20年後的 earning 來衡量) 之差異為:

Y1i – Y0i

若教學有效的話,然後差異的平均是 β

H0 : E(Y1i – Y0i) = β>0

假設E(Y0i) = α, 即

Y0i =α + ηi

α 為學生原來的潛力, ηi是誤差,或個別差異,這個個別差異會和選私校有關係,例如家庭背景、爸媽是否畢業於私立..。
Caussal-Effect model

Yi = α+βPi+ηi

Pi 和 ηi 是(統計上)不獨立的,也就是無法滿足迴歸上原來的獨立性要求。

這個 causal-effect model 的想法創新就在此,他們提出比較不嚴格的「條件獨立性假設」(conditional independence assumption),

E(ηi|Pi,Xi) = E(ηi|Xi)

所以要找其它的可能影響畢業後所得能力的變數 X (例如 SAT 的分數…),來加入估計,觀念上是

E(ηi|Pi,Xi) = E(ηi|Xi) = E(ηi|Xi)

所以, causal-effect model 最後就變成

Yi=α+βPi+γXi+ηi

此法可建構出 unbias 和 consistent 的 β 估計,而且它有明確的意義:唸私校和唸公校的「效果差異」平均值。
==ref==

Angrist, Joshua D., and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. “Undergraduate econometrics instruction: through our classes, darkly." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31.2 (2017): 125-44.

Dale, Stacy Berg, and Alan B. Krueger. “Estimating the payoff to attending a more selective college: An application of selection on observables and unobservables." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117.4 (2002): 1491-1527.

 On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey

Pedro Dal Bó and Guillaume R. Fréchette

A growing experimental literature studies the determinants of cooperation in infinitely repeated games, tests different predictions of the theory, and suggests an empirical solution to the problem of multiple equilibria. To provide a robust description of the literature’s findings, we gather and analyze a metadata set of experiments on infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. The experimental data show that cooperation is affected by infinite repetition and is more likely to arise when it can be supported in equilibrium. However, the fact that cooperation can be supported in equilibrium does not imply that most subjects will cooperate. High cooperation rates will emerge only when the parameters of the repeated game are such that cooperation is very robust to strategic uncertainty. We also review the results regarding the effect of imperfect monitoring, changing partners, and personal characteristics on cooperation and the strategies used to support it.
Full-Text Access | Supplementary Materials

New directions for modelling strategic behavior: Game-theoretic models of communication, coordination, and cooperation in economic relationships

Crawford, Vincent P. “New directions for modelling strategic behavior: Game-theoretic models of communication, coordination, and cooperation in economic relationships." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30.4 (2016): 131-50.

URL:http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.30.4.131

==original Abstract==

In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory’s principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking" and “learning" rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments

Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics

The reproducibility of scientific findings has been called into question. To contribute data about reproducibility in economics, we replicate 18 studies published in the American Economic Review and the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 2011-2014. All replications follow predefined analysis plans publicly posted prior to the replications, and have a statistical power of at least 90% to detect the original effect size at the 5% significance level. We find a significant effect in the same direction as the original study for 11 replications (61%); on average the replicated effect size is 66% of the original. The reproducibility rate varies between 67% and 78% for four additional reproducibility indicators, including a prediction market measure of peer beliefs.

Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics.pdf

舊書新入

剛得獎的作者,熱騰騰

(書中提到,他的第一篇在 JF 刊出的大作,竟然是「破例」開門錄取的論文…因為大大不同於「效率市場假說」的傳統觀點)

經濟學是科學嗎?

經濟學是科學嗎?

來源:科學月刊,2014 年 5 月號。

諾貝爾經濟獎於 1969 年設立,在 48 年的頒獎中,總共有 24 年均有當時在芝加哥大學任教或研究的經濟學家。沙勒兒是第 34 位獲此殊榮的芝加哥大學學者,但他的理論卻完全與「芝加哥經濟學派」(Chicago school of economics)的理性經濟學說相反!

    P9.pdf

    ESA-announce WZB Berlin oTree Hackathon 26-29 October

    The first WZB oTree Hackathon, to be held 26-29 October 2017 at Berlin Social Science Center (WZB) in Berlin.

    Jointly sponsored by WZB and LEEPS lab, University of California Santa Cruz, the hackathon is intended to bring the sprawling oTree community together. Programmers and researchers will connect and exchange ideas, and will extend oTree’s capabilities. Participants will form teams with 2-5 members and intensively develop a project helpful for their own research and for the oTree community. The event is targeted both at seasoned programmers who want to develop new oTree techniques and economists interested in using oTree in their research. Also, we will be organizing a crash course for folks unfamiliar with oTree.

    If you want to find out more about the WZB oTree hackathon (or what a hackathon is) visit our Hackathon website at https://www.wzb.eu/en/events/wzb-otree-hackathon

    Registration is open till October 15. If you want to atted, please send an email to gebhard.glock by October 15, indicating your name and institution.

    Accomodation is available at Motel One (An der Urania 12, 10787 Berlin) and can be booked until September 28 by sending the hotel reservation form to the hotel. Accommodation costs during the hackathon can be reimbursed for graduate students, and food for all participants will be provided at WZB. Airfare or any other transportation costs cannot be reimbursed.

    We hope to see you soon in Berlin!

    Perceived social presence reduces fact-checking

    Jun, Y., Meng, R., & Johar, G. V. (2017). Perceived social presence reduces fact-checking. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(23), 5976–5981.

    人們一旦覺察到其他讀者的存在,進行事實查核的意願便會降低

    主要的實驗流程是這樣的:實驗參與者必須登入某新聞網站並在上面閱讀三十多個新聞標題,但這些標題有真有假,參與者的工作便是決定哪些標題是真的哪些標題是假的。每答對一題得一分,但若答錯一題也會被扣一分,最終的分數會被換算成金錢發放給參與者。選項有三個,除了「真」和「假」之外,還有「事實查核」這第三個選項。如果參與者在某一題選了「事實查核」這個選項,那他就可以在實驗結束時得知這一題的正確答案。

    ……
    參與者被分成兩組,其中一組人在登入新聞網站後,會見到自己的名字顯示在網頁角落,在此將這組稱之為「單獨」組。另一組人在登入後,除了自己的名字外,還會看到另外 102 個正在線上的其他使用者的名字,稱之為「群體」組。

    接下來的實驗更神奇了。研究者把原本的「新聞網站」改成「Facebook」,也就是讓參與者在Facebook的介面上讀這些新聞標題並判斷真偽。結果當介面換成 Facebook 這種社交網站之後,「單獨」組選擇「事實查核」的比例竟然降得跟「群體」組一樣低。

    最後一個實驗中,研究者想知道人們的警覺是不是造成「群體」組事實查核比例較低這個現象的原因之一,於是便要求參與者在開始讀新聞之前先回想自己過去和現在的職責、義務與責任(duties, obligations, and responsibilities)。這麼一做果然讓「群體」組選擇「事實查核」的比例增加到跟「單獨」組一樣高!

    來源:pansci.asia/archives/123642