二月 27 2015

AJAE 農經貢獻之回顧文獻

==noted by yinung==

2010年, vol. 92, 2, AJAE 回顧了過去百年以來農經學者的貢獻, 方向含括:

生產與農場管理、農產市場、農業政策、農產貿易、農業發展、自然資源與保育、環境經濟、食品與消費經濟、鄉村發展、農企業經濟與管理、計量方法之發展。值得細閱了解。

農企業研究含食品鏈的水平和垂直參與者之協調 (agribusiness economics)、與食品鏈內的決策 (agribusiness management)

1950s 出現的研究主題:on cooperatives, farm supply markets, industrial organization, vertical integration, market power of food processing and farm supply firms,antitrust decisions, and bargaining

1960s 中: marketing structure’ of the food industry, efficiency; services to consumers; market power; regulatory activities; services such as market news;and the effects of imports; Key papers on cooperative theory and agricultural finance also appeared during the 1960s

1970-80: teaching program serving the needs of the rapidly growing nonfarm segments of the food system. Work on food system structure and performance.

===有關供應鏈===

價格傳遞機能 Wohlgenant (1989, AJAE) 或者是食品供應鏈管理和制度設計、風險移轉分擔、契約設計、體系之收入成本利潤在供應鏈成員間之分配等，特別供應鏈體系面臨外部需求成長及風險變動增加下的相關議題 Hendrikse and Bijman (2002, AJAE)

==AJAE 該期相關目錄如下==

- Alex McCalla,
- Emery Castle,
- and Vernon Eidman
The AAEA: Ever Growing and Changing Research Challenges

Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 334–355 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq013
Select this article
- Jean-Paul Chavas,
- Robert G. Chambers,
- and Rulon D. Pope
Production Economics and Farm Management: a Century of Contributions

Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 356–375 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq004
Select this article
- Robert J. Myers,
- Richard J. Sexton,
- and William G. Tomek
A Century of Research on Agricultural Markets

Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 376–403 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq014
Select this article
- Daniel A. Sumner,
- Julian M. Alston,
- and Joseph W. Glauber
Evolution of the Economics of Agricultural Policy

Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 403–423 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq015
Select this article
- Tim Josling,
- Kym Anderson,
- Andrew Schmitz,
- and Stefan Tangermann
Understanding International Trade in Agricultural Products: One Hundred Years of Contributions by Agricultural Economists

Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 424–446 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq011
Select this article
- Christopher B. Barrett,
- Michael R. Carter,
- and C. Peter Timmer
A Century-Long Perspective on Agricultural Development

Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 447–468 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq005
Select this article
- Erik Lichtenberg,
- James Shortle,
- James Wilen,
- and David Zilberman
Natural Resource Economics and Conservation: Contributions of Agricultural Economics and Agricultural Economists

Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 469–486 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq006
Select this article
- Catherine L. Kling,
- Kathleen Segerson,
- and Jason F. Shogren
Environmental Economics: How Agricultural Economists Helped Advance the Field

Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 487–505 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq012
Select this article
- Laurian Unnevehr,
- James Eales,
- Helen Jensen,
- Jayson Lusk,
- Jill McCluskey,
- and Jean Kinsey
Food and Consumer Economics

Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 506–521 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq007
Select this article
- Elena G. Irwin,
- Andrew M. Isserman,
- Maureen Kilkenny,
- and Mark D. Partridge
A Century of Research on Rural Development and Regional Issues

Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 522–553 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq008
Select this article
- Robert P. King,
- Michael Boehlje,
- Michael L. Cook,
- and Steven T. Sonka
Agribusiness Economics and Management

Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 554–570 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq009
Select this article
- David A. Bessler,
- Jeffrey H. Dorfman,
- Matthew T. Holt,
- and Jeffrey T. LaFrance
Econometric Developments in Agricultural and Resource Economics: The First 100 Years

Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 571–589 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq010

六月 15 2013

Myopic loss aversion: Information feedback vs. investment flexibility

Charles Bellemare, Michaela Krausee, Sabine Krfgerf,Chendi Zhang (2005) “Myopic loss aversion: Information feedback vs. investment flexibility“. Economics Letters, vol., 87, pp.319 – 324. *****

==notes by yinung==

主要結論：

只要資訊頻率降低, 即可讓投資風險資產意願提高.

主要實驗設計:

在於資訊迴饋頻率 frequent/infrequent, 其 treatment 有三種:

H: 投資期間1期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
M: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
L: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每3期

Bellemare et al. (2005) 實驗結果是: 投資額度 L~M>H

Results

We confirm the works by Gneezy and Potters (1997) and others building on it, and furthermore find that experimentally induced myopia in combination with loss aversion remained to affect investment behavior systematically even when flexibility in adjusting investment was no longer varied. MLA is driven by information feedback.

Abstract

We experimentally disentangle the effect of information feedback from the effect of investment flexibility on the investment behavior of a myopically loss averse investor. Our findings show that varying the information condition alone suffices to induce behavior that is in line with the hypothesis of Myopic Loss Aversion.

八月 28 2012

實驗相關文獻 in 管理科學 Management Science

http://maaw.info/ManagementJournals/ManagementScience.htm
有人整理了專門發表在 Management Science 的文章，哇，沒想到有這麼多…, 以下列出一些我較有興趣、近期的實驗相關文獻

Abdellaoui, M., E. Diecidue and A. Öncüler. 2011. Risk preferences at different time periods: An experimental investigation. Management Science (May): 975-987.

Abdellaoui, M., F. Vossmann and M. Weber. 2005. Choice-based elicitation and decomposition of decision weights for gains and losses under uncertainty. Management Science (September): 1384-1399. (JSTOR link).

Abedellaoui, M., O. L’Haridon and C. Paraschiv. 2011. Experience vs. described uncertainty: Do we need two prospect theory specifications? Management Science (October): 1879-1895.

Allon, G. and A. Bassamboo. 2011. Buying from the babbling retailer? The impact of availability information on customer behavior. Management Science (April): 713-726.

Amaldoss, W. and S. Jain. 2005. Conspicuous consumption and sophisticated thinking. Management Science (October): 1449-1466. (JSTOR link).

這篇是理論, 但也有 Laboratory test

Aral, S. and D. Walker. 2011. Creating social contagion through viral product design: A randomized trial of peer influence in networks. Management Science (September): 1623-1639.

Budescu, D. V. and B. Maciejovsky. 2005. The effect of payoff feedback and information pooling on reasoning errors: Evidence from experimental markets. Management Science (December): 1829-1843. (JSTOR link).

Cason, T. N., K. N. Kannan and R. Siebert. 2011. An experimental study of information revelation policies in sequential auctions. Management Science (April): 667-688.

Chen, H., S. H. Ham and N. Lim. 2011. Designing multiperson tournaments with asymmetric contestants: An experimental study. Management Science (May): 864-883.

Chen-Ritzo, C., T. P. Harrison, A. M. Kwasnica and D. J. Thomas. 2005. Better, faster, cheaper: An experimental analysis of a multiattribute reverse auction mechanism with restricted information feedback. Management Science (December): 1753-1762. (JSTOR link).

Ding, M., J. Eliashberg, J. Huber and R. Saini. 2005. Emotional bidders: An analytical and experimental examination of consumers’ behavior in a priceline-like reverse auction. Management Science (March): 352-364. (JSTOR link).

Harbaugh, R., J. W. Maxwell and B. Roussillon. 2011. Label confusion: The Groucho effect of uncertain standards. Management Science (September): 1512-1527.

Harbring, C. and B. Irlenbusch. 2011. Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a laboratory experiment. Management Science (April): 611-627.

Kalkanci, B., Y. Chen and F. Erhun. 2011. Contract complexity and performance under asymmetric demand information: An experimental evaluation. Management Science (April): 689-704.

Katok, E. and E. Siemsen. 2011. Why genius leads to adversity: Experimental evidence on the reputational effects of task difficulty choices. Management Science (June): 1042-1054.

Oiu, J. and E. Steiger. 2011. Understanding the tow components of risk attitudes: An experimental analysis. Management Science (January): 193-199.

Stecher, J., T. Shields and J. Dickhaut. 2011. Generating ambiguity in the laboratory. Management Science (April): 705-712.

八月 20 2012

Handbook of Experimental Economics Results

source: Handbook of Experimental Economics Results

由 Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith 主編, 回顧各種實驗之結果, 出版於 2008年, ISBN: 9780444826428

Description

Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 1st Edition,Charles Plott,Vernon Smith,ISBN9780444826428 Experimental methods in economics respond to circumstances that are not completely dictated by accepted theory or outstanding problems. While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appear blurred and may produce results that vary from strong support to little or partial support of the relevant theory.
At a recent conference, a question was asked about where experimental methods might be more useful than field methods. Although many cannot be answered by experimental methods, there are questions that can only be answered by experiments. Much of the progress of experimental methods involves the posing of old or new questions in a way that experimental methods can be applied.
The title of the book reflects the spirit of adventure that experimentalists share and focuses on experiments in general rather than forcing an organization into traditional categories that do not fit. The emphasis reflects the fact that the results do not necessarily demonstrate a consistent theme, but instead reflect bits and pieces of progress as opportunities to pose questions become recognized.
This book is a result of an invitation sent from the editors to a broad range of experimenters asking them to write brief notes describing specific experimental results. The challenge was to produce pictures and tables that were self-contained so the reader could understand quickly the essential nature of the experiments and the results.

1. MARKETS
2. MARKET ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION
3. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND THE ECONOMICS OF MULTIPLE MARKET SYSTEMS
4. GAMES
5. MECHANISM DESIGN AND POLICY APPLICATIONS
6. NON MARKET AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH
7. INDIVIDUAL CHOICE, BELIEFS AND BEHAVIOR
8. METHODS

注意 ch7. 中的這篇, 是有關報酬效果和風險偏好
Susan K. Laury and Charles A. Holt, “Payoff Scale Effects and Risk Preference Under Real and Hypothetical Conditions"

注意 ch 8. 其中的這一篇是有關有 lottery 程序控制風險偏好
Joyce E. Berg, Jhon W.Dickhaut and Thomas A.Rietz, “On the Performance of the Lottery Procedure for Controlling Risk Perferences"

八月 8 2012

Economics in the Laboratory

Vernon L. Smith (1994) “Economics in the Laboratory." Journal of Economic Perspectives ,Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter, 1994 , pp. 113-131. (link to JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138154) (AEAWeb：JEP (PDF))

==Summary by yinung==

Smith 在此文回顧了實證經濟學的重要貢獻 (其題為 “為何經濟學家要做實驗?" (why do economists conduct experiments?)), 他列舉以下 7 大理由，其實就是經濟實驗的主要功能:

經濟實驗的主要功能

1. Test a theory,or discriminate between theories

2. Explore the causes of a theory’sfailure.

3. Establish empirical regularities as a basis for new theory

4. Compare environments.

5. Compare institutions

6. Evaluate policy proposals.

7. The laboratory as a testing ground for institutional design.

經濟實驗的主要貢獻

Smith 並總結了經濟實驗多年來所發現之重要結論 (基於制度 (institutions)、環境 (environments)、與行為 (behaviors) 之架構; 不過我認為還要加上「資訊」(information) 和「預期之形成」(expectations formation) ):

1. Institutions Matter

2. Unconscious Optimization in Market Interactions

3. Information: Less Can Be Better

4. Common Information is Not Sufficient to Yield Common Expectations or “Knowledge"

5. Dominated Strategies Are for Playing, Not Eliminating

6. Efficiency and Underrevelation Are Compatible

7. The Endowment Effect

8. Fairness: Taste or Expectation?

實驗法在研究方法論之辨證

水星運行之軌道未遵循牛頓運動定律之預測，並沒有讓科學家認為該運動定律是錯誤的，反而是斷定水星和太陽中間，必定有一個未知的行星 (甚至被命名為火神星 (Vulcan) [註 1] ) 干擾了水星應該運行之路徑… (Smith, 1994, p.127)。

Smith 指出，任何對理論的驗證 (test)，都避免不了必要的輔助假設 (auxiliary hypotheses)，如此才能將觀察的結果解釋為對該理論的驗證結果。這些「輔助假設」常有很多不同的名詞，諸如: 啟始條件 (initial conditions) 、其它條件相同 (ceteris paribus clauses)、背景資訊 (background information)、… 等。

因此可以說，所有對理論的驗證，都隱含是一種聯合檢定 (joint tests) ; 亦即，對理論的驗證皆是條件式檢定，其皆建立在輔助假設 (auxiliary hypotheses) 成立的前提之下。

這就為何實驗文獻之發現，常被批評的原因, 如同「杜恩─奎因論題」(Duhem-Quine Thesis) 所述之「指任何理論儘管出現推翻它的證據，我們只要在我們的信念網絡中作一點改變，便可以繼續接受該理論」 (see 淺談「杜咸－奎因論旨」與非充分決定性論證)

Smith 在此文並對一些對實驗經濟研究法之批評，提出反駁。例如 Harrison (1992) 認為經濟實驗所得到的錯誤觀是因為受試者的實驗報酬之機會成本太低，所以才會偏離理論之預測。Smith and Walker (1993) 的近 30 年文獻回顧說明了受試者所獲之「貨幣報酬的確可以改善受試者之表現 (在某些條件之下)」，但其它除了「受試者報酬」之條件也同樣重要，因為增加受試者報酬並沒有讓那些偏離理論所預測的觀察消失 (many anomalies do not disappear by escalating payoffs, p.127)

… 未完成, 待續…

===3. Information: Less Can Be Better===

這是個有趣的現象：競爭者知道對手的資訊愈多，反而不利市場機𠛻運作 (TBD: 指哪些？)

Providing subjects with complete information, far from improving market competition, tends to make it worse.

市場運作：CDA 實驗發現 private info. 收歛較快 (Smith, 1991, 6); 在寡佔市場 Fouraker and Siegel (1963) for Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly；還有 Noussair and Porter (1992) and Brown-Kruse (1992, 未出版);

Roth (1987, 一本書) 也提到Nash bargaining game 的實驗：不知道對手的 prize 比較會符合 Nash 的預測（YNY：嫉妒？）。但Schelling (1957) 和 Siegel and Fouraker (1960) 卻提出知道別人，反而會「諒解」(more forgiving) 的看法。 Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) 把它稱做 curse of knowledge

YNY：Smith 認為

1. 更多資訊讓參與者可找到更多自利的機會，或者懲罰別人的策略 (p.119, sec 1),

2. 也有人用 folk theorem 來解釋 (多回合交手後，傾向合作而非競爭)

3. 嫉妒別人

4. 諒解別人

==References==

Smith, Vernon L., and James M. Walker, “Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics," Economic Inquiry,April 1993, 31, 245-61.

註 1: 水星偏離軌道 (水星的軌道偏離正圓程度很大，近日點距太陽僅四千六百萬千米，遠日點卻有7千萬千米，在軌道的近日點它以十分緩慢的速度按歲差圍繞太陽向前運行, see 背景資料：神秘的水星) 的真正原因，普遍相信可以由爱因斯坦所提出的广义相对论所解釋，即由于太阳质量较大，水星受它的引力作用也较大，在其附近的空间发生了较大的“弯曲” 所致。

Noussair, Charles and David Porter, “Allocating Priority with Auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, October 1992, 19, 169-195.
Roth, Alvin E., “Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory," in A. E. Roth (ed.)
Laboratory Experimentation in Economics. Cambridge University Press, 1987
Schelling, T. C., “Bargaining, Communication and Limited War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1957, 1, 19-36.
Siegel, Sidney and Lawrence E. Fouraker, Bargaining and Group Decision Making:

Experiments in Bilateral Monopoly. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.
Camerer, Colin F., George Loewenstein and Martin Weber, “The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: Experimental Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, October 1989, 97, 1232-1254.

七月 17 2012

Networks in Economics

Date:	2012-06
By:	Zenou, Yves
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9021&r=net
	We provide an overview on networks in economics. We first look at the theoretical aspects of network economics using a game-theoretical approach. We derive some results on games on networks and network formation. We also study what happens when agents choose both links and actions. We then examine how these models can be used to address some applied and empirical-relevant questions by mainly focusing on labor-market networks and crime networks. We provide some empirical evidence on these two types of networks and address some policy implications of the models.
Keywords:	criminal networks; games on networks; labor networks; network formation; Social networks
JEL:	A14

六月 3 2012

Does commitment or feedback influence myopic loss aversion? An experimental analysis

Thomas Langer, Martin Weber, (2008),Does commitment or feedback influence myopic loss aversion? An experimental analysis, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67, 810–819. LINK TO JEBO

Notes by yinung

這篇將投資期間長/短 , 和資訊迴饋頻率 (frequent/infrequent) 兩種因素進行交叉實驗, 實驗結果和 Bellemare et al. (2005) 的並不十分一致; Bellemare et al. (2005) 主要實驗設計在於資訊迴饋頻率 frequent/infrequent, 其 treatment 有三種:

H: 投資期間1期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
M: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
L: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每3期

Bellemare et al. (2005) 實驗結果是: 投資額度 L~M>H

本文有 3 個主要結論:

定期定額 (binding decisions, 連續3期) 可降低短視現象 (myopic, 對風險資產投資比例較高), 且這個現象不會隨著時間增長而改變

p.811

First, binding decisions cause people to be less myopic, perhaps because they must think through the implications of a longer time horizon.

提供較低頻率報酬結果迴饋資訊, 有助於降低短視現象, 即隨著時間增長, 可使持有/投資風險資產比例升高

Second, providing less frequent feedback seems to help people learn over time that it is better to go with the risky prospect (i.e. to be less myopic).

定期定額和資訊迴饋頻率之間似乎有複雜的混合效果 (mixed treatment effects):
- 最強效果 (應該指的是投資風險資產比例最高) 出現在 “定期定額和高資訊迴饋頻率"
- 「定期定額和高資訊迴饋頻率」下之投資風險資產比例 > 「定期定額和低資訊迴饋頻率」下之投資風險資產比例

Third, there is no simple main effect from combining commitment and feedback, but an interaction between these two variables.

作者對此現象之詮釋

It seems that if people are committed to their decisions, more frequent feedback is helpful because over time it becomes more salient that occasional losses are outweighed by ultimate gains.

文獻比較

Bellemare et al. (2005) in Economics Letters 發表的實驗結果:

只要資訊頻率降低, 即可讓投資風險資產意願提高…

Our findings show that varying the information condition alone suffices to induce behavior that is in line with the hypothesis of Myopic Loss Aversion.

Thomas Lange and Martin Weber (2005) “Myopic prospect theory vs. myopic loss aversion: how general is the phenomenon?" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 56, Issue 1, January 2005, Pages 25-38. DOI 本站

In this paper, we argue that the relation between myopia and the attractiveness of a lottery sequence is less general than previously suggested in the literature.

主要 hypotheses

Hypothesis 3

. For all treatments, the proportion of wealth α(t) invested in the risky asset increases over time.

實驗結果 (圖、表)

Abstract

Empirical research has demonstrated that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer period of commitment decreases myopia and thereby increases the willingness to invest in a risky asset. In an experimental study, we disentangle the intertwined manipulation of feedback frequency and commitment to analyze how each individual variable contributes to the change in myopia and how they interact. We find that the period of commitment exerts a substantial impact and the feedback frequency a far less pronounced impact. There is a strong interaction between both variables. The results have significant implications for real world intertemporal decision making.

Managing Dynamic Competition

Tracy R. Lewis and Huseyin Yildirim (2002) “Managing Dynamic Competition." The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 4 (Sep., 2002) (pp. 779-797). (In JSTOR: Page Scan PDF Summary)

notes by yinung

聽過一種說法: 大廠在向供應商採購時, 會故意隔幾年向另向一個競爭廠下大量訂單, 以讓這些廠商形成具有經濟規模的競爭者… 這一篇看起來好像在講這個故事

Original abstract

In many important high-technology markets, including software development, data processing, communications, aeronautics, and defense, suppliers learn through experience how to provide better service at lower cost. This paper examines how a buyer designs dynamic competition among rival suppliers to exploit learning economies while minimizing the costs of becoming locked in to one producer. Strategies for controlling dynamic competition include the handicapping of more efficient suppliers in procurement competitions, the protection and allocation of intellectual property, and the sharing of information among rival suppliers.

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See also: items that cite this item in Google Scholar External Link

Threat of Exit as a Source of Bargaining Power

FabianBergès, ClaireChambolle,

pp. 353-368

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40724565
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Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3663666

九月 8 2011

發表在 MIS Quarterly 的實驗類型文獻

Interactive Decision Aids for Consumer Decision Making in E-Commerce: The Influence of Perceived Strategy Restrictiveness

Author: Weiquan Wang and Izak Benbasat
Year: 2009 / Volume: 33 / Issue: 2

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Computer-Based Support for Group Problem-Finding: An Experimental Investigation

R. Brent Gallupe, Gerardine DeSanctis, Gary W. Dickson

MIS Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 277-296

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A Study of Influence in Computer-Mediated Group Decision Making

Ilze Zigurs, M. Scott Poole, Gerardine L. DeSanctis

MIS Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Dec., 1988), pp. 625-644

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An Experimental Validation of the Gorry and Scott Morton Framework

Peeter J. Kirs, G. Lawrence Sanders, Robert P. Cerveny, Daniel Robey

MIS Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Jun., 1989), pp. 183-197

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Critical Factors in the User Environment: An Experimental Study of Users, Organizations and Tasks

Gayle J. Yaverbaum

MIS Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Mar., 1988), pp. 75-88

The Influence of Computer Graphics on the Recall of Information

Collin J. Watson, Russell W. Driver

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An Experimental Investigation of Some MIS Design Variables

Author: Izak Benbasat and Roger G. Schroeder
Year: 1977 / Volume: 1 / Issue: 1

九月 5 2011

Hidden Information, Bargaining Power, And Efficiency: An Experiment

Date:	2011
By:	Antonio Cabrales (Departamento de Economía – Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) Gary Charness (Department of Economics, University of California – University of California, Santa Barbara) Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – CNRS : UMR5824 – Université Lumière – Lyon II – École Normale Supérieure de Lyon)
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00614472&r=net
	We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on the design and the selection of contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two principals. We first show theoretically how different ratios of principals and agents affect outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies may disappear, but they are insensitive to the number of principals. In contrast, when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment. There is, however, a tendency to choose more ‘generous’ (and more efficient) contract menus over time. We find that competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade, and that, overall, competition between agents generates the most efficient outcomes.
Keywords:	experiment; hidden information; bargaining power; competition; efficiency

==noted by yinung==

==AJAE 該期相關目錄如下==

The AAEA: Ever Growing and Changing Research Challenges

Production Economics and Farm Management: a Century of Contributions

A Century of Research on Agricultural Markets

Evolution of the Economics of Agricultural Policy

Understanding International Trade in Agricultural Products: One Hundred Years of Contributions by Agricultural Economists

A Century-Long Perspective on Agricultural Development

Natural Resource Economics and Conservation: Contributions of Agricultural Economics and Agricultural Economists

Environmental Economics: How Agricultural Economists Helped Advance the Field

Food and Consumer Economics

A Century of Research on Rural Development and Regional Issues

Agribusiness Economics and Management

Econometric Developments in Agricultural and Resource Economics: The First 100 Years

==notes by yinung==

主要結論：

主要實驗設計:

Results

Abstract

Description

==Summary by yinung==

經濟實驗的主要功能

經濟實驗的主要貢獻

實驗法在研究方法論之辨證

==References==

Notes by yinung

文獻比較

Abstract

相關文獻

notes by yinung

Original abstract

References

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