| Date: | 2015 |
| By: | Aflahagah, Fo Kodjo Dzinyefa Bernard, Tanguy Viceisza, Angelino |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1450&r=net |
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Coordination failures are at the heart of development traps. Although communication can reduce such failures, to date experimental evidence has primarily been lab based. This paper studies the impact of communication in stag hunt coordination games played by members of Senegalese farmer groups—a setting where collective commercialization has suffered from coordination failure, as in many rural contexts. We find that communication increases coordination only in larger experimental groups, where it matters most from the standpoint of poverty traps. We also find that these effects are driven by communication’s impact on perceptions of strategic uncertainty. Some policy implications are discussed.
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| Keywords: | coordination, communication, cooperatives, field experimentation, development, strategic uncertainty, |
Monthly Archives: 九月 2015
Saving Face and Group Identity
==notes by yinung==
很有趣的保留面子 (saving face) 的實驗?
| Date: | 2015 |
| By: | Tor Eriksson (Department of economics – University of Aarhus) Lei Mao (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – ENS Lyon – École normale supérieure – Lyon – UL2 – Université Lumière – Lyon 2 – UCBL – Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 – Université Jean Monnet – Saint-Etienne – PRES Université de Lyon – CNRS, Central University of Finance and Economics) Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – ENS Lyon – École normale supérieure – Lyon – UL2 – Université Lumière – Lyon 2 – UCBL – Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 – Université Jean Monnet – Saint-Etienne – PRES Université de Lyon – CNRS) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01161750&r=net |
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Are people willing to sacrifice resources to save one’s and others’ face? In a laboratory experiment, we study whether individuals forego resources to avoid the public exposure of the least performer in their group. We show that a majority of individuals are willing to pay to preserve not only their self-but also other group members’ image. This behavior is frequent even in the absence of group identity. When group identity is more salient, individuals help regardless of whether the least performer is an in-group or an out-group. This suggests that saving others’ face is a strong social norm.
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Evolution of Fairness and Group Formation in Multi-Player Ultimatum Games
| Date: | 2015-08 |
| By: | NISHIMURA, Takeshi OKADA, Akira SHIRATA, Yasuhiro |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:econdp:2015-06&r=net |
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Group formation is a fundamental activity in human society. Humans often exclude others from a group and divide the group benefit in a fair way only among group members. Such an allocation is called in-group fair. Does natural selection favor an in-group fair allocation? We investigate the evolution of fairness and group formation in a three-person Ultimatum Game (UG) in which the group value depends on its size. In a stochastic model of the frequency-dependent Moran process, natural selection favors the formation of a two-person subgroup in the low mutation limit if its group value exceeds a high proportion (0.7) of that of the largest group. Stochastic evolutionary game theory provides theoretical support to explain the behavior of human subjects in economic experiments of a three-person UG.
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Network Form and Performance. The Case of Multi-Unit Franchising
==notes by yinung==
以前的實證文獻多指向 MUF 優於 SUF (single-unit franchising).
兩種 MUF 授權方式 (franchising): 區域 & 循序
Two types of multi-unit franchising are distinguished: area development franchising and sequential multi-unit franchising (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996; Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt, 2005)
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Area development franchising is based on a contract that allows a franchisee to run several outlets at a certaintime in a specified geographical area. It is often associated with a territorial exclusivity right.
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Sequential multi-unit franchising refers to a contract that transfers to the franchisee the right to open a new unit in addition to the existing one.
| Date: | 2015-03-09 |
| By: | Muriel Fadairo (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – CNRS – UCBL – Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 – UL2 – Université Lumière – Lyon 2 – Université Jean Monnet – Saint-Etienne – PRES Université de Lyon – ENS Lyon – École normale supérieure – Lyon) Cintya Lanchimba (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – CNRS – UCBL – Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 – UL2 – Université Lumière – Lyon 2 – Université Jean Monnet – Saint-Etienne – PRES Université de Lyon – ENS Lyon – École normale supérieure – Lyon) Josef Windsperger (University of Vienna [Vienna]) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01128075&r=net |
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(定義) Multi-unit franchising (MUF) is a governance form inside franchising networks where the franchisor transfers to the franchisees the right to own and operate more than one outlet. While previous empirical literature has revealed various advantages of MUF as compared to single-unit franchising (SUF), we study the impact of this governance form on the network performance, taking into account different contexts. Our results from propensity score matching show that MUF leads to higher performance. However, non-parametric estimations highlight thresholds suggesting that a mix of SUF and MUF is a more efficient governance form than a pure MUF network.
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Direct and indirect network effects: are they equivalent?
Clements, Matthew T. “Direct and indirect network effects: are they equivalent?." International Journal of Industrial Organization 22.5 (2004): 633-645.
Abstract
Network effects may be either direct or indirect. While many analyses conflate the two, I show that the ways in which direct and indirect effects influence technological standardization are quite different. Some parameter changes have opposite effects in the two models, and some factors which are irrelevant under direct effects are central under indirect effects. Compatibility in particular has a different interpretation and more subtle implications for standardization in the indirect model.
Keywords
Network effects, Network externalities, Standards, Compatibility
JEL classification
- L1
A Short Survey of Network Economics
Shy, Oz. “A short survey of network economics." Review of Industrial Organization 38.2 (2011): 119-149.
Abstract
This article surveys a variety of topics that are related to network economics. Topics covered include: consumer demand under network effects, compatibility decisions and standardization, technology advances in network industries, two-sided markets, information networks and intellectual property, and social influence.
Keywords
Survey Network economics Network industries Network effects Network externalities
JEL Classification
D4 L1 L8 Z1
Alternative food networks and local markets: determinants of consumers’ choices between conventional and farmers’ stands
| Date: | 2015-06 |
| By: | Novelli, Silvia Corsi, Alessandro |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aiea15:207289&r=net |
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Direct purchases are a widespread and important typology of the so-called Alternative Food Networks. Within this channel, farmers’ markets represent a popular and deeply investigated farmer-to-consumer market segment. While farmers’ markets are a quite recent initiatives, it is traditional to find in many towns in Italy both conventional stands and farmers’ stands selling fruit and vegetables in the same district market. We therefore analyse the behavioural characteristics of local market consumers choosing to purchase from farmers in order to point out the determinants of their choice. The consumers’ preferences were assessed through an in-person survey. Data were collected interviewing consumers in open-air markets in Torino, Cuneo, Alessandria and Asti, four cities in Piedmont Region (Italy) where farmers sell their products. The determinants of the choice to buy from farm stands were analysed with a probit model using a final sample of 1,138 respondents. Explanatory variables comprise the consumers’ general attitudes towards the purchase of food (importance given to convenience, price, quality and trust) and their personal characteristics. Also, other variables were added in order to highlight the possible role of markets and areas with distinctive characteristics. The most important factor affecting consumers’ choice for farm stand is the quest for quality. Consumers with a strong interest in quality are significantly more likely to buy from farmers. Among the personal characteristics, being the household member in charge of buying fruits and vegetables, and education, are the main determinants of the choice of farmers’ stands. On the contrary, the effects of variables such as income and job skill level are not clear enough,and seem to be open to different interpretations.
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| Keywords: | Alternative Food Networks, direct purchase, consumers’ choices, Agricultural and Food Policy, D4, Q13, |
Games Played on Networks
==Notes by yinung==
原本獨立的 game 在 linked network 玩會如何呢？
本文介紹了網路位置 (network position) 觀念， 及其對均衡的影響 (Ballester, CalvÛ-Armengol & Zenou (2006) Örst establish the connection between equilibrium action and Bonacich centrality (Bonacich 1987)，另見 Yves Zenou. (2015), 
“Key players" (344 Kb) , In: Y. Bramoullé, B.W. Rogers and A. Galeotti (Eds.), Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. Vox column)
“Key players" (344 Kb) , In: Y. Bramoullé, B.W. Rogers and A. Galeotti (Eds.), Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. Vox column)| Date: | 2015-03 |
| By: | Yann Bramoullé (AMSE – Aix-Marseille School of Economics – EHESS – École des hautes études en sciences sociales – Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) – Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM) – AMU – Aix-Marseille Université) Rachel Kranton (Duke University, Department of Economics – Duke University (Durham, USA)) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01180657&r=net |
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This chapter studies games played on fixed networks. These games capture a wide variety of economic settings including local public goods, peer effects, and technology adoption. We establish a common analytical framework to study a wide game class. We unearth new connections between games in the literature and in particular between those with binary actions, like coordination and best-shot games, and those with continuous actions and linear best replies. We review and advance existing results by showing how they tie together within the common framework. We discuss the game-theoretic underpinnings of key notions including Bonacich centrality, maximal independent sets, and the lowest and largest eigenvalue. We study the interplay of individual heterogeneity and the network and we develop a new notion – interdependence – to analyze how a shock to one agent affects the action of another agent. We outline directions for future research.
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行為 & 經濟實驗文獻注 (備忘) by 楊奕農 