Industrial organization theory and experimental economics

Plott, Charles R. “Industrial organization theory and experimental economics." journal of Economic Literature 20.4 (1982): 1485-1527. 提供的 [PDF]

==notes by yinung==

這篇是廠商理論相關的實驗文獻回顧, 包含完全競爭市場、寡佔、獨佔


Durable-goods monopoly: laboratory market and bargaining experiments

Reynolds, Stanley S. “Durable-goods monopoly: laboratory market and bargaining experiments." The RAND Journal of Economics (2000): 375-394. 提供的 [PDF]


Results from single-period monopoly experiments (nondurable environment) are compared with results from multiperiod monopoly experiments that have features of a durable-goods environment. Average prices were below the static monopoly benchmark price in all settings. Observed initial prices were higher in multiperiod experiments than in single-period experiments, in contrast to equilibrium predictions. Prices in multiperiod experiments tended to fall over time; there was less price cutting in market experiments than in bargaining experiments. There was substantial demand withholding by buyers in multiperiod experiments. A version of bounded rationality is a promising candidate for explaining deviations from equilibrium predictions.

Literature on Monopoly Experiments*

Classroom Experiment


學生扮演「價格蒐尋獨佔廠商」(in the role of a price-searching monopolist),

電腦提供消費者需求 (函數), 通常對 monopolist 是不確定的


Williams and Walker (1993) 發現只有少數受試者可以獲得至少 90% 的可能獨佔利潤, 主要原因是未能運用邊際法則 (marginal principles)


(個人 vs 分組)

廠商觀點 (補充消費者觀點: ultimatum 觀點)


(前提: 學生已了解完全競爭市場, 但尚未介紹獨佔市場)

將學生分為 K 組, 每組 N 個學生 (N=5-6; 缺點是消費者人數少不見得適合實務上之獨佔市場)

其中有一位扮演獨佔廠商, 其它扮演消費者


分得一張個人資訊表, 記載 WTP


分得一張個人資訊表, 記載 生產成本

實驗重覆 K 回合 (K=8 in Oxoby (2001), 遊戲共計 40 min)


前幾回合, 獨佔成本不是公開資訊; 後幾回合, 獨佔成本變成公開資訊

消費者的 WTP 分佈是公開資訊;


實驗獲利排名前 n 個獨佔廠商, 前 m 個消費者會實際獲獎 (獎金或分數)

只有第 4 和第8回合獲利列入成績, 以利獨佔廠商估計需求


假設 5 人一組 (N=5), 班上總共 M 個學生

獨佔廠商資訊sheet: M/N 張

消費者資訊sheet: 4*(M/N) 張

成交紀錄表sheet: 每組 1 張


(個人 vs 分組)




==Monopoly 實驗之變形==

(A) 差別定價

獨佔廠商可以出兩次價 (用來探討差別定價):

在獨佔廠商宣佈 first price/second 之後, 消費者決定購買, 但決定購買後, 不可以反悔

(不過, Oxoby (2001) 實驗結果, 並沒有受試者專注於 price discrimination 之現象; 故 second price 在此為擔任探索需求線 (或 MR 線) 之任務)

(B) Coase Conjecture

無法維持獨佔定價之廠商, 價格將收歛到 P=MC



獨佔是最不理想的市場結構, (相對於完全競爭市場)

1. 價格控制

2. 產量減少

3. 效率與無謂損失 (私人動機與社會動機之歧異)


Oxoby (2001) 實驗結果

獨佔成本不公開: 92% of the groups 達 monopoly equil.

獨佔成本公開:  僅 34% of the groups 達 monopoly equil.

==教學指引 Instructions for the Teacher==




實驗後之討論指引 (含實驗報告之撰寫)

實驗結果呈現 (與比較)




  • Oxoby, Robert J. “A monopoly classroom experiment." The Journal of Economic Education 32.2 (2001): 160-168. JSTOR. *****


The author uses a simple classroom experiment to develop the economic model of monopoly. As a pedagogical tool, the experiment introduces students to the nature of the monopoly problem and motivates them to think of the associated efficiency issues as a divergence between private benefits and social contributions. As a test of economic principles, the experiment highlights the role of information and fairness ideals in determining economic outcomes.

Computerized: Wells 1991; Williams and Walker 1993;
directly in the classroom: Leuthold 1987
Reviews: DeYoung 1993; Williams and Walker 1993;

  • Nelson, Robert G., and Richard Oliver Beil. “Pricing strategy under monopoly conditions: an experiment for the classroom." Journal of agricultural and applied economics 26 (1994): 287-287. 提供的 [PDF]

Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information

Date: 2013
By: Nicolas Jacquemet (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, BETA – Bureau d’économie théorique et appliquée – CNRS : UMR7522 – Université de Strasbourg – Université Nancy II)
Adam Zylberstejn (EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris, CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Paris I – Panthéon-Sorbonne)
We experimentally study an asymmetric coordination game with two Nash equilibria: one is Pareto-efficient, the other is Pareto-inefficient and involves a weakly dominated strategy. We assess whether information about the interaction partner helps eliminate the imperfect equilibrium. Our treatments involve three information-enhancing mechanisms: repetition and two kinds of individual signals: messages from partner or observation of his past choices. Repetition-based learning increases the frequencies of the most efficient outcome and the most costly strategic mismatch. Moreover, it is superseded by individual signals. Like previous empirical studies, we find that signals provide a screening of partners’ intentions that reduces the frequency of coordination failures. Unlike these studies, we find that the transmission of information between partners, either via messages or observation, does not suffice to significantly increase the overall efficiency of outcomes. This happens mostly because information does not restrain the choice of the dominated action by senders.
Keywords: coordination game; communication; cheap-talk; observation

Market experience is a reference point in judgments of fairness

Date: 2013-07
By: Holger Herz
Dmitry Taubinsky
People’s desire for fair transactions can play an important role in negotiations, organizations, and markets. In this paper, we show that markets can also shape what people consider to be a fair transaction. We propose a simple and generally-applicable model of path-dependent fairness preferences, in which past experiences shape preferences, and we experimentally test the model’s predictions. We find that previous exposure to competitive pressure substantially and persistently reduces subjects’ fairness concerns, making them more likely to accept low offers. Consistent with our theory, we also find that past experience has little effect on subjects’ inclinations to treat others unfairly.
Keywords: Social preferences, reference points, fairness, bargaining
JEL: C78