Tell Me How to Rule: Leadership, Delegation, and Voice in Cooperation

Date: 2016
By: Marco Faillo
Federico Fornasari
Luigi Mittone
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpce:1604&r=net
Following some recent studies, we experimentally test the effect of intra-group leadership in a public good experiment. Specifically, individuals taking part in our experiment are randomly assigned either the role of leader or the role of follower. Leaders take part in a public good game, aware of the fact that every decision they make directly affects their followers. In this sense, our experimental setting combines the dimension of leadership in cooperation with the one of delegated agents. In our experiment, we find that leadership produces two main effects: subjects contribute more, and tend to punish more frequently. In spite of the presence of higher contributions, we observe lower payoffs; these are caused by an aggressive behavior that push leaders to mane an undue use of punishment. Allowing one-sided communication between followers and leaders provide a different effect: communication reduces decision makers’ aggressiveness, leading to lower contributions and punishment, but better results in terms of final payoffs. The same welfare can be reached when leadership is not implemented at all; this suggests that the presence of a dictatorial leader in public goods with punishment can be beneficial only when there is communication.
Keywords: Voluntary contribution experiment, Leadership, Punishment
JEL: C72 C92 H41 O12
廣告

Are Results of Social- and Self-Image Concerns in Voluntary Contributions Game Similar?

==notes by yinung==

self-image concerns: 可看見別人的決策, 但別人看不到自己的決策
social-image concerns: 自己的決策可以被看見

自我傾向者, 隨團隊走 (若貢獻<平均, 則增加貢獻), 而且此種人, 貢獻較穩定

Date: 2015-02
By: Martin Daniel Siyaranamual (Department of Economics, Padjadjaran University)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unp:wpaper:201501&r=net
Social interactions may encourage the cooperative behaviours by triggering either self-image concerns (when one sees others’ decisions without being seen) or social-image concerns (when one’s decision is seen by others). A laboratory experiment is designed to compare these two concerns directly, using a four-players finitely repeated public goods experiment on two directed star networks, self-image and social-image networks. The comparison of the players voluntary contributions in both types of networks reveals that their contributing behaviours are statistically indistinguishable. However, the players who belong to the self-image network are more willing to conform with the group behaviours, meaning that they will increase (reduce) the contributions if theirs are below (above) their groups average. Furthermore, I also find evidence that the contributing behaviours are more stable in the self-image networks than in the social-image network.
Keywords: Social-image; Self-image; Directed network; Public good experiment
JEL: C92 D19 H41 Z13

Social Incentives Matter: Evidence from an Online Real Effort Experiment

Date: 2012-07
By: Tonin, Mirco (University of Southampton)
Vlassopoulos, Michael (University of Southampton)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6716&r=net
Contributing to a social cause can be an important driver for workers in the public and non-profit sector as well as in firms that engage in Corporate Social Responsibility activities. This paper compares the effectiveness of social incentives to financial incentives using an online real effort experiment. We find that social incentives lead to a 20% rise in productivity, regardless of their form (lump sum or related to performance) or strength. When subjects can choose the mix of incentives half sacrifice some of their private compensation to increase social compensation, with women more likely than men. Furthermore, social incentives do not attract less productive subjects, nor subjects that respond more to exogenously imposed social incentives. Our calculations suggest that a dollar spent on social incentives is equivalent to increasing private compensation by at least half a dollar.
Keywords: private incentives, social incentives, sorting, prosocial behavior, real effort experiment, corporate social responsibility, gender
JEL: D64

Social capital dynamics and collective action: the role of subjective satisfaction

Social capital dynamics and collective action: the role of subjective satisfaction

Date: 2011-06
By: Leonardo Becchetti (Department of Economics, Universitˆ Tor Vergata)
Stefano Castriota (Department of Economics, Universitˆ di Perugia)
Pierluigi Conzo (Università di Roma Tor Vergata & EIEF)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp29&r=net
In low income countries grass-root collective action is a well known substitute for government provision of public goods. In our research we wonder what is its effect on the law of motion of social capital, a crucial microeconomic determinant of economic development. To this purpose we structure a ?sandwich? experiment in which participants play a public good game (PGG) between two trust games (TG1 and TG2). Our findings show that the change in trustworthiness between the two trust game rounds generated by the PGG treatment is crucially affected by the subjective satisfaction about the PGG rather than by standard objective measures related to PGG players? behavior. These results highlight that subjective satisfaction after collective action has relevant predictive power on social capital creation providing information which can be crucial to design successful self-organized resource regimes.
Keywords: trust games, public good games, randomized experiment, social capital, subjective wellbeing
JEL: O12

Testing Behavioral Public Economics Theories in the Laboratory

Testing Behavioral Public Economics Theories in the Laboratory

Date: 2011-04

By: James Alm (Department of Economics, Tulane University)

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tul:wpaper:1102&r=net

“Behavioral economics", or the application of methods and evidence from other social sciences to economics, has increased greatly in significance in the last two decades. An important method by which many of its predictions have been tested has been via laboratory experiments. In this paper I survey and assess experimental tests of various applications of behavioral economics to the specific area of public economics, or “behavioral public economics". I discuss the basic elements of behavioral economics, the methodology of experimental economics, applications of experimental methods to behavioral public economics, and topics in which future applications should prove useful.

Keywords: experimental methods, behavioral economics

JEL: C9

Select Papers for nep-net.