Do traders learn to select efficient market institutions?

• Original Paper
• Open Access
• Published: 16 April 2021

• Carlos Alós-Ferrer,
• Johannes Buckenmaier &
• Georg Kirchsteiger

Experimental Economics volume 25, pages203–228 (2022)Cite this article

• 569 Accesses

• 2 Citations

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Abstract

When alternative market institutions are available, traders have to decide both where and how much to trade. We conducted an experiment where traders decided first whether to trade in an (efficient) double-auction institution or in a posted-offers one (favoring sellers), and second how much to trade. When sellers face decreasing returns to scale (increasing production costs), fast coordination on the double-auction occurs, with the posted-offers institution becoming inactive. In contrast, under constant returns to scale, both institutions remain active and coordination is slower. The reason is that sellers trade off higher efficiency in a market with dwindling profits for biased-up profits in a market with vanishing customers. Hence, efficiency alone might not be sufficient to guarantee coordination on a single market institution if the surplus distribution is asymmetric. Trading behavior approaches equilibrium predictions (market clearing) within each institution, but switching behavior across institutions is explained by simple rules of thumb, with buyers chasing low prices and sellers considering both prices and trader ratios.

5G競標終拍板！一圖搞清楚總標金1380.81億元這樣分配

url: https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2020-01-16/355192

眾所矚目的5G競標今天終於宣告落幕，總標金達新台幣1380.81億元，其中熱門頻段3.5GHz標金就占了1364.33億元，單一頻段價格創下目前世界各國競標最高紀錄（加權計算各國人口數、使用年限後的金額）！

台灣5G第一波釋照自去年12月10日開始競標，底價為新台幣300億元，由中華電信、遠傳電信、台灣大哥大、亞太電信、台灣之星共5大電信業者角逐。最後在關鍵的3.5GHz部分，中華電獲得90MHz頻寬，遠傳獲得80MHz，台灣大獲得60MHz、台灣之星獲得40MHz，亞太電信則退出；在28GHz部分，中華電獲得600MHz頻寬，遠傳獲得400MHz，台灣大獲得200MHz，亞太電信獲得400MHz，台灣之星退出；1.8GHz自始至終均無人競標。

國家通訊傳播委員會（NCC）公布的競標結果如下：

《中華電信》

3500MHz 得標頻寬：90MHz、得標價：45,675百萬元

28000MHz得標頻寬：600MHz、得標價：618百萬元

《遠傳電信》

3500MHz 得標頻寬：80MHz、得標價：40,600百萬元

28000MHz得標頻寬：400MHz、得標價：412百萬元

《亞太電信》

3500MHz 得標頻寬：0、得標價：0

28000MHz得標頻寬：400MHz、得標價：412百萬元

《台灣大哥大》

3500MHz 得標頻寬：60MHz、得標價：30,450百萬元

28000MHz得標頻寬：200MHz、得標價：206百萬元

《台灣之星》

3500MHz 得標頻寬：40MHz、得標價：19,708百萬元

28000MHz得標頻寬：0、得標價：0

先前有市場人士指出，之所以遲遲無法截標，是因為3.5GHz頻段的「關鍵10MHz」擺不平。剛開始中華電信、遠傳都想拿滿100MHz，但在標金攀高後，開始考慮各退一步。假設雙方都只拿80MHz，台灣大哥大又考慮與亞太電信共頻，二家各拿60MHz、20MHz，加上台灣之星需要拿到基本的40MHz，這樣總計頻寬就達到280MHz，比實際釋出頻寬270MHz多10MHz，導致5G競標一直無法拍板定案。

還有專家擔心，此次競標可能會持續到農曆新年過後，屆時總標金恐怕會突破1500億元。但因亞太電信在最後關頭退出，預言沒有成真。

不過，由於之後還有第二階段的位置競標，基於各家都希望取得連續頻段的情況下，整體標金還是有可能突破1500億元。之後的5G資費將如何訂定，外界認為，國內電信業龍頭中華電信將扮演關鍵角色。

Article: 5G 競標第 5 天，第 42 回合暫總標金 346.86 億元

5G 競標第 5 天，第 42 回合暫總標金 346.86 億元

https://flip.it/eGU-b3; 2020年拍賣最終結果：5G競標終拍板！一圖搞清楚總標金1380.81億元這樣分配

5G 第一波釋照 10 日開始競標，底價訂為新台幣 300 億元，由於 28GHz 和 1800MHz 仍有區塊無業者出價，靠著最熱門的頻段 3.5GHz 競爭，暫時總得標金在第 23 回合超越底價 300 億元，業界認為這次的競標偏向冷靜、理性。

今天競標進入第 5 天，第 42 回合總標金為 346.86 億元，最熱門的頻段 3.5GH z暫得標金 336.56 億元，28GHz 的熱度提升，暫時得標 10 個區塊，暫得標金 10.3 億元，1800MHz 尚無人出手。

Auctions with external incentives: Experimental evidence

Auctions with external incentives: Experimental evidence

Date:	2016
By:	Miguel A. Fonseca (Department of Economics, University of Exeter) Francesco Giovannoni (Department of Economics, CSE and CMPO, University of Bristol) Miltiadis Makris (Department of Economics, University of Southampton)
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exe:wpaper:1602&r=net
	We consider auctions where bidders have external incentives and focus on the case where their valuations in the auction are positively correlated with their productivity which matters in a second stage job market. We study how this affects bidding behavior and wages in the job market and proceed to test the model’s implication in an experiment where treatments differ according to which bids are disclosed. Our results broadly confirm the theoretical prediction that bidders tend to overbid, and their bidding behavior and wages are influenced by the disclosure rule. The data also suggests that the dispersion in worker wages is affected by the disclosure rule, suggesting the importance of reputational bidding.
Keywords:	Auctions, signaling, disclosure, experiments.
JEL:	C92 D44 D82

The advantage of resource queues over spot resource markets: decision coordination in experiments under resource uncertainty

Fonseca, Miguel A., Alexander Pfaff, and Daniel Osgood. “The advantage of resource queues over spot resource markets: decision coordination in experiments under resource uncertainty." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 94.5 (2012): 1136-1153. [oxfordjournals.org]; [Open Access PDF]

==Notes by yinung==

本文用實驗法探討灌溉水源 (以 water queues 的形式) 的事前分配 (用 bidding) vs 事後水源拍賣，對生產決策 (種高/低水量需求作物) 之影響。以2007-08 英國 Exeter 大學學生和巴西農業區半工半讀的學生或公務員為受試者，實驗結果證明，事前的 water queues 制度，相對於事後的 spot market 分配水源的制度，有助於提昇效率。

其原因主要是在，決策者面對 environmental and strategic 兩種不確定之下, 可以利用先知道對手對環境不確定之選擇，用來當做生產決策協調之依據。

[引文] The advantage of resource queues over spot markets concerns two types of uncertainty, environmental and strategic.

(較早寫的)

此篇用經濟實驗法, 研究農民在灌溉用水不確定下之決策; 投入種子、肥料、整地的成本, 但利潤取決於不確定供水。在環境不確定 (雨量多寡) 前，先以 bidding (water queues) 決定用水優先序，可做為投入種植決策之協調機制，使得在事前 water queues 制度下， 比雨量確定後才拍賣決定水權制度更有效率。

==abstract==

Farmers have to make key decisions, such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil, before knowing how much water they will get. They face losses if they make costly decisions but do not receive water, and they may forego profits if they receive water without being prepared. We consider the coordination of farmers’ decisions, such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil when farmers must divide an uncertain water supply. We compare ex-ante queues (pre-decision) to
an ex-post spot market (post-decision & post-rain) in experiments in rural Brazil and a university in England. Queues have greater coordination success than does the spot market.

==References==

Lefebvre, M., L. Gangadharan, and S. Thoyer. 2012. “Do Security-Differentiated Water Rights Improve the Performance of Markets?” American Journal of Agricultural Economics. doi:10.1093/ajae/aas060.

本文回顧到這篇:
The most relevant experiment of which we are aware is that of Lefebvre et al. (2012), which studies profits with security-differentiated water rights (mimicking the essence of a queue) versus non-differentiated, equal share rights. The differentiated rights are seen to have profit and risk-management benefits relative to the non-differentiated rights.

Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce

Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce

==noted by yinung==

這個網站搜尋、比價的主題很久了, 但仍是有趣, 也是有人用 law of one price 的觀念來看, 但裡頭的實驗怎麼做, 再了解。

Date:	2014-08
By:	Michael Dinerstein Liran Einav Jonathan Levin Neel Sundaresan
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20415&r=net
	Search frictions can explain why the “law of one price" fails in retail markets and why even firms selling commodity products have pricing power. In online commerce, physical search costs are low, yet price dispersion is common. We use browsing data from eBay to estimate a model of consumer search and price competition when retailers offer homogeneous goods. We find that retail margins are on the order of 10%, and use the model to analyze the design of search rankings. Our model explains most of the effects of a major re-design of eBay’s product search, and allows us to identify conditions where narrowing consumer choice sets can be pro-competitive. Finally, we examine a subsequent A/B experiment run by eBay that illustrates the greater difficulties in designing search algorithms for differentiated products, where price is only one of the relevant product attributes.
JEL:	D12 D22 D83 L13 L86

Car License Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Car License Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Date:	2014-09-02
By:	Lijia Tan (The Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics and MOE Key Laboratory in Econometrics, Xiamen University) Lijia Wei (School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University)
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fee:wpaper:1401&r=net
	In Singapore and many Chinese cities, tens of thousands of people participate in car license auctions each month. In a car license auction, many car licenses are sold but each participant can only bid for one license. We examine the theoretical properties of three auction formats: Shanghai auction, Guangzhou auction, and Singapore auction. Our main results are that (1) No equilibrium of the Shanghai auction can guarantee an efficient allocation, (2) the Singapore auction allocates objects efficiently if and only if a unique market clearing price does not exist, and (3) the Guangzhou auction is efficient if bidders are symmetric. The experimental evidence confirms our theoretical prediction. Our experiment also shows that the learning effects over time are quite different among these auction formats.
Keywords:	Auction; Car License; Laboratory Experiment
JEL:	C92 D02 D04 D44

Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price

Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price

Date:	2013
By:	Kircher, Philipp Kim, Kyungmin
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:sirdps:532&r=net
	We consider a frictional two-sided matching market in which one side uses public cheap talk announcements so as to attract the other side. We show that if the first-price auction is adopted as the trading protocol, then cheap talk can be perfectly informative, and the resulting market outcome is efficient, constrained only by search frictions. We also show that the performance of an alternative trading protocol in the cheap-talk environment depends on the level of price dispersion generated by the protocol: If a trading protocol compresses (spreads) the distribution of prices relative to the first-price auction, then an efficient fully revealing equilibrium always (never) exists. Our results identify the settings in which cheap talk can serve as an efficient competitive instrument, in the sense that the central insights from the literature on competing auctions and competitive search continue to hold unaltered even without ex ante price commitment.
Keywords:	Directed search, competitive search, commitment, cheap talk,

The Market for Paintings in Paris between Rococò and Romanticism

The Market for Paintings in Paris between Rococò and Romanticism

Date:	2014
By:	Federico Etro (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari) Elena Stepanova (Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa)
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2014:08&r=net
	We analyze organization of auctions and bidding strategies with a unique dataset on Paris auctions between 700s and 800s. Prices reflect the objective features of the paintings and of the sale, and they reveal a substantial death effect, with upward jumps in the years after the death of the artists. Both the hedonic and repeated sale price indexes show a declining pattern for the relative price of paintings starting with the French Revolution. On this basis we analyze the emerging role and market power of art dealers and employ network theory to study whether they created rings to manipulate the outcome of the auctions for their profits. Dealers appear to have been divided into four main communities heavily trading between themselves and we find evidence of collusive behavior with lower hammer prices for buyers belonging to the same community of the dealers organizing the auction.
Keywords:	Art market, Hedonic prices, Repeated sales price index, Network theory.
JEL:	Z11 N0 D4

Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi-Item Multi-Unit Auctions – An experimental study

Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi-Item Multi-Unit Auctions – An experimental study

Date:	2014-06
By:	Regina Betz (Australian School of Business, the University of New South Wales) Ben Greiner (School of Economics, Australian School of Business, the University of New South Wales) Sascha Schweitzer (University of Bayreuth) Stefan Seifert (University of Bayreuth)
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:swe:wpaper:2014-31&r=net
	We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed-bid vs. closed clock vs. open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous vs. sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi-unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed-bid auctions in terms of efficiency and revenues. This advantage disappears when the items are auctioned sequentially. In addition, auctioning sequentially has positive effects on total revenues across all auction formats, resulting from fiercer competition on the item auctioned first.
Keywords:	emission permits, auction design, laboratory experiment
JEL:	C90 D44 Q53