|By:||Zacharias Maniadis (School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton)
Fabio Tufano (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)
John A List (School of Economics, University of Chicago)
Some researchers have argued that anchoring in economic valuations casts doubt on the assumption of consistent and stable preferences. We present new evidence that questions the robustness of certain anchoring results. We then present a theoretical framework that provides insights into why we should be cautious of initial empirical findings in general. The model importantly highlights that the rate of false positives depends not only on the observed significance level, but also on statistical power, research priors, and the number of scholars exploring the question. Importantly, a few independent replications dramatically increase the chances that a given original finding is true.
|Keywords:||Anchoring, Methodology, Replication, Willingness to Accept, Experiment|
|By:||Daniele Nosenzo (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)
Simone Quercia (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)
Martin Sefton (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)
We study the effect of group size on cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanism games. As in previous experiments, we study four- and eight-person groups in high and low marginal per capita return (MPCR) conditions. We find a positive effect of group size in the low MPCR condition, as in previous experiments. However, in the high MPCR condition we observe a negative group size effect. We extend the design to investigate two- and three-person groups in the high MPCR condition, and find that cooperation is highest of all in two-person groups. The findings in the high MPCR condition are consistent with those from n-person prisoner’s dilemma and oligopoly experiments that suggest it is more difficult to sustain cooperation in larger groups. The findings from the low MPCR condition suggest that this effect can be overridden. In particular, when cooperation is low other factors, such as considerations of the social benefits of contributing (which increase with group size), may dominate any negative group size effect.
|Keywords:||voluntary contribution mechanism, cooperation, group size|
Among residents of an informal housing area in Cairo, we examine how dictator giving varies by the social distance between subjects – friend versus stranger – and by the anonymity of the dictator. While giving to strangers is high under anonymity, we find – consistent with Leider et al. (2009) – that (i) a decrease in social distance increases giving, (ii) giving to a stranger and to a friend is positively correlated, and (iii) more altruistic dictators increase their giving less under non-anonymity than less altruistic dictators. However, friends are not alike in their altruistic preferences, suggesting that an individual’s intrinsic preferences may not necessarily be shaped by his (or her) peers. Instead, reciprocal motives seem important, indicating that social relationships may be valued differently when individuals are financially dependent on them. —
|Keywords:||giving,reciprocity,social distance,networks, sorting|
|JEL:||C93 D64 L14 O12|
Backward induction is a widely accepted principle for predicting behavior in sequential games. In the classic example of the “centipede game,” however, players frequently violate this principle. An alternative is a “dynamic level-k” model, where players choose a rule from a rule hierarchy. The rule hierarchy is iteratively defined such that the level-k rule is a best response to the level-(k-1) rule, and the level-∞ rule corresponds to backward induction. Players choose rules based on their best guesses of others’ rules and use historical plays to improve their guesses. The model captures two systematic violations of backward induction in centipede games, limited induction and repetition unraveling. Because the dynamic level-k model always converges to backward induction over repetition, the former can be considered to be a tracing procedure for the latter. We also examine the generalizability of the dynamic level-k model by applying it to explain systematic violations of backward induction in sequential bargaining games. We show that the same model is capable of capturing these violations in two separate bargaining experiments.
- Camerer, C. and Ho, T-H “Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling," In Handbook of Game Theory, Forthcoming. PDF File provided by berkeley
- Ho, T-H. “Individual Learning in Games," Blume, L. and Durlauf, S. (eds.) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics: Design of Experiments and Behavioral Economics, Palgrave Macmillian, 2008. PDF File
- Camerer, C. Ho, T-H. and Chong,J-K. “Models of Thinking, Learning, and Teaching in Games," The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 93: 2 (2003), 192-195. PDF File
- Camerer, C., Ho, T-H, and Chong, J-K. “Behavioral Game Theory: Thinking, Learning and Teaching," Paper Presented at the Nobel Prize Symposium (Dec 2001). PDF File
- 這篇和選美賽局 beauty contest 有關
Ho, T-H., Camerer, C., and Weigelt, K., “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental P-Beauty Contests," The American Economic Review, 88 (1998), 947-969. PDF File
- Ho, T-H. and Weigelt, K., “Task Complexity, Equilibrium Selection, and Learning: An Experimental Study," Management Science, 42 (1996), 659-679. PDF File
- Ho, T-H. and K. Weigelt, “Trust Building Among Strangers," Management Science , 51: 4, pp. 1-12, 2005. [Lead Article] [Finalist, John D. C. Little Best Paper Award]. PDF File
We examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors. We consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture. We show that (1) demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit-maximizing licensing strategy; (2) the seller’s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive; (3) the seller’s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low; (4) larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation, and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs; and (5) a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation.
Schmitz, Patrick W. “On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information." Journal of Economic Theory 106.1 (2002): 177-189.uni-muenchen.de 提供的 [PDF]
Consider a research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot develop a marketable final product based on the new technology. There are two downstream firms that might successfully develop the new product. If the downstream firms’ benefits from being the sole supplier of the new product are private information, the research lab will sometimes sell two licenses, even though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive license. This is in contrast to the standard result that a monopolist will sometimes serve fewer, but never more buyers when there is private information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L12, D45, D82
- private information
Cohen, Wesley M., and Richard C. Levin. (1989). Empirical studies of innovation and market structure. Handbook of industrial organization, 2, 1059-1107.
==notes by yinung==
這是一篇有關 patent 的 文獻 review
- Cuihong, F., Jun, B. H., & Wolfstetter, E. G. (2013). Licensing process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates. Games and Economic Behavior. korea.ac.kr 提供的 [PDF]
- Mavrommati, A., & Karakitsiou, A. (2013). Ad-valorem and Royalty Licensing Under Decreasing Returns to Scale. Asian Journal of Business and Management, 1(1). ajouronline.com 提供的 [PDF]
- Chang, M. C., Hu, J. L., & Lin, C. H. (2013). The Optimal Licensing Strategy of an Outside Patentee in Vertically-Related Markets. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 5(3), p102. ccsenet.org 提供的 [PDF]
- Xue, M. G., & Su, L. L. (2012, September). Optimal patent licensing strategy in patent litigation. In Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE), 2012 International Conference on (pp. 1569-1574). IEEE.
Datta, A., Reed, R., & Jessup, L. (2013). Commercialization of innovations: an overarching framework and research agenda. American Journal of Business, 28(2), 5-5.
Mukherjee, A., & Mukherjee, S. (2013). Technology licensing and innovation. Economics Letters.
Pénin, J. (2012). Strategic uses of patents in markets for technology: Definition and consequences of pure trolls and pure brokers. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
- Pénin, J. (2011). Strategic uses of patents in markets for technology: A story of fabless firms, brokers and trolls. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 84(2), 633-641.
Feldman, M. P., Colaianni, A., Kang, L., Krattiger, A., Mahoney, R. T., Nelsen, L., … & Kowalski, S. P. (2007). Lessons from the commercialization of the Cohen-Boyer patents: the Stanford University licensing program. Intellectual property management in health and agricultural innovation: a handbook of best practices, Volumes 1 and 2, 1797-1807.
The Cohen-Boyer licensing program, by any variety of metrics, was widely successful. Recombinant DNA (rDNA) products provided a new technology platform for a range of industries, resulting in over US$35 billion in sales for an estimated 2,442 new products. Over the duration of the life of the patents (they expired in December 1997), the technology was licensed to 468 companies, many of them fledgling biotech companies who used the licenses to establish their legitimacy. Over the 25 years of the licensing program, Stanford and the University of California system accrued US$255 million in licensing revenues (to the end of 2001), much of which was subsequently invested in research and research infrastructure. In many ways, Stanford’s management of the Cohen-Boyer patents has become the gold standard for university technology licensing. Stanford made pragmatic decisions and was flexible, adapting its licensing strategies as circumstances changed.
==ultimatum games in experimental studies==
- Grimm, V., & Mengel, F. (2011). Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces rejection rates in ultimatum games. Economics Letters, 111(2), 113-115.
- Berger, R., Rauhut, H., Prade, S., & Helbing, D. (2012). Bargaining over waiting time in ultimatum game experiments. Social science research, 41(2), 372-379.
Battersby, G. J., & Grimes, C. W. (2012). Licensing royalty rates. Aspen Publishers Online.
The data in Licensing Royalty Rates is compiled using information from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. After careful review by a blue-ribbon panel of expert licensing consultants uniquely qualified to know what the appropriate rate range is for specific properties in each licensing category, the information is organized into four time-saving sections that give researchers fast access to comprehensive statistical and analytical data:
- Royalty rate listing alphabetically by licensed product provides a detailed alphabetical listing of products and their suggested rate range across all product categories.
- Royalty rate listing by international trademark class lets you quickly identify subtle royalty rate differences between similar products within specific international trademark classes.
- Checklist of licensed products and services offers a quick-reference to products with a high potential for licensing.
- Comprehensive list of licensed products and services presents a detailed list of all surveyed products and services within a trademark class for preparing intent-to-use trademark applications.
This detailed information gives both beginning and more experienced licensing professionals the confidence needed to negotiate the maximum allowable rate regardless of the product, the market and the parameters of the specific deal itself.
|By:||Doh-Shin Jeon (Toulouse School of Economics)
Yassine Lefouili (Toulouse School of Economics)
We study bilateral cross-licensing agreements among N(> 2) firms that engage in competition after the licensing phase. It is shown that the most collusive cross-licensing royalty, i.e. the one that allows the industry to achieve the monopoly profit, is sustainable as the outcome of bilaterally efficient agreements. When the terms of the agreements are not observable to third parties, the monopoly royalty is the unique symmetric bilaterally efficient royalty. However, when the terms of the agreements are public, the most competitive royalty (i.e. zero) can also be bilaterally efficient. Policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements are derived from these results.
|Keywords:||Cross-Licensing, Collusion, Antitrust and Intellectual Property|
|JEL:||L44 O33 O34|