Smith, Vernon L. “Theory and experiment: What are the questions?." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 73.1 (2010): 3-15. [PDF];[my notes]
Smith 提到了 OPM (other person’s money) 問題，可以用以下的方式解決
We could give the constant positive sum ultimatum game economic content as follows: Each player provides $M of his own money. Some procedure is used for pairing the subjects, and determining who is to be Player 1 and who Player 2; this procedure in some variations might incorporate an earned and/or investment feature. It is understood that their pairing has economic significance in the sense that there are synergistic gains from the interaction equal to some fixed sum y > 2M. The experimenter provides only the surplus above 2M which represents the gains from specialization and exchange, as this is the one reliable source of a “free lunch” that converts economic systems into non-zero sum games. Hence, the total to be shared under the property right rules of the game is 2M + y, making it feasible for each to receive a share of the jointly created net gain above their pooled initial contribution, 2M.
Wu, Yujia; Gao, Li; Wan, Yan; Wang, Fang; Xu, Sihua; Yang, Zijing; Rao, Hengyi; Pan, Yu (2018). Effects of facial trustworthiness and gender on decision making in the Ultimatum Game. Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal
(3), 499-516. (DOI: https://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.6966
As little is yet known about the influence of facial trustworthiness and gender on fairness consideration in decision making, we examined whether a proposer’s facial trustworthiness and gender would influence a responder’s willingness to accept the proposer’s monetary offer. Participants in our study were 79 Chinese undergraduate students (responders) who played the Ultimatum Game with 4 proposers (2 male and 2 female) with different facial trustworthiness. As predicted, responders were more willing to accept offers from trustworthy-looking proposers. We found that facial trustworthiness was a more salient cue when proposers were men than when they were women and, furthermore, that the students’ emotional response to faces was correlated with their fairness consideration. Considering the implicit influence of facial trustworthiness and gender on decision making, potentially there are broader implications of our findings for certain business activities, such as negotiation and bargaining.
Crawford, Vincent P. “New directions for modelling strategic behavior: Game-theoretic models of communication, coordination, and cooperation in economic relationships." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30.4 (2016): 131-50.
In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory’s principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking" and “learning" rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments
Reynolds, Stanley S. “Durable-goods monopoly: laboratory market and bargaining experiments." The RAND Journal of Economics (2000): 375-394. arizona.edu 提供的 [PDF]
Results from single-period monopoly experiments (nondurable environment) are compared with results from multiperiod monopoly experiments that have features of a durable-goods environment. Average prices were below the static monopoly benchmark price in all settings. Observed initial prices were higher in multiperiod experiments than in single-period experiments, in contrast to equilibrium predictions. Prices in multiperiod experiments tended to fall over time; there was less price cutting in market experiments than in bargaining experiments. There was substantial demand withholding by buyers in multiperiod experiments. A version of bounded rationality is a promising candidate for explaining deviations from equilibrium predictions.