Literature on Two-sided markets (selective)

==seminal papers==

  • Rochet, Jean‐Charles, and Jean Tirole. “Platform competition in two‐sided markets." Journal of the european economic association 1.4 (2003): 990-1029. (link to PDF)
  • Armstrong, Mark. “Competition in two‐sided markets." The RAND Journal of Economics 37.3 (2006): 668-691. (link to PDF)
  • Rochet, Jean‐Charles, and Jean Tirole. “Two‐sided markets: a progress report." The RAND journal of economics 37.3 (2006): 645-667. (link to PDF)

==reviews==

  • Rysman, Marc. “The economics of two-sided markets." Journal of economic perspectives 23.3 (2009): 125-43. (link to PDF)
廣告

哈佛商評:打造雙邊市場策略

==YNY 摘要==

URL: https://www.hbrtaiwan.com/article_content_AR0003412.html

不太一樣的雙邊市場策略

在某些產業,例如,銀行、軟體、媒體等,這類公司的獲利方式,是把顧客網絡不同邊的市場連結起來,像是連結讀者和廣告主。這些行業的特性與眾不同,所以在制定策略時,需要運用新的方法。

  • 把雙邊網絡裡的兩群使用者連結起來的產品和服務,稱為「平台」(platform)
  • 平台對這兩群使用者提供服務,都需要負擔成本,也能從這兩群使用者賺取收入,不過,我們會談到,往往有一邊是受到補貼的。
    雙邊網絡平台的供應商能從兩邊賺取收入。但大部分時候,補貼一部分使用者的做法,是有道理的。但很重要的策略問題是:應該補貼哪一邊的使用者,以及補貼多久?
  • 這兩群使用者彼此吸引,經濟學家稱為網絡效應(network effect)

對雙邊網絡提供服務的平台,並不是新的現象

  • 汽車駕駛人,以及遍布各地的加油站連結 ()
  • 廣告主和上網搜尋的人
  • 零售電力市場變成平台,撮合消費者和特定的發電廠 (傳統行業也重新架構轉型為平台,例如,)
  • 更多實例

雙邊市場面臨的挑戰

1:平台訂價
一般來說,雙邊網絡有一個「補貼邊」(subsidy side)。這群使用者如能大量上門,另一群使用者,也就是「金錢邊」(money side)會覺得很有價值
2:贏家通吃
像索尼建立Betamax 錄影帶標準投入的心血,最後輸給 VHS錄影帶標準
因平台共享時,整個市場的規模會變大,是很大的誘因。但爭奪網絡主控地位的得失很大,因此各家公司初期必須投入龐大的經費
3:包圍威脅
鄰近的平台供應商,可能會覬覦你的平台,採取「包圍」攻勢,進軍你的市場,常導致市場的界限趨於模糊。

===註===
設戶(homing)成本是指網絡使用者為了建立和維護與平台的關係,必須承擔的所有費用,包括平台的採用、運作,以及時間的機會成本。使用者在好幾個平台設「戶」,支出便會增加。舉例來說,絕大多數的個人電腦使用者都使用單一作業系統(幾乎全是Windows),因為採用多套作業系統的成本很貴,需要額外增加硬體、軟體和訓練等方面的支出。同樣地,距離也會限制消費者一次能造訪的購物商場家數,這就會限制賣場的家數。如果多處設戶的成本很高,使用者需要很好的理由,才會和多座平台保持往來。

==來源==

: https://www.hbrtaiwan.com/article_content_AR0003412.html
策略規畫

打造雙邊市場策略

Strategies for Two-sided Markets
ar0003412_1

 

Should dark PoolS be banned from regulated exchangeS?

Date: 2016-01-12
By: Nathalie Oriol (GREDEG – Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion – CNRS – Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique – UNS – Université Nice Sophia Antipolis)
Alexandra Rufini (GREDEG – Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion – CNRS – Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique – UNS – Université Nice Sophia Antipolis)
Dominique Torre (GREDEG – Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion – CNRS – Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique – UNS – Université Nice Sophia Antipolis)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01254447&r=net
European financial markets experiment a strong competition between historical players and new trading platforms, including the controversial dark pools. Our theoretical setting analyzes the interaction between heterogeneous investors and trading services providers in presence of market externalities. We compare different forms of organization of the market, each in presence of an off-exchange and an incumbent facing a two-sided activity (issuers and investors): a consolidated exchange with the incum- bent only, and fragmented exchanges with several platforms, including lit and dark pools, in competition for order ows. By capturing investors from off-exchange, dark trading may enhance market externalities and market stakeholders’ welfare.
Keywords: Microstructure, dark pools , Over-The-Counter market, liquidity, market externalities, two-sided markets

Private Contracts in Two-Sided Markets

Date: 2015-09
By: Gaston Llanes (Escuela de Administracion, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile)
Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda (Escuela de Administracion, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:1516&r=net
We study a two-sided market in which a platform connects consumers and sellers, and signs private contracts with sellers. We compare this situation with a two-sided market with public contracts. We find that the platform provider sets positive (negative) royalties to sellers and earns a negative (positive) markup on consumers when contracts are private (public). Thus, private contracting has a significant effect on the price structure. Private contracting leads to lower platform profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. We study the welfare effects of most-favored-nation clauses, price-forcing contracts, and integration with sellers; and relate our results with the agency model of sales. Our results indicate that enhancing the market power of a dominant platform over sellers may increase welfare because it acts as a commitment device for inducing lower seller prices, mitigating the hold-up problem borne by consumers when they cannot observe sellers’ contracts.
Keywords: Two-Sided Markets; Platforms; Vertical Relations; Most-Favored Nation; Price-Forcing Contracts; Resale Price Maintenance; Integration; Agency Model of Sales
JEL: L12 L14 L42

Either or Both Competition: A “Two-sided" Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships

Date: 2014-10-18
By: Attila Ambrus (Duke University)
Emilio Calvano (CSEF, Università di Napoli Federico II)
Markus Reisinger (Otto Beisheim School of Management)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:378&r=net
In media markets, consumers spread their attention to several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates online. The traditional framework for studying competition among media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. We propose a new model that allows consumers to choose multiple outlets and use it to study the effect of strategic interaction on advertising levels, and the impact of entry and mergers. We show that novel forces come into play, which reflect the outlets’ incentives to control the composition of the customer base in addition to its size. We link consumer preferences and advertising technologies to market outcomes. The model can explain a number of empirical regularities that are difficult to reconcile with existing models.
Keywords: Media Competition, Two-Sided Markets, Multi-Homing, Viewer Composition, Viewer, Preference Correlation
JEL: D43 L13 L82 M37

The Economics of Internet Media

Date: 2014
By: Peitz, Martin
Reisinger, Markus
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnh:wpaper:37116&r=net
We survey the economics literature on media as it applies to the Internet. The Internet is an important driver behind media convergence and connects information and communication technologies. While new Internet media share some properties with traditional media, several novel features have appeared: On the content side, aggregation by third parties that have no editorial policy and user-generated content have become increasingly important. On the advertiser side, fine-tuned tailoring and targeting of ads based on individual user characteristics are common features on many Internet media and social networks. On the user side, we observe increased possibilities of time-shifting, multi-homing, and active search. These changes have gone hand-in-hand with new players entering media markets, including search engines and Internet service providers. Some of these players face novel strategic considerations, such as how to present search results. In response to these changes, an emerging economics literature focuses on the allocative and welfare implications of this new media landscape. This paper is an attempt to organize these contributions and provide a selective account of novel economic mechanisms that shape market outcomes of Internet media. A large body of work has focused on the advertising part of the industry, while some studies also look at content provision and the interaction between the two.
Keywords: Internet , media economics , digital media , targeting , news aggregation , search advertising , display advertising , two-sided markets
JEL: L82 L86 M37 L13 D21 D22

Game of Platforms: Strategic Expansion in Two-Sided Markets

Date: 2013-09
By: Sagit Bar-Gill (Tel Aviv University)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:1312&r=net
Online platforms, such as Google, Facebook, or Amazon, are constantly expanding their activities, while increasing the overlap in their service offering. In this paper, we study the scope and overlap of online platforms’ activities, when they are endogenously determined. We model an expansion game between two online platforms offering two different services to users for free, while selling user clicks to advertisers. At the outset, each platform offers one service, and users may subscribe to one platform or both (multihoming). In the second stage, each platform decides whether to expand by adding the service already offered by its rival. Platforms’ expansion decisions affect users’ mobility, and thus the partition of users in the market, which, in turn, affects platform prices and profits. We analyze the equilibrium of the expansion game, demonstrating that, in equilibrium, platforms may decide not to expand, even though expansion is costless. Such strategic “no expansion" decisions are due to quantity and price effects of changes in user mobility, brought on by expansion. Both symmetric expansion and symmetric no-expansion equilibria may arise, as well as asymmetric expansion equilibria, even for initially symmetric platforms.
Keywords: Two-sided markets, Platforms, Entry, Online advertising
JEL: L11 L13 L14

Price Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Consumers and Network Effects

Date: 2013-10
By: Lapo Filistrucchi (CentER, TILEC, Tilburg University and Department of Economics, University of Florence)
Tobias J. Klein (CentER, TILEC, Tilburg University)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:1320&r=net
We model a two-sided market with heterogeneous customers and two heterogeneous network effects. In our model, customers on each market side care differently about both the number and the type of customers on the other side. Examples of two-sided markets are online platforms or daily newspapers. In the latter case, for instance, readership demand depends on the amount and the type of advertisements. Also, advertising demand depends on the number of readers and the distribution of readers across demographic groups. There are feedback loops because advertising demand depends on the numbers of readers, which again depends on the amount of advertising, and so on. Due to the difficulty in dealing with such feedback loops when publishers set prices on both sides of the market, most of the literature has avoided models with Bertrand competition on both sides or has resorted to simplifying assumptions such as linear demands or the presence of only one network effect. We address this issue by first presenting intuitive sufficient conditions for demand on each side to be unique given prices on both sides. We then derive sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in prices. For merger analysis, or any other policy simulation in the context of competition policy, it is important that equilibria exist and are unique. Otherwise, one cannot predict prices or welfare effects after a merger or a policy change. The conditions are related to the own- and cross-price effects, as well as the strength of the own and cross network effects. We show that most functional forms used in empirical work, such as logit type demand functions, tend to satisfy these conditions for realistic values of the respective parameters. Finally, using data on the Dutch daily newspaper industry, we estimate a flexible model of demand which satisfies the above conditions and evaluate the effects of a hypothetical merger and study the effects of a shrinking market for offline newspapers.
Keywords: two-sided markets, indirect network effects, merger simulation, equilibrium, competition policy, newspapers
JEL: L13 L40 L82

The Adoption Process of Payment Cards -An Agent- Based Approach

Date: 2012-05
By: Biliana Alexandrova-Kabadjova
Sara Gabriela Castellanos Pascacio
Alma L. García-Almanza
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2012-02&r=net
We investigate the payment card’s adoption rate under consumers’ and merchants’ awareness of network externalities, given two levels of Interchange Fees in a multiagent card market. For the purpose of our research, in multiple instances of the model (scenarios) the investigated effects are analyzed over the complete process of adoption, until the market’s saturation point is achieved. For each scenario, a comparison is made between two different levels of Interchange Fees and different degrees of consumers’ and merchants’ awareness. We model explicitly the interactions between consumers and merchants at the point of sale. We allow card issuers to charge consumers with fixed fees and provide net benefits from card usage, whereas acquirers can charge fixed and transactional fees to merchants.
Keywords: Two-sided markets, financial services, network formation.
JEL: D7