When Identifying Contributors is Costly: An Experiment on Public Goods

When Identifying Contributors is Costly: An Experiment on Public Goods

Date:	2014
By:	Anya Savikhin Samek (School of Human Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison) Roman M. Sheremeta (Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University and the Economic Science Institute, Chapman University,)
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:14-04&r=net
	Studies show that identifying contributors significantly increases contributions to public goods. In practice, however, viewing identifiable information is costly, which may discourage people from accessing such information. To address this question, we design a public goods experiment in which participants can pay a fee to view information about identities and corresponding contributions of their group members. We then compare this to a treatment in which there is no identifiable information, and a treatment in which all contributors are freely identified. Our main findings are that: (1) contributions in the treatment with costly information are as high as those in the treatment with free information, (2) participants choose to view the information about 10% of the time, and (3) being a high contributor is positively correlated with choosing to view identifiable information about others. Thus, it seems that having access to information is important even when such information is rarely viewed. Or findings have practical implications for non-profit organizations with a large pool of donors and for designers of recognition systems, especially in online communities with many participants.
Keywords:	public-goods, information, experiments
JEL:	C72 C91 H41

The Relation between Information and Heterogeneous Ability in Joint Projects – An experimental Analysis

The Relation between Information and Heterogeneous Ability in Joint Projects – An experimental Analysis –

Date:	2014
By:	Gerlinde Fellner Yoshio Iida Sabine Kröger Erika Seki
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1411&r=net
	We study voluntary contribution behavior of individuals who vary in their ability to contribute to a joint project under different information scenarios. We investigate a situation with two types who vary only in their external marginal return (low and high). Results of a laboratory experiment suggest that, when group members are not aware of the heterogeneity in their group, both types make the same nominal contributions. When agents are informed about the heterogeneity, contributions increase but differently by type. High types contribute only more with sufficient social exposure, i.e., when information on the type of the contributor is available. Low types, on the other hand, contribute only more when they are aware of the distribution of types, but have no information on the type of the contributor.
Keywords:	Public goods, Voluntary contribution mechanism, Heterogeneity, Information, Norms
JEL:	C9 H41