| Date: | 2015 |
| By: | Aflahagah, Fo Kodjo Dzinyefa Bernard, Tanguy Viceisza, Angelino |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1450&r=net |
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Coordination failures are at the heart of development traps. Although communication can reduce such failures, to date experimental evidence has primarily been lab based. This paper studies the impact of communication in stag hunt coordination games played by members of Senegalese farmer groups—a setting where collective commercialization has suffered from coordination failure, as in many rural contexts. We find that communication increases coordination only in larger experimental groups, where it matters most from the standpoint of poverty traps. We also find that these effects are driven by communication’s impact on perceptions of strategic uncertainty. Some policy implications are discussed.
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| Keywords: | coordination, communication, cooperatives, field experimentation, development, strategic uncertainty, |
Tag Archives: Communication
Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
| Date: | 2015 |
| By: | Tjaša Bjedov (Université de Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, 93, Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France; University of Fribourg, Bd de Pérolles 90 CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland) Thierry Madiès (University of Fribourg, Bd de Pérolles 90 CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland) Marie Claire Villeval (Université de Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, 93, Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1507&r=net |
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We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take-turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take-turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate.
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| Keywords: | Coordination, communication, turn taking, conflict, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D74 L15 H71 |
Whom are you talking with ? An experiment on credibility and communication structure
| Date: | 2014-11-05 |
| By: | GRANDJEAN, Gilles (CEREC, Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles) MANTOVANI, Marco (CEREC, Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles; DEMS, University of Milan – Bicocca) MAULEON, Ana (CEREC, Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles; Universit√© catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium) VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent (CEREC, Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2014042&r=net |
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The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication Рi.e. who is talking with whom Рon the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. According to our analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is public. When pair of agents exchange messages privately, the players should play the Pareto dominated equilibrium and disregard communication. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only when announcing to play it is credible. When private communication is allowed, lying is prevalent, and players converge to the Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Nevertheless, at the individual level, players’ beliefs and choices tend to react to messages even when these are non-credible.
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Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
| Date: | 2015-03 |
| By: | Bjedov, Tjaša (University of Fribourg) Madies, Thierry (University of Fribourg) Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8953&r=net |
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We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take-turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take-turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate.
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| Keywords: | coordination, communication, turn taking, conflict, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D74 L15 H71 |
Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information
| Date: | 2013-07 |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, BETA – Bureau d’économie théorique et appliquée – CNRS : UMR7522 – Université de Strasbourg – Université Nancy II) Adam Zylbersztejn (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Paris I – Panthéon-Sorbonne) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00845123&r=net |
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We experimentally study an asymmetric coordination game with two Nash equilibria: one is Pareto-efficient, the other is Pareto-inefficient and involves a weakly dominated strategy. We assess whether information about the interaction partner helps eliminate the imperfect equilibrium. Our treatments involve three information-enhancing mechanisms: repetition and two kinds of individual signals: messages from partner or observation of his past choices. Repetition-based learning increases the frequencies of the most efficient outcome and the most costly strategic mismatch. Moreover, it is superseded by individual signals. Like previous empirical studies, we find that signals provide a screening of partners’ intentions that reduces the frequency of coordination failures. Unlike these studies, we find that the transmission of information between partners, either via messages or observation, does not suffice to significantly increase the overall efficiency of outcomes. This happens mostly because information does not restrain the choice of the dominated action by senders.
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| Keywords: | coordination game; communication; cheap-talk; observation |
Facts and Figuring: An Experimental Investigation of Network Structure and Performance in Information and Solution Spaces
| Date: | 2014-03 |
| By: | Jesse Shore (Boston University – Department of Information Systems) Ethan Bernstein (Harvard Business School, Organizational Behavior Unit) David Lazer (Harvard University – Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:14-075&r=net |
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Using data from a novel laboratory experiment on complex problem solving in which we varied the network structure of 16-person organizations, we investigate how an organization’s network structure shapes performance in problem-solving tasks. Problem solving, we argue, involves both search for information and search for solutions. Our results show that the effect of network structure is opposite for these two important and complementary forms of search. Dense clustering encourages members of a network to generate more diverse information, but discourages them from generating diverse theories: in the language of March (1991), clustering promotes exploration in information space, but decreases exploration in solution space. Previous research, generally focusing on only one of those two spaces at a time, has produced inconsistent conclusions about the value of network clustering. By adopting an experimental platform on which information was measured separately from solutions, we were able to reconcile past contradictions and clarify the effects of network clustering on problem-solving performance. The finding both provides a sharper tool for structuring organizations for knowledge work and reveals the challenges inherent in manipulating network structure to enhance performance, as the communication structure that helps one antecedent of successful problem solving may harm the other.
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| Keywords: | networks, experiments, clustering, problem solving, exploration and exploitation, knowledge, information, communication, search |
Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information
| Date: | 2013 |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, BETA – Bureau d’économie théorique et appliquée – CNRS : UMR7522 – Université de Strasbourg – Université Nancy II) Adam Zylberstejn (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Paris I – Panthéon-Sorbonne) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00845123&r=net |
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We experimentally study an asymmetric coordination game with two Nash equilibria: one is Pareto-efficient, the other is Pareto-inefficient and involves a weakly dominated strategy. We assess whether information about the interaction partner helps eliminate the imperfect equilibrium. Our treatments involve three information-enhancing mechanisms: repetition and two kinds of individual signals: messages from partner or observation of his past choices. Repetition-based learning increases the frequencies of the most efficient outcome and the most costly strategic mismatch. Moreover, it is superseded by individual signals. Like previous empirical studies, we find that signals provide a screening of partners’ intentions that reduces the frequency of coordination failures. Unlike these studies, we find that the transmission of information between partners, either via messages or observation, does not suffice to significantly increase the overall efficiency of outcomes. This happens mostly because information does not restrain the choice of the dominated action by senders.
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| Keywords: | coordination game; communication; cheap-talk; observation |
Endogenous vs. Exogenous Transmission of Information: An Experiment
==notes by yinung==
此實驗研究資訊傳遞效率 (利用 matching game 為基本設計)
player2 和 player1 若選擇 (和 nature played by player 1, 隨機)一致, 則獲利 = 1;否則得 0
treatment: 有C/無NC online chat
所謂 endogenous communication:
… several type 1 players make an intentional mistake to induce a change in type 2’s behavior. Several type 2 players, by looking at type1’s actions, make some kind of guess about the future actions of nature.
| Date: | 2013 |
| By: | Aurora García-Gallego (LEE & Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain) Penélope Hernández-Rojas (ERI-CES & Department of Economic Analysis, University of Valencia, Spain) Amalia Rodrigo-González (Department of Business Finance, University of Valencia, Spain) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jau:wpaper:2013/06&r=net |
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Based on Gossner, Hernández and Neyman’s (2006) 3-player game (hereafter GHN) we analyze communication efficiency in the lab. In that game, player 1 represents random nature an i.i.d. procedure, player 2 is a fully informed player (wiser), and player 3 is the less informed player (agent). The game is repeated and players 2 and 3 get 1 if both actions match nature’s actions and 0 otherwise. We propose an experiment following this game. We implement two treatments: one without chat (NC) and one with chat (C). In the treatment with chat, players may first send messages to each other through an online chat application, and then play the game. After the chat time, only the wiser player has perfect information on the realized (random) sequence played by nature. The players then play the finitely repeated binary game. In treatment NC, subjects just play the game. In the experiment we observed endogenous communication treatment NC as well as exogenous in treatment C, both of which result in higher payoffs. Furthermore, when explicit communication is possible we observe a chat effect which can be interpreted as a higher level of efficiency in communication. Strategies used by subjects are in line with GHN strategies.
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| Keywords: | communication, transmission of information, efficiency, experiments |
| JEL: | D8 |
The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and Potential of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest
George Loewenstein & Daylian M. Cain & Sunita Sah, (2011) “The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and Potential of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest,"
American Economic Review, vol. 101(3), pages 423-28, May. [link to AER]
Noted by Yi-Nung
這篇提及到 Can and Moore (2005, 2011) 的實驗, 有關利益衝突與揭露 (disclosure of conflicts);
可應用在:
centipede game (揭露/未揭露 first mover 的 payoff)
理專/Broker 揭露/未揭露 commission
Ultimatum game 改成 部份捐款給慈善機構 (或 as a public good), 是否會緩和 fairness 的要求
主要結論: more information, in general, is not very effective in improving decisions…. that disclosure does not replace more effective measures, such as working harder to eliminate conflicts of interest in the first place.
p.424: … the introduction of a subsidy or fine can undermine nonmaterial motives, disclosing a conflict of interest can likewise undermine the advisor’s motivation to adhere to professional standards. … Experimental research suggests that … people feel “licensed" to act immorally in subsequent interactions. Disclosure also introduces a possible rationalization for unethical behavior…"expect" bias.
research on judgment suggests that advisees are likely to “anchor" on the advice they receive and then adjust insufficiently, even though they know the advice may be biased (Tversky and Kahnemen, 1974) (先說先嬴…)
p.424:
…disclosure can lead to an increase rather than a decrease in trust if the disclosure is interpreted as a sign of honesty or if the fact that the advisor is receiving payments is interpreted as in indication of professional standing.
主要的例子:
1. 房地產仲介
2. 醫病諮詢
(p.242) In the absence of disclosure,…, a patient’s rejection of participation in a drug trial would likely be attributed to risk aversion… The same rejection,… might be attributed to the patient’s distrust of the doctor
3. 財務經紀人與顧問
Abstract:
We review evidence from our published and ongoing research that disclosing conflicts of interest has unintended consequences, helping conflicted advisors and harming their advisees: With disclosure, advisors feel comfortable giving more biased advice, but advisees do not properly adjust for this and generally fail to sufficiently discount biased advice. Disclosure also increases pressure on advisees to comply with advice; following disclosure, advisees feel more uncomfortable in turning down advice (e.g., it signals distrust of the advisor’s motives). Finally, we examine the effectiveness of policy interventions aimed at reducing these unintended consequences and discuss how to realize potential benefits of disclosure.
行為 & 經濟實驗文獻注 (備忘) by 楊奕農 