PD game 相關文獻回顧 (以合作為觀點)

Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma

DM Kreps, P Milgrom… – Journal of Economic Theory, 1982 – Elsevier
A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the single-period dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in
被引用 1659 次相關文章全部共 11 個版本;   edegan.com 提供的 [PDF]

Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma: Experimental evidence

J Andreoni… – The Economic Journal, 1993 – JSTOR
In the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, it is well known that defection in every game is the unique dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium. This follows from the familiar backward-induction arguments. Kreps et al. (i 982), however, show that if there is incomplete information
被引用 386 次相關文章全部共 14 個版本;   dklevine.com 提供的 [PDF]

Notes by Yi-Nung

Kreps et al. (1982) 提出了一個引發許多後續研究的有趣模型,他們證明在有限重覆的 PD 賽局中,如果賽局雙方對其對手之行為模式有某種的不完全資訊的話,則在此有限重覆的賽局之早期中,雙方皆採合作策略是符合理性的。…(待續)

Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner’s dilemma games

R Cooper, DV DeJong, R Forsythe… – Games and Economic …, 1996 – econ.ucsd.edu 0013 Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner’s Dilemma Games*
knowledge of rationality does not hold in this theoretical structure.
被引用 218 次
相關文章全部共 13 個版本
; ucsd.edu 提供的 [PDF]

Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner’s dilemma game

J Brosig – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2002 – Elsevier
that individuals with a cooperative disposition experience strong emotions that prevent them from cheating, then it should also be observed that, after communicating, these individuals will not exploit the expected cooperation of their partner in prisoner’s dilemma games.
被引用 88 次相關文章全部共 12 個版本;   usc.edu 提供的 [PDF]

The evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games: Experimental evidence

PD Bo… – The American Economic Review, 2011 – ingentaconnect.com
criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not pro- vide solution has been provided to the problem of equilibrium selection: when both cooperation and defection Previous experimental evidence has shown that subjects often fail to coordinate on a spe- cific
被引用 43 次相關文章全部共 34 個版本;    brown.edu 提供的 [PDF]

Tacit Cooperation, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence from Repeated Dominance Solvable Games

JB Van Huyck, JM Wildenthal… – Games and Economic …, 2002 – Elsevier
R. Cooper, DV DeJong, R. Forsythe and TW Ross, Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoners P. Milgrom, J. Roberts and R. Wilson, Rational Cooperation in the and JK Murnighan, Equilibrium Behavior and Repeated Play of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
被引用 24 次相關文章全部共 11 個版本;    psu.edu 提供的 [PDF]

Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

G Charness, GR Fréchette… – Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 – Elsevier
We wished to not only test the general effectiveness of endogenous payments for cooperation We noted earlier that mutual cooperation is the unique action pair consistent with SPE As controls, we conducted one session for each game without the possibility of transfer payments
被引用 25 次相關文章全部共 18 個版本;      escholarship.org 提供的 [PDF]

The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment

HT Normann, B Wallace – University of London Royal Holloway …, 2006 – papers.ssrn.com
unknown horizon would be. Empirically, however, it is well known that stable cooperation does occur also in finitely repeated games. – A related concern is to avoid endgame effects. Morehous (1966) observed that defection
被引用 31 次相關文章全部共 6 個版本; uni-duesseldorf.de 提供的 [PDF]

Cooperation in infinitely repeated games: Extending theory and experimental evidence

M Blonski, P Ockenfels… – JW Goethe Universität Frankfurt, …, 2007 – luiss.it
A proper understanding of the determinants of cooperation is crucial for the social sciences.  In this paper we propose a novel theoretical tool that enhances this understanding. Accordingly we present experimental evidence designed to differentiate clearly among the prevailing
被引用 7 次相關文章HTML 版全部共 2 個版本   ;   luiss.it 提供的 [PDF]

Notes by Yi-Nung

這篇談及了讓人們之合作較容易形成的四個條件 (Mailath G. and L. Samuelson, 2006):
(i) 合作利得相對大於不合作
(ii) 對手採合作下, 不合作利得相對小
(iii) 因不合作而預期被報復 (或懲罰) 的恐懼或嚴重性高
(iv) 較有耐心或較重視未來價值者

AE Roth… – Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1978 – Elsevier
Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoner’s dilemma. Two equilibrium indices are derived and are compared with two cooperation indices proposed by Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people’s behavior in a commons dilemma situation.
被引用 100 次相關文章全部共 4 個版本; harvard.edu 提供的 [PDF]

Notes by Yi-Nung

這篇是 PD game ending-rule 設成 q = (1-p) 的原始文獻 (其中也有實驗)

其中其實已經提到 ‘Tit-for-Tat’ 策略 (不只是從 Kreps et al. 1982, JET 來的):

… a player  to  play  his  cooperative  choice  in  the  first  period,  and  in  every  other period  to  play  the  same  choice  that  his  opponent  made  in  the  previous  period.

The [experimental] findings  also  indicated  that  the  last  play  of  an  n-period  game  may  result  in  a  reduction in  cooperative  choices.

應該把 ending-rule 設成機率的原因:

It  is  often  contended  in  the  literature  that  if  subjects  are  not  informed  of  the  number  periods  to  be played,  the  resulting  game yields  the  same  equilibria  as  the  infinite  game, since  no period  is  known  to  be  the  last.  However,  this  is  a considerable  oversimplification.  Since  it  is  apparent  that  the  game  must  eventually  terminate,  subjects  must  form  subctive  probabilities  greater  than  zero  that  a given  period  might  be  the  last.  Although  such obabilities  have  neither  been  observed  nor  controlled  by  experimenters,  we  shall  see that  they  play  a critical  role  in  determining  the  nature  of  equilibrium  outcomes.  (原因何在?)

P. 195

Morehous’s  (1966)  results  for  a game  with  a fixed duration  of  1, 2,  5,  or  10 periods  are  an  important  comparison.  He  reports  no  significant difference  in  the  amount  of  cooperation  evidenced  in  these  games,  although  the  results were  in  the  same  direction  as  our  results.

有關 face-to-face

E Williams – Psychological Bulletin, 1977 – psycnet.apa.org
1971) again used the Prisoner’s Dilemma, though only one of the pair was a subject, the other being a confederate. At certain points in the game, the confederate gave standardized friendly or unfriendly mes- sages in written form, by audio only, by audio-video, or face to face.
被引用 354 次相關文章全部共 4 個版本

The sound of silence in prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games

I Bohnet… – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1999 – Elsevier
exchanged in facetoface interactions which induces individuals to change their behavior, but rather the participants’ identification. While mutual identification allows for reciprocity, one-way identification excludes future social sanctions. In the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game
被引用 243 次相關文章全部共 12 個版本; psu.edu 提供的 [PDF]

Collective action and the evolution of social norms

E Ostrom – The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000 – JSTOR
To the surprise of the experimenters, a higher level of cooperation occurred in the control groups that played the regular prisoner’s dilemma in both phases, especially for those who communicated on a facetoface basis. The
被引用 946 次相關文章全部共 35 個版本,   192.12.12.16 提供的 [PDF]

Some consequences of e-mail vs. facetoface communication in experiment

N Frohlich… – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 1998 – Elsevier
be that when there is substantial substance to communicate and debate because subjects face a complex decision, facetoface interaction helps establish what both individual and group interests dictate. The act of talking with one another may reveal the underlying dilemma.
被引用 78 次相關文章全部共 11 個版本;  jku.at 提供的 [PDF]

Do economists make bad citizens?

RH Frank, TD Gilovich… – The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1996 – JSTOR
In naturally occurring social dilemmas, facetoface promises are sometimes an option, sometimes not. But when combined with our survey of charitable giving and the results of our prisoner’s dilemma experiments-as well as parallel findings reported by Marwell and Ames (1981
被引用 181 次相關文章全部共 13 個版本unimc.it 提供的 [PDF]

M Shubik – Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1970 – JSTOR
interaction. Third parties and writ- ten documents, as well as the avoidance of individual facetoface confrontation, are often used to remove sociopsychological factors. Let us return to our specific analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. When
被引用 86 次相關文章全部共 6 個版本auth.gr 提供的 [PDF]

The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face

yinung: 看一些 smile 的照片後, 再進行實驗

JPW Scharlemann, CC Eckel, A Kacelnik… – Journal of Economic …, 2001 – Elsevier
Choosing the cooperative strategy is risky, because cheaters can always take advantage of the cooperator. In a prisoner’s dilemma game, defecting leaves the cheater better off and makes the cooperator worse off. In an exchange relationship the same is true.
被引用 139 次相關文章全部共 14 個版本; psu.edu 提供的 [PDF]

和電腦互動的文獻

A prisoner’s dilemma experiment on cooperation with people and human-like computers.

S Kiesler, L Sproull… – Journal of Personality and Social …, 1996 – psycnet.apa.org
Andreoni and Miller (1993) obtained moderately high coop- eration rates by having participants play a prisoner’s dilemma game with an acquaintance of the 3 As would be expected in the absence of visibility and facetoface communication, cooperation rates are lower in these
被引用 106 次相關文章全部共 11 個版本nagoya-u.ac.jp 提供的 [PDF]

與 end-game effect 有關

Normann and Wallace (2012, IJGT) The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment

此文提到其它 end-game 的文獻:(最早?) Morehous (1966), Axelrod (1984), Murnighan and Roth (1983), Holt (1985)

Andreoni and John H. Miller (1993) Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

已注意到 end-game 但避談 (用刪去最後樣本來處理)

Wichman, Harvey. 1970. ‘‘Effects of Isolation and Communication on Cooperation in a Two-Person Game.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 16:114–20.

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Does commitment or feedback influence myopic loss aversion?: An experimental analysis

Thomas Langer and Martin Weber (2008) " Does commitment or feedback influence myopic loss aversion?: An experimental analysis" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 67, Issues 3-4, September 2008, Pages 810-819. via DOI;

這篇和 Langer andWeber (2008) 重覆

Notes by Yi-Nung

這篇將投資期間長/短 , 和資訊迴饋頻率 (frequent/infrequent) 兩種因素進行交叉實驗, 實驗結果和 Bellemare et al. (2005) 的並不十分一致; Bellemare et al. (2005) 主要實驗設計在於資訊迴饋頻率 frequent/infrequent, 其 treatment 有三種:

H: 投資期間1期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
M: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
L: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每3期

Bellemare et al. (2005) 實驗結果是: 投資額度 L~M>H

Original Abstract

Empirical research has demonstrated that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer period of commitment decreases myopia and thereby increases the willingness to invest in a risky asset. In an experimental study, we disentangle the intertwined manipulation of feedback frequency and commitment to analyze how each individual variable contributes to the change in myopia and how they interact. We find that the period of commitment exerts a substantial impact and the feedback frequency a far less pronounced impact. There is a strong interaction between both variables. The results have significant implications for real world intertemporal decision making.

Keywords: Intertemporal decision making; Myopic loss aversion; Feedback frequency; Length of commitment; Evaluation period

相關文獻

Bellemare et al. (2005) Myopic loss aversion: Information feedback vs. investment flexibility, Economics Letters, Volume 87, Issue 3, June 2005, Pages 319-324.

Individual Expectations and Aggregate Macro Behavior

總經的實驗!

Individual Expectations and Aggregate Macro Behavior

Date: 2011-05
By: Tiziana Assenza
Peter Heemeijer
Cars Hommes
Domenica Massaro
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:298&r=net
The way in which individual expectations shape aggregate macroeconomic variables is crucial for the transmission and effectiveness of monetary policy. We study the individual expectations formation process and the interaction with monetary policy, within a standard New Keynesian model, by means of laboratory experiments with human subjects. We find that a more aggressive monetary policy that sets the interest rate more than point for point in response to inflation stabilizes inflation in our experimental economies. We use a simple model of individual learning, with a performance-based evolutionary selection among heterogeneous forecasting heuristics, to explain coordination of individual expectations and aggregate macro behavior observed in the laboratory experiments. Three aggregate outcomes are observed: convergence to some equilibrium level, persistent oscillatory behaviour and oscillatory convergence. A simple heterogeneous expectations switching model fits individual learning as well as aggregate outcomes and outperforms homogeneous expectations benchmarks.
Keywords: Experiments; Monetary Policy; Expectations; Heterogeneity
JEL: C91

The Effects of Penalty Design on Market Performance: Experimental Evidence from an Emissions Trading Scheme with Auctioned Permits

The Effects of Penalty Design on Market Performance: Experimental Evidence from an Emissions Trading Scheme with Auctioned Permits

Date: 2010-12
By: Restiani, Phillia
Betz, Regina
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eerhrr:107586&r=net
This paper investigates the behavioural implications of penalty designs on market performance using an experimental method. Three penalty types and two penalty levels are enforced in a laboratory permit market with auctioning, including the Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme proposed design of tying the penalty rate to the auction price. Compliance strategies are limited to undertaking irreversible abatement investment decisions or buying permits. We aim to assess how penalty design under the presence of subjectsâ risk preferences might affect compliance incentives, permit price discovery, and efficiency. In contrast to theory, we find that penalty levels serve as a focal point that indicates compliance costs and affects compliance strategies. The make-good provision penalty provides stronger compliance incentives than the other penalty types. However, the theory holds with regard to permit price discovery, as we find no evidence of the effect of penalty design on auction price. Interestingly, risk preference does not directly affect compliance decision, but it does influence price discovery, which evidently is a significant factor in compliance decisions as well as efficiency. Most importantly, a trade-off between investment incentives and efficiency is observed.
Keywords: emissions trading, penalty design, experiment, auction, irreversible investment, abatement, compliance, Environmental Economics and Policy, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

What is the actual shape of perception utility?

What is the actual shape of perception utility?

Date: 2011-06-20
By: Kontek, Krzysztof
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:31715&r=net
Cumulative Prospect Theory (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979, 1992) holds that the value function is described using a power function, and is concave for gains and convex for losses. These postulates are questioned on the basis of recently reported experiments, paradoxes (gain-loss separability violation), and brain activity research. This paper puts forward the hypothesis that perception utility is generally logarithmic in shape for both gains and losses, and only happens to be convex for losses when gains are not present in the problem context. This leads to a different evaluation of mixed prospects than is the case with Prospect Theory: losses are evaluated using a concave, rather than a convex, utility function. In this context, loss aversion appears to be nothing more than the result of applying a logarithmic utility function over the entire outcome domain. Importantly, the hypothesis enables a link to be established between perception utility and Portfo-lio Theory (Markowitz, 1952A). This is not possible in the case of the Prospect Theory value function due its shape at the origin.
Keywords: Prospect Theory; value function; perception utility; loss aversion; gain-loss separability violation; neuroscience; Portfolio Theory; Decision Utility Theory.
JEL: D81

EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON THE ‘INSIDIOUS’ ILLIQUIDITY RISK

EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON THE ‘INSIDIOUS’ ILLIQUIDITY RISK

Date: 2011-06-21
By: Damien Besancenot (CEPN – Centre d’Economie de l’Université Paris Nord – Université Paris-Nord – Paris XIII – CNRS : UMR7234)
Radu Vranceanu (Economics Department – ESSEC Business School)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cepnwp:halshs-00602107&r=net
This paper brings experimental evidence on investors’ behavior subject to an “illiquidity" constraint, where the success of a risky project depends on the participation of a minimum number of investors. The experiment is set up as a frameless coordination game that replicates the investment context. Results confirm the insidious nature of the illiquidity risk: as long as a first illiquidity default does not occur, investors do not seem able to fully internalize it. After several defaults, agents manage to coordinate on a default probability above which they refuse to participate to the project. This default probability is lower than the default probability of the first illiquidity default.
Keywords: Coordination game, Illiquidity risk, Threshold strategy, Experimental economics

Ordering effects and strategic response in discrete choice experiments

Ordering effects and strategic response in discrete choice experiments

Date: 2010-03
By: Scheufele, Gabriela
Bennett, Jeff
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eerhrr:107743&r=net
This study explores ordering effects and response strategies in repeated binary discrete choice experiments (DCE). Mechanism design theory and empirical evidence suggest that repeated choice tasks per respondent introduce strategic behavior. We find evidence that the order in which choice sets are presented to respondents may provide strategic opportunities that affect choice decisions (âstrategic responseâ). The findings propose that the âstrategic responseâ does not follow strong cost-minimization but other strategies such as weak cost-minimization or good deal/ bad deal heuristics. Evidence further suggests that participants, as they answer more choice questions, not only make more accurate choices (âinstitutional learningâ) but may also become increasingly aware of and learn to take advantage of the order in which choice sets are presented to them (âstrategic learningâ).
Keywords: discrete choice experiments, incentive compatibility, mixed logit models, ordering effects, repeated binary choice task, response strategies, Environmental Economics and Policy,

A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception

A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception

Date: 2011-06
By: Andrew Caplin
Daniel Martin
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17163&r=net
We introduce a rational choice theory that allows for many forms of imperfect perception, including failures of memory, selective attention, and adherence to simplifying rules of thumb. Despite its generality, the theory has strong, simple, and intuitive implications for standard choice data and for more enriched choice data. The central assumption is rational expectations: decision makers understand the relationship between their perceptions, however limited they may be, and the (stochastic) consequences of their available choices. Our theory separately identifies two distinct “framing" effects: standard effects involving the layout of the prizes (e.g. order in a list) and novel effects relating to the information content of the environment (e.g. how likely is the first in the list to be the best). Simple experimental tests both affirm the basic model and confirm the existence of information-based framing effects.
JEL: D01

Social capital dynamics and collective action: the role of subjective satisfaction

Social capital dynamics and collective action: the role of subjective satisfaction

Date: 2011-06
By: Leonardo Becchetti (Department of Economics, Universitˆ Tor Vergata)
Stefano Castriota (Department of Economics, Universitˆ di Perugia)
Pierluigi Conzo (Università di Roma Tor Vergata & EIEF)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp29&r=net
In low income countries grass-root collective action is a well known substitute for government provision of public goods. In our research we wonder what is its effect on the law of motion of social capital, a crucial microeconomic determinant of economic development. To this purpose we structure a ?sandwich? experiment in which participants play a public good game (PGG) between two trust games (TG1 and TG2). Our findings show that the change in trustworthiness between the two trust game rounds generated by the PGG treatment is crucially affected by the subjective satisfaction about the PGG rather than by standard objective measures related to PGG players? behavior. These results highlight that subjective satisfaction after collective action has relevant predictive power on social capital creation providing information which can be crucial to design successful self-organized resource regimes.
Keywords: trust games, public good games, randomized experiment, social capital, subjective wellbeing
JEL: O12

The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and Potential of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest

George Loewenstein & Daylian M. Cain & Sunita Sah, (2011) “The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and Potential of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest,"
American Economic Review,  vol. 101(3), pages 423-28, May. [link to AER]

Noted by Yi-Nung

這篇提及到 Can and Moore (2005, 2011) 的實驗, 有關利益衝突與揭露 (disclosure of conflicts);

可應用在:

centipede game (揭露/未揭露 first mover 的 payoff)
理專/Broker 揭露/未揭露 commission
Ultimatum game 改成 部份捐款給慈善機構 (或 as a public good), 是否會緩和 fairness 的要求

主要結論: more information, in general, is not very effective in improving decisions…. that disclosure does not replace more effective measures, such as working harder to eliminate conflicts of interest in the first place.

p.424: … the introduction of a subsidy or fine can undermine nonmaterial motives, disclosing a conflict of interest can likewise undermine the advisor’s motivation to adhere to professional standards. … Experimental research suggests that … people feel “licensed" to act immorally in subsequent interactions. Disclosure also introduces a possible rationalization for unethical behavior…"expect" bias.

research on judgment suggests that advisees are likely to “anchor" on the advice they receive and then adjust insufficiently, even though they know the advice may be biased (Tversky and Kahnemen, 1974) (先說先嬴…)

p.424:

…disclosure can lead to an increase rather than a decrease in trust if the disclosure is interpreted as a sign of honesty or if the fact that the advisor is receiving payments is interpreted as in indication of professional standing.

主要的例子:

1. 房地產仲介

2. 醫病諮詢

(p.242) In the absence of disclosure,…, a patient’s rejection of participation in a drug trial would likely be attributed to risk aversion… The same rejection,… might be attributed to the patient’s distrust of the doctor

3. 財務經紀人與顧問

Abstract:

We review evidence from our published and ongoing research that disclosing conflicts of interest has unintended consequences, helping conflicted advisors and harming their advisees: With disclosure, advisors feel comfortable giving more biased advice, but advisees do not properly adjust for this and generally fail to sufficiently discount biased advice. Disclosure also increases pressure on advisees to comply with advice; following disclosure, advisees feel more uncomfortable in turning down advice (e.g., it signals distrust of the advisor’s motives). Finally, we examine the effectiveness of policy interventions aimed at reducing these unintended consequences and discuss how to realize potential benefits of disclosure.