Auctions with external incentives: Experimental evidence

Date: 2016
By: Miguel A. Fonseca (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)
Francesco Giovannoni (Department of Economics, CSE and CMPO, University of Bristol)
Miltiadis Makris (Department of Economics, University of Southampton)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exe:wpaper:1602&r=net
We consider auctions where bidders have external incentives and focus on the case where their valuations in the auction are positively correlated with their productivity which matters in a second stage job market. We study how this affects bidding behavior and wages in the job market and proceed to test the model’s implication in an experiment where treatments differ according to which bids are disclosed. Our results broadly confirm the theoretical prediction that bidders tend to overbid, and their bidding behavior and wages are influenced by the disclosure rule. The data also suggests that the dispersion in worker wages is affected by the disclosure rule, suggesting the importance of reputational bidding.
Keywords: Auctions, signaling, disclosure, experiments.
JEL: C92 D44 D82
廣告

Where Do Social Preferences Come From?

Date: 2015-08
By: Chaning Jang (Department of Psychology, Princeton University)
John Lynham (Department of Economics & UHERO, University of Hawaii at Manoa; Center for Ocean Solutions, Stanford University)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hae:wpaper:2015-8&r=net
Where do preferences for fairness come from? We use a unique field setting to test for a spillover of sharing norms from the workplace to a laboratory experiment. Fishermen working in teams receive random income shocks (catching fish) that they must regularly divide among themselves. We demonstrate a clear correlation between sharing norms in the field and sharing norms in the lab. Furthermore, the spillover effect is stronger for fishermen who have been exposed to a sharing norm for longer, suggesting that our findings are not driven by selection effects. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that work environments shape social preferences.
Keywords: ultimatum game; social preferences; fairness; workplace spillovers
JEL: Q2 C9 C7 B4 D1

Communication and coordination: Experimental evidence from farmer groups in Senegal:

Date: 2015
By: Aflahagah, Fo Kodjo Dzinyefa
Bernard, Tanguy
Viceisza, Angelino
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1450&r=net
Coordination failures are at the heart of development traps. Although communication can reduce such failures, to date experimental evidence has primarily been lab based. This paper studies the impact of communication in stag hunt coordination games played by members of Senegalese farmer groups—a setting where collective commercialization has suffered from coordination failure, as in many rural contexts. We find that communication increases coordination only in larger experimental groups, where it matters most from the standpoint of poverty traps. We also find that these effects are driven by communication’s impact on perceptions of strategic uncertainty. Some policy implications are discussed.
Keywords: coordination, communication, cooperatives, field experimentation, development, strategic uncertainty,

Alternative food networks and local markets: determinants of consumers’ choices between conventional and farmers’ stands

Date: 2015-06
By: Novelli, Silvia
Corsi, Alessandro
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aiea15:207289&r=net
Direct purchases are a widespread and important typology of the so-called Alternative Food Networks. Within this channel, farmers’ markets represent a popular and deeply investigated farmer-to-consumer market segment. While farmers’ markets are a quite recent initiatives, it is traditional to find in many towns in Italy both conventional stands and farmers’ stands selling fruit and vegetables in the same district market. We therefore analyse the behavioural characteristics of local market consumers choosing to purchase from farmers in order to point out the determinants of their choice. The consumers’ preferences were assessed through an in-person survey. Data were collected interviewing consumers in open-air markets in Torino, Cuneo, Alessandria and Asti, four cities in Piedmont Region (Italy) where farmers sell their products. The determinants of the choice to buy from farm stands were analysed with a probit model using a final sample of 1,138 respondents. Explanatory variables comprise the consumers’ general attitudes towards the purchase of food (importance given to convenience, price, quality and trust) and their personal characteristics. Also, other variables were added in order to highlight the possible role of markets and areas with distinctive characteristics. The most important factor affecting consumers’ choice for farm stand is the quest for quality. Consumers with a strong interest in quality are significantly more likely to buy from farmers. Among the personal characteristics, being the household member in charge of buying fruits and vegetables, and education, are the main determinants of the choice of farmers’ stands. On the contrary, the effects of variables such as income and job skill level are not clear enough,and seem to be open to different interpretations.
Keywords: Alternative Food Networks, direct purchase, consumers’ choices, Agricultural and Food Policy, D4, Q13,

Spatial Coordination in Agglomeration Bonus Schemes with Transaction Costs and Communication: An Experimental Study

Spatial Coordination in Agglomeration Bonus Schemes with Transaction Costs and Communication: An Experimental Study
Date: 2015-05
By: Simanti Banerjee (University of Nebraska-Lincoln)
Timothy N. Cason (Purdue University)
Frans P. de Vries (University of Stirling)
Nick Hanley (Department of Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St. Andrews)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sss:wpaper:2015-10&r=net
Agglomeration Bonus (AB) schemes reward private landowners to spatially coordinate land use decisions to enhance the supply of ecosystem services. The AB mechanism creates a coordination game with multiple Pareto ranked Nash equilibria, which correspond to different spatially-coordinated land use patterns. This paper experimentally analyses subjects’ participation decisions, land use choices and AB performance in the presence of transaction costs, with and without the option to communicate with neighboring subjects in a local network setting. The experiment varies transaction costs at two levels (high and low), which affects the risks and payoffs of coordinating on the different equilibria. Results indicate a significant difference in participation under high and low transaction costs in the early stages of the experiment. Increased experience reduces participation rates and AB performance. Costless pre-play communication induces full participation and land use choice pertaining to the efficient Nash equilibrium. If communication is costly, the level of transaction costs affects participation levels, the degree of spatial coordination, and the ecosystem services benefits produced. Our study suggests that performance of Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes in general and the AB scheme in particular can be improved through mechanisms intended to reduce the costs associated with participation and communication.
Keywords: Coordination Games, Lab Experiments, Local Networks, Payment for Ecosystem Services
JEL: C91 D83 D81 Q51 Q

 

Can Farmers Create Efficient Information Networks? Experimental Evidence from Rural India

Date: 2015
By: A. Stefano Caria
Marcel Fafchamps
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2015-07&r=net
We run an artefactual field experiment in rural India which tests whether farmers can create efficient networks in a repeated link formation game, and whether group categorization results in homophily and loss of network efficiency. We find that the efficiency of the networks formed in the experiment is significantly lower than the efficiency which could be achieved under selfish, rational play. Many individual decisions are consistent with selfish rationality and with a concern for overall welfare, but the tendency to link with the ‘most popular’ farmer in the network causes large efficiency losses. When information about group membership is disclosed, social networks become more homophilous, but not significantly less efficient. Networks play an important role in the diffusion of innovations in developing countries. If they are inefficiently structured, there is scope for development policies that support diffusion.

Innovation through Networking: The Case of the Agricultural Sector

Date: 2014-10
By: Lambrecht, Evelien
Kühne, Bianka
Gellynck, Xavier
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iefi14:199370&r=net
Innovation is widely recognized as being an important strategic tool for companies to increase their competitive advantage. Hereby, networks have become increasingly important as external sources for the necessary knowledge, ideas and financial resources. The main contribution of this paper is to shed light on how different network partners can explain or facilitate the different types of innovations in the agricultural sector. In contrast to other studies, we make a distinction between all four types of innovation: product, process, marketing and organizational innovation. Thus, this study has the objective to gain insight into the innovation process of farmers in terms of how they innovate, which network partners they consult in relation to innovation type, the obstacles they face, and where the network activities could be better aligned with the needs of the farmers, which could help to enable them to optimally support innovation and networking. The study is based on 36 in-depth interviews with farmers spread over five subsectors in Flanders (northern Belgium). Our most important findings are that the consulted partners and the observed barriers are different dependent on the innovation type. Hence, our study delivers a set of valuable insights and implications for farmers, network coordinators and policymakers. Farmers must be aware of the importance of partner suitability and network heterogeneity for the innovation type they are aiming at. Furthermore, farmers have to be aware of the fact that efficient networking is not the optimisation of single relationships independently of each other, but instead the management of synergies and coordination of all relationships in an efficient way. In addition, network coordinators should set up a clear strategy and communicate for which innovations their network can advise and help the farmer. These first conclusions should be further proven and supported by future research in order to draw general conclusions for the agricultural sector. As the sample of our study is limited to 36 respondents spread over five subsectors, it is necessary to conduct a quantitative study to achieve a representable sample and to include more subsectors. In addition, the study is limited to the Flemish region and literature in other countries about this subject is scarce. Hence, other researchers are encouraged to investigate if the results of Flanders can be supported by other regions in Europe and the world.
Keywords: Farmers, network, innovation, Flanders, qualitative research, Agribusiness,

AJAE 農經貢獻之回顧文獻

==noted by yinung==

2010年, vol. 92, 2, AJAE 回顧了過去百年以來農經學者的貢獻, 方向含括:

生產與農場管理、農產市場、農業政策、農產貿易、農業發展、自然資源與保育、環境經濟、食品與消費經濟、鄉村發展、農企業經濟與管理、計量方法之發展。值得細閱了解。

農企業研究含食品鏈的水平和垂直參與者之協調 (agribusiness economics)、與食品鏈內的決策 (agribusiness management)

1950s 出現的研究主題:on cooperatives, farm supply markets, industrial organization, vertical integration, market power of food processing and farm supply firms,antitrust decisions, and bargaining

1960s 中: marketing structure’ of the food industry, efficiency; services to consumers; market power; regulatory activities; services such as market news;and the effects of imports; Key papers on cooperative theory and agricultural finance also appeared during the 1960s
1970-80: teaching program serving the needs of the rapidly growing nonfarm segments of the food system. Work on food system structure and performance.
===有關供應鏈===
價格傳遞機能 Wohlgenant (1989, AJAE) 或者是食品供應鏈管理和制度設計、風險移轉分擔、契約設計、體系之收入成本利潤在供應鏈成員間之分配等 ,特別供應鏈體系面臨外部需求成長及風險變動增加下的相關議題 Hendrikse and Bijman (2002, AJAE)

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Experiments in J. Agri. Econ

 

 

Experiments in EJAE