1. 文證明用 risk-dominance Nash 可解釋
Q: (待查 maximin criterion）
作者預期: (p.21)…An alternative with a low critical mass is likely to have an advantage in the beginning …As the game proceeds, one may expect that participants’ ability to coordinate their choices increases, which should reduce the importance of riskiness for participants’ choices.
risk dominance Nash equilibriaHarsanyi and Selten (1988) develop the concept of risk dominance as a refnement criterion in games with multiple Nash equilibria. In short, that theory selects the Nash equilibrium in which players choose less risky strategies
Suleymanova, Irina, and Christian Wey. “On the role of consumer expectations in markets with network effects." Journal of Economics 105.2 (2012): 101-127. (link to 本站)
Keser, Claudia, Suleymanova, Irina, and Wey, Christian (2011) “Technology adoption in markets with network effects: Theory and experimental evidence." DICE discussion paper No. 33, Germany. link to PDF
We examine a technology adoption game with network effects in which coordination on technology A and technology B constitute a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payoff-dominant. We define a technology’s critical mass as the minimum share of users necessary to make the choice of this technology a best response for any remaining user. We show that the technology with a lower critical mass is risk-dominant and is chosen by the maximin criterion. We present experimental evidence that both pay-off dominance and risk dominance explain participants’ choices. The relative riskiness of a technology can be proxied using technologies’ critical masses or stand-alone values. —
|Keywords:||Network Effects,Critical Mass,Coordination,Riskiness|
Distinguishing informational cascades from herd behavior in the laboratory
Bo ̆açhan Çelen and Shachar Kariv (2004) The American Economic Review, 2004 – ingentaconnect.com
… circumstances. While the terms informational cascade and herd behavior are used
interchange- ably in the literature, Lones Smith and Peter N. Sørensen (2000)
emphasize that there is a significant difference between them. …
Smith and Sørensen (2000) emphasize that there is a significant difference between them. An informational cascade is said to occur when an infinite sequence of individuals ignore their private information when making a decision, whereas herd behavior occurs when an infinite sequence of individuals make an identical decision, not necessarily ignoring their private information.
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