Where Do Social Preferences Come From?

Date: 2015-08
By: Chaning Jang (Department of Psychology, Princeton University)
John Lynham (Department of Economics & UHERO, University of Hawaii at Manoa; Center for Ocean Solutions, Stanford University)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hae:wpaper:2015-8&r=net
Where do preferences for fairness come from? We use a unique field setting to test for a spillover of sharing norms from the workplace to a laboratory experiment. Fishermen working in teams receive random income shocks (catching fish) that they must regularly divide among themselves. We demonstrate a clear correlation between sharing norms in the field and sharing norms in the lab. Furthermore, the spillover effect is stronger for fishermen who have been exposed to a sharing norm for longer, suggesting that our findings are not driven by selection effects. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that work environments shape social preferences.
Keywords: ultimatum game; social preferences; fairness; workplace spillovers
JEL: Q2 C9 C7 B4 D1
廣告

Evolution of Fairness and Group Formation in Multi-Player Ultimatum Games

Date: 2015-08
By: NISHIMURA, Takeshi
OKADA, Akira
SHIRATA, Yasuhiro
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:econdp:2015-06&r=net
Group formation is a fundamental activity in human society. Humans often exclude others from a group and divide the group benefit in a fair way only among group members. Such an allocation is called in-group fair. Does natural selection favor an in-group fair allocation? We investigate the evolution of fairness and group formation in a three-person Ultimatum Game (UG) in which the group value depends on its size. In a stochastic model of the frequency-dependent Moran process, natural selection favors the formation of a two-person subgroup in the low mutation limit if its group value exceeds a high proportion (0.7) of that of the largest group. Stochastic evolutionary game theory provides theoretical support to explain the behavior of human subjects in economic experiments of a three-person UG.

Ultimatum game: A meta-analysis of the past three decades of experimental research

Date: 2014-10
By: Jean-Christian Tisserand (CRESE)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:0802032&r=net
The ultimatum game undoubtely lists the largest experimental literature of the past three decades. In this article, we focus on the choice of the proposer of the ultimatum game and the explanatory variables that may influence the amount offered. We perform a meta-analysis with a total of 97 observations from simple ultimatum game gathered through 42 articles published between 1983 and 2012. While the theoretical prediction announces that the equilibrium offer should be zero, our results show that the weighted average offer is 42.3% of the amount at stake. Among the numerous variables studied, only being an economist has a significant impact on the amounts offered.
Keywords: Meta-analysis, Ultimatum game, Experimental economics, Microeconomics, Behavioral economics
JEL: C78 C91 D03

When Ignorance is Bliss* : Information Asymmetries Enhance Prosocial Behavior in Dicator Games

Date: 2014
By: Winschel, Evguenia
Zahn, Philipp
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnh:wpaper:36632&r=net
In most laboratory experiments concerning prosocial behavior subjects are fully informed how their decision influences the payoff of other players. Outside the laboratory, however, individuals typically have to decide without such detailed knowledge. To asses the effect of information asymmetries on prosocial behavior, we conduct a laboratory experiment with a simple non-strategic interaction. A dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We observe subjects with heterogenous social preferences. While under symmetric information only individuals with the same type of preferences transfer, under asymmetric information different types transfer at the same time. As a consequence and the main finding of our experiment, uninformed dictators behave more prosocially than informed dictators.
Keywords: Asymmetric Information , Prosocial Behavior , Efficiency Concern , Inequality Aversion , Dictator Game
JEL: D82 C91

Durable-goods monopoly: laboratory market and bargaining experiments

Reynolds, Stanley S. “Durable-goods monopoly: laboratory market and bargaining experiments." The RAND Journal of Economics (2000): 375-394. arizona.edu 提供的 [PDF]

==Abstract:==

Results from single-period monopoly experiments (nondurable environment) are compared with results from multiperiod monopoly experiments that have features of a durable-goods environment. Average prices were below the static monopoly benchmark price in all settings. Observed initial prices were higher in multiperiod experiments than in single-period experiments, in contrast to equilibrium predictions. Prices in multiperiod experiments tended to fall over time; there was less price cutting in market experiments than in bargaining experiments. There was substantial demand withholding by buyers in multiperiod experiments. A version of bounded rationality is a promising candidate for explaining deviations from equilibrium predictions.

Market experience is a reference point in judgments of fairness

Date: 2013-07
By: Holger Herz
Dmitry Taubinsky
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:128&r=net
People’s desire for fair transactions can play an important role in negotiations, organizations, and markets. In this paper, we show that markets can also shape what people consider to be a fair transaction. We propose a simple and generally-applicable model of path-dependent fairness preferences, in which past experiences shape preferences, and we experimentally test the model’s predictions. We find that previous exposure to competitive pressure substantially and persistently reduces subjects’ fairness concerns, making them more likely to accept low offers. Consistent with our theory, we also find that past experience has little effect on subjects’ inclinations to treat others unfairly.
Keywords: Social preferences, reference points, fairness, bargaining
JEL: C78

Literature on three person/outside options/information ultimatum game

Information in ultimatum games: An experimental study

RTA Croson – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1996 – Elsevier
Considerations of fairness and strategy: Experimental data from sequential games.
Game-theoretic models and the role of information in bargaining. Bargaining and market
behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: An experimental study.
 

[PDF] Two-level ultimatum bargaining with incomplete information: An experimental study

W Güth, S Huck, P Ockenfels – The Economic Journal, 1996 – JSTOR
I73-85. Frankfurt. Guth, W. and van Damme, E. (I 994) -‘Information, strategic behavior
and fairness in ultimatum bargaining – an experimental study. Working Paper,
CentER/Tilburg. Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K. and Smith, VA (I994).
 

==Three person==

Bargaining outside the lab–a newspaper experiment of a threeperson ultimatum game*

W Güth, C Schmidt, M Sutter – The Economic Journal, 2007 – Wiley Online Library
Werner Gu® th, Carsten Schmidt and Matthias Sutter 5,132 readers of the German weekly,
Die Zeit, participated in a threeperson bargaining experiment. In our data analysis we focus
on (1) the influence of age, gender, profession and medium chosen for participation and (

Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study

W Güth, E Van Damme – Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1998 – Elsevier
This paper reports on an experimental study of ultimatum bargaining situations in which an
inactive third player is present. The proposerXsuggests an allocation (x, y, z) on how to
divide a cake betweenX, Y, andZ. A messagemthat (partially) reveals this proposal is sent

Tests of fairness models based on equity considerations in a threeperson ultimatum game

JH Kagel, KW Wolfe – Experimental Economics, 2001 – Springer
Abstract Two recent models incorporating fairness considerations into the economics
literature based on agents’ concerns about the distribution of payoffs between themselves
and others (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 114 (3), 769–816;

Incentive contracts versus trust in threeperson ultimatum games: an experimental study

S Büchner, LG González, W Güth, MV Levati – European Journal of Political …, 2004 – Elsevier
Whether incentive contracts outperform trust in terms of productive efficiency is usually
explored by principal-agent experiments. We investigate this question using the simpler and
more neutral frame of a threeperson ultimatum experiment. We find that (mutual) trust is

On ultimatum bargaining experiments—A personal review

W Güth – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1995 – Elsevier
355-384. Oppewal, H. and E. Tougareva, 1992, A threeperson ultimatum game to investigate
effects of differences in need, sharing rules and observability on bargaining behaviour. Information,
fairness, and strategic behaviour in 3person ultimatum bargaining.

Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more “rational” players?

G Bornstein, I Yaniv – Experimental Economics, 1998 – Springer
Abstract This article reports two experiments that compared the standard ultimatum
game played by individuals with the same game played by threeperson groups.
In the group treatment, the members of the allocating group

A threeperson ultimatum game to investigate effects of differences in need, sharing rules and observability on bargaining behaviour

H Oppewal, E Tougareva – Journal of economic psychology, 1992 – Elsevier
Abstract This paper describes an extension of the well-known simple two-person ultimatum
game. The extended game includes differences between players in their need for the
payoffs and it includes a third person who shares with the person who accepts an offer. In

[PDF] Responder behavior in threeperson ultimatum game experiments

A Riedl, J Vyrastekova – 2003 – dare.uva.nl
Abstract We extend the standard ultimatum game to a three person game where the
proposer chooses a three-way split of a pie and two responders independently and
simultaneously choose to accept or reject the proposal. We investigate whether a

[引言] Testing between alternative models of fairness: a new three person ultimatum game

J Kagel, K Wolfe – 1999 – mimeo

Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis

H Oosterbeek, R Sloof, G Van De Kuilen – Experimental Economics, 2004 – Springer
and Carnevale, 1997; Messick et al., 1997). – Nor did we include the threeperson
ultimatum game with one proposer and two respon- ders as studied by Güth and Van
Damme (1998). – We also excluded a study in which subjects
 

Take it or leave it for something better? Responses to fair offers in ultimatum bargaining

R Nelissen, DSI van Someren, M Zeelenberg – Journal of Experimental …, 2009 – Elsevier
In order to investigate whether responders in ultimatum bargains show true concerns for
egalitarianism, we investigated their decisions in a modified version of the ultimatum game that
presented responders with an outside option that was larger than their payoff from accepting
 

==Outside Options==

Outside options and social comparison in three-player ultimatum game experiments

MJ Knez, CF Camerer – Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 – Elsevier
We conducted ultimatum games in which a proposer offers a division of 10toarespondent,
whoacceptsorrejectsit.Ifanofferisrejected,playersreceiveaknownoutsideoption.Ourproposersmadesimultaneousofferstotwo…
,withoutsideoptionsof 2 and 4.Therateofrejectedofferswashigherthaninsimi…,around50%, …

被引用 131 次 相關文章 全部共 7 個版本 引用

 

On perceptions of fairness: The role of valuations, outside options, and information in ultimatum bargaining games

PM Schmitt – Experimental Economics, 2004 – Springer
Abstract This study examines fairness perceptions in ultimatum bargaining games with
asymmetric payoffs, outside options, and different information states. Fairness perceptions
were dependent on treatment conditions. Specifically, when proposers had higher chip
 

Unfairness, anger, and spite: Emotional rejections of ultimatum offers

MM Pillutla, JK Murnighan – Organizational Behavior and Human Decision …, 1996 – Elsevier
hypotheses in this accept offers that are less than the value of their out- context straightforward:
Rational models suggest that side option. responses to ultimatum offers will only be affected by
The third variable, information, was first investi- the size of offers and outside options.

Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games

R Croson, T Boles, JK Murnighan – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2003 – Elsevier
Our experimental design uses a finitely repeated ultimatum game with an outside option
for the responder and two-sided asymmetric information (about that outside option for
the proposer and about the size of the pie for the responder).

An outside option experiment

K Binmore, A Shared, J Sutton – The Quarterly Journal of …, 1989 – qje.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. AN OUTSIDE OPTION EXPERIMENT* KEN BINMORE AVNER SHAKED JOHN SUTTON
0, and b1 + b2 .^. M. Breakdown will be assumed to be precipitated by one or other of the players
leaving the negotiation table for good in order to take up his outside option b4.

An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: Information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers

PG Straub, JK Murnighan – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1995 – Elsevier
27 (1995) 345-364 349 nothing. Although the results from multiple trial demand games with
outside options suggested that equal outcomes were not particularly salient, the question
remains whether fairness is a consideration in one-shot ultimatum games.

[PDF] A general experiment on bargaining in demand games with outside options

LM Kahn, JK Murnighan – The American Economic Review, 1993 – JSTOR
when s = 10 percent, p = 0.5, and d = 0.8 (although it is nearly as large when d = 1). When p is
0.5, the negotiation resembles an ultimatum game, and the existence of a 10-percent outside
option does not greatly affect the equilibrium compared to a game with no outside option.

Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game

J Gale, KG Binmore, L Samuelson – Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 – Elsevier
toughness. Even when we do play anonymously, outside options are often available.
For experiments. Short-run refusals of positive offers in the pure Ultimatum Game
therefore create no problem for orthodox game theory. However

Why people reject advantageous offers—Non-monotonic strategies in ultimatum bargaining: Evaluating a video experiment run in PR China

H Hennig-Schmidt, ZY Li, C Yang – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2008 – Elsevier
Numerous symmetric ultimatum game experiments (UG in the following) with zero outside
options have shown that individual proposers typically offer 30–50 percent of the pie,
with the equal split often being the modal and median offer.

Social utility in ultimatum bargaining

MJJ Handgraaf, E Van Dijk, D De Cremer – Social Justice Research, 2003 – Springer
Presence of Outside Options Introducing an outside option to the ultimatum game (ie, giving
one or both players the opportunity to receive endowments when no agreement is reached)
may greatly influence the weights of equity and self-interest.
 

An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: Information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers

PG Straub, JK Murnighan – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1995 – Elsevier
Binmore, Kenneth, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton, 1989, An Outside Option
Experiment, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 753-770. An Outside Option
Experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (1989), pp. 753–770.
 

Bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options

K Chatterjee, CC Lee – Games and Economic Behavior, 1998 – Elsevier
3; KG Binmore, A. Shaked, J. Sutton; An Outside Option Experiment. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 104 (1989), pp. 753–770. Full Text via CrossRef. 4; Chatterjee, K. Dutta, B. 1995,
Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners, Pennsylvania State University
 

A general experiment on bargaining in demand games with outside options

LM Kahn, JK Murnighan – The American Economic Review, 1993 – JSTOR
1264 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Participants in the experiment were 118
undergraduates (typically juniors and se- niors) in marketing and management classes who were
randomly assigned to be player 1 or player 2. Each player 2 had an outside option, paid in the
 

Outside options in a bargaining model with decay in the size of the cake

A Dalmazzo – Economics Letters, 1992 – Elsevier
Binmore, KG, A. Shaked and J. Sutton, 1989, An outside option experiment, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 104, 753-770. An outside option experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104
(1989), pp. 753–770. Full Text via CrossRef. Chae and Yang, 1988; S. Chae, J.-A. Yang
 

Fairness, escalation, deference, and spite: strategies used in labor-management bargaining experiments with outside options

J Carpenter, MA Rudisill – Labour Economics, 2003 – Elsevier
Approximately the same number of interactions ended at each of the two ultimatum
subgames (half those firms that searched took the outside option). Outside options and
social comparison in three-player ultimatum game experiments.

==Reviews==

 

Ultimatum bargaining behavior: A survey and comparison of experimental results

W Güth, R Tietz – Journal of Economic Psychology, 1990 – Elsevier
The fold theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information.
Econometrica 54, 533-554. Gdth, W., 1988. pp. 703-717. Gh, W. and R. Tietz, 1985. `Strategic
power versus distributive justice. Homans, GC, 1961. Social behavior: Its elementary forms.
 
 

Accepting Zero in the Ultimatum Game: Selfish Nash Response?

Date: 2012-01
By: Gianandrea Staffiero (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Filippos Exadaktylos (BELIS, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies,Istanbul Bilgi University)
Antonio M. Espín
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:msc:wpaper:201203&r=net
The rejection of unfair proposals in ultimatum games is often quoted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. In this paper we focus on those responders who accept any proposals, setting the minimum acceptable offer (MAO) at zero. While this behavior could result from the randomization between the two payoff-maximizing strategies (i.e. setting MAO at zero or at the smallest positive amount), it also implies that the opponent’s payoff is maximized and the “pie†remains intact. We match subjects’ behavior as ultimatum responders with their choices in the dictator game, in two large-scale experiments. We find that those who set MAO at zero are the most generous dictators. Moreover, they differ substantially from responders whose MAO is the smallest positive offer, who are the greediest dictators. Thus, an interpretation of zero MAOs in terms of selfish, payoff-maximizing behavior could be misleading. Our evidence indicates that the restraint from punishing others can be driven by altruism and by the desire to maximize social welfare.
Keywords: ultimatum game, dictator game, altruism, social welfare, costly punishment, selfishness, social preferences
JEL: C93

Laboratory Evidence on Face-to-Face: Why Experimental Economics is of Interest to Regional Economists*

Björn Frank (2012) “Laboratory Evidence on Face-to-Face: Why Experimental Economics is of Interest to Regional Economists." International Regional Science Review, June 13, 2012. doi: 10.1177/0160017612449017. working paper PDF; Journal Web. **

Notes by yinung

此文提及 death of distance" (Cairncross, 2001) or “death of geography" 意思是

…the shrinking costs for transportation, especially transportation of messages’ pure in formation content.

必需有 face-to-face 溝通的原因是

… widely agreed that communication often must be face-to-face in order to be effective. But why?

1. nonverbal 和 verbal 同時發生,減少誤解(Storper and Venables, 2004; Winger, 2005, sections 4 – 6; and Hildrum, 2007, p. 469 with further references).

2. 比較有意義 (???待了解)

3. 發現想看到的,也發現原來沒想看到的隱含事務

4. buzzing (流言???)

5. face-to-face 溝通成本高,可視為建立長期關係之投資

6. 建立互信的必要條件

以上是理論,經濟實驗 (不含心理實驗)之證據為此文之回顧重點

匿名實驗結果有時不具參考性,此文同意此觀點 (至少用 email 溝通知道名字)

幾個與 face-to-face 相關因素

  1. 即時回應之效果 and 冷淨作用 Cooling effects: effect of spontaneity (decision time)  in Sec. 2
  2. trust 和合作受到 face-to-face 之影響 in Sec. 3
  3. 細節因素,如 smiling 和 eye contact  在 f2f 中之角色

冷靜效果

..experiment on the effect of a substantive cooling off period in an experiment was invented by Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz (2008).

在 ultimatum game 中,8:2 和 5:5 的分餅被提出,看對手是否接受。24小時後,接受的決定可以被修改。餅獎金大小分別有 2,5,8 euros. Cooling off period 並未導致拒絕率大幅降低 (from 42.6% to 39.4%) ,且不顯著。但將 reward 變大 (期望值相同,用 lottery 方式),則拒絕率顯著大幅下降 fom 27.7% to 20.5%.

增加決策時間之壓力也有同樣的效果 (提高拒絕率) increased time pressure might well increase the rejection rate by Sutter, Kocher and Strauß (2003). 決策時間減少 (100秒 mm> 10 秒),拒絕率增加從 40.3 to 78.2%。 Cappelletti, Güth and Ploner (2008) 也有類似的發現 (180秒 vs 30 秒)。情感區 (affective system) 和 (deliberative system) 在大腦中並不相同。

Implications:

在 UG 中,拒絕率上升,代表效率下降。出價者將會喜歡拒絕率降低 (因此可降低 offer); 反之,回應者將喜歡拒絕率上升。故,出價者將偏好 face-to-face 溝通。不過要注意的是 UG 是單向一次 negotiation, 一般的談判會有雙向回應

建立互信 & 合作

Valley, Moag and Bazerman (1998)

(註: 有時互信和合作很難區分 see

兩人買賣股票,出價B

只有 seller 知道 V; Seller 會接受 if B>V; seller 得到 (B-V);

Buyer 只知 V~uniform(0,100), 真實 V 要等 Buyer 買到以後才知道。真實價值 = 1.5V; buyer 得到 (1.5V-B);

Buyer 問 seller V=?, 但 seller 可以 lie; 不過 face-to-face 之下,seller 顯著地比較不可能 lie (face-to face 只有 1 of 14, 7% lie; 電話 55% lie; 不匿名witten 33% lie). 有些 face-to-face 的 buyer 並沒有問 seller V;

結果發現 face-to-face 導致比較多的 Pareto improving deals.

Pareto deals (雙方皆獲益)

face-to-face: 51.7% (out of n=21) 成交; 顯著大於 written comm. 但不顯著大於 telephone comm.

written comm.: 22.2% (未成交 52% 接近理論值)

telephone comm.: 38.1%

Non-Pareto deals (buy’s loss):

face-to-face: 23.8%

written comm.: 25.9%

telephone comm.: 47.6%

Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) PD game (應是 public good game)

5人一組玩多人 PD game 共 15 回合; 前 8 回合用 (a) 事先沒有 comm.; (b) email (c) face-to-face;

每人在每回合決定貢獻 0~10 給 group, 留下其餘。

S=5人貢獻之加總; 每人皆領回 0.4S

理論:每人皆貢獻 10, 則 S = 50,每人皆領回 0.4S = 20; 若每人皆貢獻 0, 則每人只得 10

實驗結果

各 treatment 之平均貢獻 (前 8回合

(a) 沒有 comm: 2.9

(b) email: 7.6

(c) face-to-face: 9.99

9回合以後(皆沒有 comm.)

Contributions in groups with previous face-to-face communication quickly collapse to the level of the e-mail-groups.

face-to-face 效果持續多久

一回合就夠了? (Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann, 2003; Bochet et al., 2006)

Rocco (1998).

6人一組玩28回合的 public good game;在第 10,15,20加入 face-to-face comm.;

每一回合貢獻 x of 13 tokens; 全部人之貢獻加總= S; 每人之 Payoffs = ???

face-to-face comm. 有助於 maximize group welfare 在後半段實驗; Email comm. 並沒有較高的合作;但實驗前一天 email comm. 的人 face-to-face 之後,卻有類似的效果。

Bochet et al. (2006)

4人10回合的 PG game;比較 5分鐘的實驗前 face-to-face vs 第 1,4,7回合 online 討論 in a chat room;

實驗結果

兩者差異沒有後大, 其平均貢獻:

chat room: 81.4%

face-to-face: 96.2%

但在第10回合有 drop, chat romm ->52.1%; face-to-face -> 78.1

Naquin, Kurtzberg and Belkin (2008),

玩 threshold PG game; 4 人一組;若至少有 3人 捐出 1 張餐券,則每人獲兩張 ¥7餐券 2 張;

比較 非匿名之 email 和 face-to-face 決策:

email: 35.8% of the participants 捐出

face-to-face: 69.9%

其它溝通媒介

Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003)

4人一組,10回合 PG game; 其貢獻 of endowment

audio comm.: 48%

anonymous: 57%

video comm: 93%

face-to-face: 97% (後兩者顯著高於前兩者)

照片 出現 10 秒: 貢獻率低於 anonymous

Face-to-face 可能隱含的影響因素

Smiling

Scharlemann et al. (2001) 在 trust game 中,發現微笑有助於合作

 Player 1 — [$1, 0.5]
|
Player 2 — [0.8, 1.25]
|
Player 1 — [1.20, 1.20]

Player 1 是受試者,Player 2 是電腦但 show 照片 (treatment 是否微笑,取自相片資料庫),只要 Player 1 選擇 trust 策略,則電腦 (Player 2) 必定也用 trust 回應。結果發現, Player 1 之回應

沒有微笑: 55.0% 選擇 trust 策略
有微笑:     68.3%
(是否顯著待查)

eye contact

Burnham and Hare (2007)

4人一組,6回合 PG game (對手不重覆); 其貢獻 of endowment ~ (0, 10,相當於 2 美金), 總貢獻*2 均分給 4 人.

實驗組看到金屬臉但具有人類眼睛的影像 (MIT 發明的 “Kismet” robot), 實驗結果:

所有人和6回合平均
看到眼睛:5.39
匿名:        4.17

Haley and Fessler (2005)
玩 dictator game, 分$10美金, 實驗組看到眼睛圖片,對照組看到 label, 結果

Player 1 分給 Player 2
看到眼睛:3.79
沒有看到眼睛:2.45

Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006)現地實驗中也發現,eye contact 會讓貢獻較多錢

在48位大學職員喝咖啡處貼眼睛海報 or 花海報各幾週,自願投幣奉獻 (honesty box) 金額

在貼眼睛海報的時候,自願投幣奉獻金額顯著較高

Frey and Bohnet (1995) 在 PD game 中讓受試者選擇合作和背叛,合作率

visual contact + talking : 78%
visual contact + no talking : 23%
匿名:12%

Wichman (1970) 在 PD game 中讓受試者選擇合作和背叛; 70回合,固定對手,合作率

無限制的 face-to-face: 87%
互聽到聲音: 72.1%
只有 visual contact: 47.7%
匿名40.7%

Abstract

The notion of face-to-face contacts has recently become very popular as a reason why firms still locate in proximity to others after the “death of distance.” Controlled laboratory experiments provide direct and reliable evidence on the importance of face-to-face contacts. It is the purpose of this article to survey and to organize new and developing string of literature with a special focus on its importance for regional economics. However, the article might also serve to alert more experimentalists to the importance of their work for current regional science, of which they seem not to be aware.

References (部份)

  • 冷卻效果
    Oechssler, Jörg, Andreas Roider and Patrick Schmitz (2008), Cooling-Off in Negotiations – Does It Work?, mimeo: http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/6807.html
  • 決策時間長短 in Ultimatum game
    Sutter, Matthias, Martin Kocher and Sabine Strauß (2003), Bargaining under time pressure in an experimental ultimatum game, Economics Letters 81, 341–347.
  • Cappelletti, Dominique, Werner Güth and Matteo Ploner (2008), Being of two minds: an ultimatum experiment investigating affective processes, mimeo.
  • 其它
    Bateson, Melissa, Daniel Nettle and Gilbert Roberts (2006), Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting, Biology Letters 2, 412–414.
  • Bochet, Olivier, Talbot Page, and Louis Putterman (2006), “Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60, 11-26.
  • Bohnet, Iris and Bruno S. Frey (1999), The sound of silence in prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 38, 43-57.
  • Brosig, Jeannette, Axel Ockenfels and Joachim Weimann (2003), The effect of communication media on cooperation, German Economic Review 4, 217-241.
  • Burnham, Terence C. and Brian Hare (2007), Engineering Human Cooperation. Does Involuntary Neural Activation Increase Public Goods Contributions?, Human Nature 18, 88-108.
  • Frey, Bruno S. and Iris Bohnet (1995), Institutions Affect Fairness: Experimental Investigations, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151, 286-303.
  • Frohlich, Norman and Joe Oppenheimer (1998), Some consequences of e-mail vs. face-to-face communication in experiment, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 35, 389-403.
  • Haley, Kevin J. and Daniel M.T. Fessler (2005), Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game, Evolution and Human Behavior 26, 245–256.
  • Naquin, Charles E., Terri R. Kurtzberg and Liuba Y. Belkin (2008), E-Mail Communication and Group Cooperation in Mixed Motive Contexts, forthcoming: Social Justice Research,
  • Rocco, Elena (1998), Trust Breaks Down in Electronic Contexts but Can Be Repaired by Some Initial Face-to-Face Contact, Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems 1998, 496-502.
  • Scharlemann, Jörn P.W., Catherine C. Eckel, Alex Kacelnik and Rick K. Wilson (2001), The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face, Journal of Economic Psychology 22, 617-640.
  • Valley, Kathleen L., Joseph Moag and Max H. Bazerman (1998), ‘A matter of trust’: Effects of communication on the efficiency and distribution of outcomes, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, 211-238.
  • Valley, Kathleen, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max H. Bazerman (2002), How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games, Games and Economic Behavior 38, 127-155.
  • Wichman, Harvey (1970), Effects of Isolation and Communication on Cooperation in a Two-Person Game, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,16, 114-120. http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/16/1/114/; DOI;

暫記

PD game
Frey and Bohnet (1995) J Inst. & Theo. Econ.
(合作率)
visual contact + talking : 78%
visual contact + no talking : 23%
匿名:12%
Wichman (1970) J Per & Soc Psy
(合作率)
無限制的 face-to-face: 87%
互聽到聲音: 72.1%
只有 visual contact: 47.7%
匿名40.7%
UG
Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz (2008)
時間減少
Sutter, Kocher and Strauß (2003) EL
Cappelletti, Güth and Ploner (2008) mimeo

dictator game
Haley and Fessler (2005)

Trust game
Valley, Moag and Bazerman (1998) JEBO
Scharlemann et al. (2001) (smiling 在 trust game 中) JEPsy

Public good game
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) JEBO
Rocco (1998) Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference
Bochet et al. (2006) JEBO
Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003) GER
Burnham and Hare (2007) (眼睛 contact) Human Nature

Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006) 在現地實驗(自助咖啡投幣)

Accepting Zero in the Ultimatum Game: Selfish Nash Response?

Date: 2013-01-01
By: Gianandrea Staffiero (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business)
Filippos Exadaktylos (BELIS, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University)
Antonio M. Espín (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gra:wpaper:13/01&r=net
The rejection of unfair proposals in ultimatum games is often quoted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. In this paper we focus on those responders who accept any proposals, setting the minimum acceptable offer (MAO) at zero. While this behavior could result from the randomization between the two payoff-maximizing strategies (i.e. setting MAO at zero or at the smallest positive amount), it also implies that the opponent’s payoff is maximized and the “pie” remains intact. We match subjects’ behavior as ultimatum responders with their choices in the dictator game, in two large-scale experiments. We find that those who set MAO at zero are the most generous dictators. Moreover, they differ substantially from responders whose MAO is the smallest positive offer, who are the greediest dictators. Thus, an interpretation of zero MAOs in terms of selfish, payoff-maximizing behavior could be misleading. Our evidence indicates that the restraint from punishing others can be driven by altruism and by the desire to maximize social welfare.
Keywords: ultimatum game, dictator game, altruism, social welfare, costly punishment, selfishness, social preferences.