# Causal Effects Model 的估計

## ==Causal Effects 估計範例==

in Angrist and Pischke (2017, JEP, p130-132)，主要提出觀念的是 Dale and Kruger (2002, QJE)

Casusal Effect: 在申請入學時，同時接到私大和州大入學許可，但最後後選擇唸私大、或州大的學生為樣本：

Yi: 全部的樣本的畢業生所得，可觀察的，其中又分為兩類

Y1i : 第 i 個樣本的「受私校教育後」所得

Y0i : 第 i 個樣本的「受州校教育後」所得

Pi: ＝1 if 第 i 個樣本唸私立，＝0 otherwise 唸州立大學

Y10 : 第 i 個樣本的原來能力

Y1i – Y0i

H0 : E(Y1i – Y0i) = β>0

Y0i ＝α + ηi

α 為學生原來的潛力， ηi是誤差，或個別差異，這個個別差異會和選私校有關係，例如家庭背景、爸媽是否畢業於私立..。
Caussal-Effect model

Yi = α+βPi+ηi

Pi 和 ηi 是(統計上)不獨立的，也就是無法滿足迴歸上原來的獨立性要求。

E(ηi|Pi,Xi) = E(ηi|Xi)

E(ηi|Pi,Xi) = E(ηi|Xi) = E(ηi|Xi)

Yi=α+βPi+γXi+ηi

==ref==

Angrist, Joshua D., and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. “Undergraduate econometrics instruction: through our classes, darkly." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31.2 (2017): 125-44.

Dale, Stacy Berg, and Alan B. Krueger. “Estimating the payoff to attending a more selective college: An application of selection on observables and unobservables." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117.4 (2002): 1491-1527.

# New directions for modelling strategic behavior: Game-theoretic models of communication, coordination, and cooperation in economic relationships

Crawford, Vincent P. “New directions for modelling strategic behavior: Game-theoretic models of communication, coordination, and cooperation in economic relationships." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30.4 (2016): 131-50.

## ==original Abstract==

In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory’s principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking" and “learning" rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments

# GIMS, an open source market software

S. Palan, GIMS-Software for asset market experiments. J. Behav. Exp. Finance 5, 1–14, (2015). Medline doi:10.1016/j.jbef.2015.02.001 (可免費閱讀)

==by YNY==

GIMS 是架在 z-Tree 上，專門用來跑財務資產市場 (又稱 double auction asset market) 的實驗平台軟體，採開放源碼 (open source) 授權。

• EconPort MarketLink(based on Java and experiments can be run over the internet)
• Flex-E-Markets(not open source)
• GIMS(based on z-Tree)
• jMarkets (open-source software based on Java)
• SoPHIE Labs (非免費)

# 新經濟學範式告別曼昆？

yinung: 終於有新式經濟學教科書問世了… 用三個觀點重新描述「數據時代」的經濟學。

…有一本全新的《經濟學》面世，曼昆《經濟學原理》突然面臨強有力的挑戰。這就是阿西莫格魯、萊布森與李斯特合著的《經濟學》。這三人都是當下紅得發紫的經濟學家，也都已在多個領域做出突出貢獻，被認為是未來數年諾貝爾經濟學獎理所當然的候選人…

# 微观经济与宏观经济实验原理.方法与案例

ISBN: 9787111389781

# Saving Face and Group Identity

==notes by yinung==

 Date: 2015 By: Tor Eriksson (Department of economics – University of Aarhus) Lei Mao (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – ENS Lyon – École normale supérieure – Lyon – UL2 – Université Lumière – Lyon 2 – UCBL – Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 – Université Jean Monnet – Saint-Etienne – PRES Université de Lyon – CNRS, Central University of Finance and Economics) Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – ENS Lyon – École normale supérieure – Lyon – UL2 – Université Lumière – Lyon 2 – UCBL – Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 – Université Jean Monnet – Saint-Etienne – PRES Université de Lyon – CNRS) URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01161750&r=net Are people willing to sacrifice resources to save one’s and others’ face? In a laboratory experiment, we study whether individuals forego resources to avoid the public exposure of the least performer in their group. We show that a majority of individuals are willing to pay to preserve not only their self-but also other group members’ image. This behavior is frequent even in the absence of group identity. When group identity is more salient, individuals help regardless of whether the least performer is an in-group or an out-group. This suggests that saving others’ face is a strong social norm.

# Experiments in EJAE

• Abstract
• Full Text (HTML)
• Full Text (PDF)

# The advantage of resource queues over spot resource markets: decision coordination in experiments under resource uncertainty

Fonseca, Miguel A., Alexander Pfaff, and Daniel Osgood. “The advantage of resource queues over spot resource markets: decision coordination in experiments under resource uncertainty." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 94.5 (2012): 1136-1153. [oxfordjournals.org]; [Open Access PDF]

### ==Notes by yinung==

[引文] The advantage of resource queues over spot markets concerns two types of uncertainty, environmental and strategic.
(較早寫的)

### ==abstract==

Farmers have to make key decisions, such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil, before knowing how much water they will get. They face losses if they make costly decisions but do not receive water, and they may forego profits if they receive water without being prepared. We consider the coordination of farmers’ decisions, such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil when farmers must divide an uncertain water supply. We compare ex-ante queues (pre-decision) to
an ex-post spot market (post-decision & post-rain) in experiments in rural Brazil and a university in England. Queues have greater coordination success than does the spot market.

### ==References==

Lefebvre, M., L. Gangadharan, and S. Thoyer. 2012. “Do Security-Differentiated Water Rights Improve the Performance of Markets?” American Journal of Agricultural Economics. doi:10.1093/ajae/aas060.

The most relevant experiment of which we are aware is that of Lefebvre et al. (2012), which studies profits with security-differentiated water rights (mimicking the essence of a queue) versus non-differentiated, equal share rights. The differentiated rights are seen to have profit and risk-management benefits relative to the non-differentiated rights.