Roth, Alvin E. “The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics." Econometrica 70.4 (2002): 1341-1378. [PDF] [**]
Economists have lately been called upon not only to analyze markets, but to design them. Market design involves a responsibility for detail, a need to deal with all of a market’s complications, not just its principle features. Designers therefore cannot work only with the simple conceptual models used for theoretical insights into the general working of markets. Instead, market design calls for an engineering approach. Drawing primarily on the design of the entry level labor market for American doctors (the National Resident Matching Program), and of the auctions of radio spectrum conducted by the Federal Communications Commission, this paper makes the case that experimental and computational economics are natural complements to game theory in the work of design. The paper also argues that some of the challenges facing both markets involve dealing with related kinds of complementarities, and that this suggests an agenda for future theoretical research.
KEYWORDS:Market design, game theory, experimental economics, computational economics
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. “Mindful economics: The production, consumption, and value of beliefs." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30.3 (2016): 141-64. [PDF] aeaweb.org
人類的 heuristics and biases (Tversky and Kahneman 1974)
(as discussed in a “Symposium on Overconfidence” in the Fall 2015 issue of this journal)
YNY: moderate overconfidence can be helpful to enhance people’s ability to do things and interact with others successfully. Overoptimistic individuals often work more, save more, expect to retire later, and much healthier.
- confirmation bias,
- distorted probability weighting
本文回顧 growing literature on motivated beliefs and reasoning
==cited by Bruno S. Frey==
[This article] provides a most useful survey of recent insights of psychology but also makes a successful effort to integrate them into economics. They deal with heuristics and biases inconsistent with the standard homo oeconomicus such as over-confidence, confirmation bias, distorted probability weighting, and other cognitive mistakes.
Rysman, Marc. “The economics of two-sided markets." Journal of economic perspectives 23.3 (2009): 125-43. [aeaweb];[PDF][**]
At a local Best Buy, a child places a new Sony PlayStation 3 on the cashier’ scounter while the parents dig out their Visa card. The gaming system and the payment card may appear to have little connection other than this purchase. However, these two items share an important characteristic that is generating a series of economic insights and has important implications for strategic decision making and economic policy making. Both video game systems and payment cards are examples of two-sided markets.
Zizzo, Daniel John. “Claims and confounds in economic experiments." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization93.C (2013): 186-195. [PDF];
==notes by YNY==
用 「獨特性、相關性、合理性」DRP 方法來衡量實驗的困惑
We present a distinctiveness, relevance and plausibility (DRP) method for systematically evaluating potential experimental confounds. A claim is a statement being inferred on the basis of experimental data analysis. A potential confound is a statement providing a prima facie reason why the claim is not justified (other than internal weakness). In evaluating whether a potential confound is problematic, we can start by asking whether the potential confound is distinctive from the claim; we can then ask whether it is relevant for the claim; and we can conclude by asking whether it is plausible in the light of the evidence.
Crawford, Vincent P. “New directions for modelling strategic behavior: Game-theoretic models of communication, coordination, and cooperation in economic relationships." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30.4 (2016): 131-50.
In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory’s principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking" and “learning" rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments
C. F. Camerer, A. Dreber, E. Forsell, T.-H. Ho, J. Huber, M. Johannesson, M. Kirchler, J. Almenberg, A. Altmejd, T. Chan, E. Heikensten, F. Holzmeister, T. Imai, S. Isaksson, G. Nave, T. Pfeiffer, M. Razen, H. Wu. Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics. Science, 2016; DOI: 10.1126/science.aaf0918
終於有人系統性地檢視經濟實驗, 雖然只挑 AER 和 QJE 所發表的, 但經得起「重覆實驗」來驗證結果的研究, 才符合科學的精神…
Shy, Oz. “A short survey of network economics." Review of Industrial Organization 38.2 (2011): 119-149.
This article surveys a variety of topics that are related to network economics. Topics covered include: consumer demand under network effects, compatibility decisions and standardization, technology advances in network industries, two-sided markets, information networks and intellectual property, and social influence.
Survey Network economics Network industries Network effects Network externalities
==Notes by yinung==
原本獨立的 game 在 linked network 玩會如何呢？
本文介紹了網路位置 (network position) 觀念， 及其對均衡的影響 (Ballester, CalvÛ-Armengol & Zenou (2006) Örst establish the connection between equilibrium action and Bonacich centrality (Bonacich 1987)，另見 Yves Zenou. (2015), “Key players"
(344 Kb) , In: Y. Bramoullé, B.W. Rogers and A. Galeotti (Eds.), Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks
, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. Vox column)
||Yann Bramoullé (AMSE – Aix-Marseille School of Economics – EHESS – École des hautes études en sciences sociales – Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) – Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM) – AMU – Aix-Marseille Université)
Rachel Kranton (Duke University, Department of Economics – Duke University (Durham, USA))
This chapter studies games played on fixed networks. These games capture a wide variety of economic settings including local public goods, peer effects, and technology adoption. We establish a common analytical framework to study a wide game class. We unearth new connections between games in the literature and in particular between those with binary actions, like coordination and best-shot games, and those with continuous actions and linear best replies. We review and advance existing results by showing how they tie together within the common framework. We discuss the game-theoretic underpinnings of key notions including Bonacich centrality, maximal independent sets, and the lowest and largest eigenvalue. We study the interplay of individual heterogeneity and the network and we develop a new notion – interdependence – to analyze how a shock to one agent affects the action of another agent. We outline directions for future research.