BDM程序 (Becker, Degroot, and Marschak) 是一種廣泛使用的激勵相容機制，用於測量個人對消費品和其他體驗的價值（例如，Budescu、Weinberg和Wallsten，1988；Fox、Rogers和Tversky，1996；Kahneman、Knetsch和Thaler，1990；Prelec和Simester，2001）。在使用此程序時，參與者被告知可獲得貨物的銷售價格分佈，並被要求指出其保留價格。完成後，從價格分佈中隨機抽取一個售價（實現價格），並實施適當的結果：如果保留價格超過實現價格，決策者將獲得貨物並支付實現價格；如果保留價格低於實現價格，決策者將不獲得貨物並且不支付任何費用。
==see also==
Becker, Gordon M., Morris H. Degroot, and Jacob Marschak. “Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method." Behavioral Science 9.3 (1964): 226-232. [pdf]
Smith, Stephanie M., and Ian Krajbich. “Mental representations distinguish value-based decisions from perceptual decisions." Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 28 (2021): 1413-1422. [web] [pdf]
==YNY’s notes==
value-based 和 perceptual decisions 的分類和例子
For example, value-based decisions include choosing which food you want to eat or which gamble you want to take, while perceptual decisions include determining which direction a group of flickering dots is moving (Roitman & Shadlen, 2002) or which line segment is closest to horizontal (as in Tavares et al., 2017).
However, there is another important divide typical of these tasks: the source of information required to make the decision. Perceptual decisions generally rely on evaluations of stimuli, while value-based decisions rely on memory-based representations. This second division follows from research that has established distinct neural mechanisms for memory versus perception (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2014; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991; Suzuki & Baxter, 2009).
==see also==
Trueblood, Jennifer S., and Jonathan C. Pettibone. “The phantom decoy effect in perceptual decision making." Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 30.2 (2017): 157-167. [PDF] wiley.com
==abstract==
幻影誘餌是指一種在進行選擇時，尚不存在的替代方案，但這個方案卻優於另一個“目標”選擇。…
A phantom decoy is an alternative that is superior to another “target” option but is unavailable at the time of choice. In value-based decisions involving phantom decoys (e.g., consumer choices), individuals often show increased preference for the similar, inferior target option over a non-dominated competitor alternative. Unlike value-based decisions that are driven by subjective goals, perceptual decisions typically have an outside criterion that defines the goal of the task (e.g., target is present or absent). Despite their obvious differences, past research has documented a number of commonalities between both types of decisions. In a set of three experiments, we examine the influence of phantom options on simple perceptual decisions and point out a critical difference between perceptual and value-based decisions. Our results show that in perceptual choice, participants prefer competitor options to target options, the opposite of the pattern typically found in consumer choice. We use the results of the experiments to examine the predictions of four different models of context effects including loss aversion and dynamic, preference accumulation models. We find that accumulation models provide the best explanation for our results as well as being able to generalize to other context effects.
==refer to==
感知決策是指利用感官信息引導行為以應對外部世界的過程
Perceptual decision making is the process by which sensory information is used to guide behavior toward the external world. (2014)
在感知決策過程中，即使在兩者對正確決策同樣具有信息的任務中，受試者通常更強烈地依賴早期感官證據，而不是後期證據。During perceptual decisions, subjects often rely more strongly on early, rather than late, sensory evidence, even in tasks when both are equally informative about the correct decision. (2018)
感知決策是根據現有感知信息從一組選項中做出選擇的行為 Perceptual decision making is the act of choosing one option from a set of alternatives based on available sensory information. (2020)
Macchi, Elisa. 2023. “Worth Your Weight: Experimental Evidence on the Benefits of Obesity in Low-Income Countries." American Economic Review, 113 (9): 2287-2322. (DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211879)
I study the economic value of obesity—a status symbol in poor countries associated with raised health risks. Randomizing decision-makers in Kampala, Uganda to view weight-manipulated portraits, I find that obesity is perceived as a reliable signal of wealth but not of beauty or health. Thus, leveraging a real-stakes experiment involving professional loan officers, I show that being obese facilitates access to credit. The large obesity premium, comparable to raising borrower self-reported earnings by over 60 percent, is driven by asymmetric information and drops significantly when providing more financial information. Notably, obesity benefits and wealth-signaling value are commonly overestimated, suggesting market distortions.
Burland, Elizabeth, Susan Dynarski, Katherine Michelmore, Stephanie Owen, and Shwetha Raghuraman. 2023. “The Power of Certainty: Experimental Evidence on the Effective Design of Free Tuition Programs." American Economic Review: Insights, 5 (3): 293-310.
Proposed “free college" policies vary widely in design. The simplest set tuition to zero for everyone. More targeted approaches limit free tuition to those who demonstrate need through an application process. We experimentally test the effects of these two models on the schooling decisions of low-income students. An unconditional free tuition offer from a large public university substantially increases application and enrollment rates. A free tuition offer contingent on proof of need has a much smaller effect on application and none on enrollment. These results are consistent with students placing a high value on financial certainty when making schooling decisions.
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Experimental Economics volume 25, pages203–228 (2022)
When alternative market institutions are available, traders have to decide both where and how much to trade. We conducted an experiment where traders decided first whether to trade in an (efficient) double-auction institution or in a posted-offers one (favoring sellers), and second how much to trade. When sellers face decreasing returns to scale (increasing production costs), fast coordination on the double-auction occurs, with the posted-offers institution becoming inactive. In contrast, under constant returns to scale, both institutions remain active and coordination is slower. The reason is that sellers trade off higher efficiency in a market with dwindling profits for biased-up profits in a market with vanishing customers. Hence, efficiency alone might not be sufficient to guarantee coordination on a single market institution if the surplus distribution is asymmetric. Trading behavior approaches equilibrium predictions (market clearing) within each institution, but switching behavior across institutions is explained by simple rules of thumb, with buyers chasing low prices and sellers considering both prices and trader ratios.
Experimental Economics volume 25, pages229–253 (2022)
We develop a new design for the experimental beauty-contest game (BCG) that is suitable for children in school age and test it with 114 schoolchildren aged 9–11 years as well as with adults. In addition, we collect a measure for cognitive skills to link these abilities with successful performance in the game. Results demonstrate that children can successfully understand and play a BCG. Choices start at a slightly higher level than those of adults but learning over time and depth of reasoning are largely comparable with the results of studies run with adults. Cognitive skills, measured as fluid IQ, are predictive only of whether children choose weakly dominated strategies but are neither associated with lower choices in the first round nor with successful performance in the BCG. In the implementation of our new design of the BCG with adults we find results largely in line with behavior in the classical BCG. Our new design for the experimental BCG allows to study the development of strategic interaction skills starting already in school age.
Experimental Economics volume 25, pages68–110 (2022)
We investigate the role of endowment inequality in a local and global public goods setting with multiple group membership and examine the effect of temporal role reversal on cooperation decisions. Subjects can contribute to a global public good which benefits all subjects and two local public goods which benefit only subjects of either their own group or the group of the other endowment type. Endowment inequality per-se decreases contributions of subjects with a high endowment to the global public good, but increases cooperation of subjects with a low endowment on their local public good, thereby aggravating income disparities. Exogenously induced role reversal for several periods affects cooperation behavior of subjects with a high endowment positively and induces them to contribute more to the global good. Cooperation in unequal environments thus appears to be more stable when all parties have experienced the public goods game from the disadvantageous perspective.
Experimental Economics volume 25, pages26–67 (2022)
We present an experiment where subjects sequentially receive signals about the true state of the world and need to form beliefs about which one is true, with payoffs related to reported beliefs. We attempt to control for risk aversion using the Offerman et al. (Rev Econ Stud 76(4):1461–1489, 2009) technique. Against the baseline of Bayesian updating, we test for belief adjustment underreaction and overreaction and model the decision making process of the agent as a double hurdle model where agents with inferential expectations first decide whether to adjust their beliefs and then, if so, decide by how much. We also test the effects of increased inattention and complexity on belief updating. We find evidence for periods of belief inertia interspersed with belief adjustment. This is due to a combination of random belief adjustment; state-dependent belief adjustment, with many subjects requiring considerable evidence to change their beliefs; and quasi-Bayesian belief adjustment, with aggregate insufficient belief adjustment when a belief change does occur. Inattention, like complexity, makes subjects less likely to adjust their stated beliefs, while inattention additionally discourages full adjustment.
Roth, Alvin E. “Laboratory experimentation in economics." Economics & Philosophy 2.2 (1986): 245-273. [PDF]
TBD
行為 & 經濟實驗文獻注 (備忘) by 楊奕農 