The Intellectual Property Marketplace: Emerging Transaction and Investment Vehicles*

Malackowski, J. E., Cardoza, K., Gray, C., & Conroy, R. (2007). The Intellectual Property Marketplace: Emerging Transaction and Investment Vehicles. Licensing Journal, 27(2), 1-11. **

==notes by yinung==

p. 9 提到以證券交易的概念來「發行IP」,以專業評估決定發行「授權數量」(例如100 million units over
five years),然後 IP 擁有的公司再決定釋出多少授權數目, 每個授權(例如 70 million units at three cents a unit),由市場進行交易

IP 交易係由  or litigation 之壓力下所形成; 其交易成本很大,交易完成時間需 6-18 個月

… the historic IP marketplace, there are a number of key conclusions. First, the market was primarily motivated by the threat of patent enforcement or litigation. Second, there were very high transaction costs associated with transferring IP rights. .. it often takes 6 to 18 months to complete a deal, and this comes at significant costs.

第一次 Ocean Tomo 的 IP auction in San Francisco, April 2006.

1200 patent 中有 430 項列入拍賣,分成 78 lots, 400 人出席,交易金額 8.5 m 美元; 44 % 成交 (一般汽車拍賣成交率約 1/3 ` 1/2),此外還有 off the floor 交易

第二次 auction 成交金額 2.39 m

Should I sell or should I license 賣斷還是授權?


over the last 30 years the labor and industrial economy has been supplanted by the knowledge economy.


In 1975, more than 80 percent of the US market’s value was composed of tangible assets: factories, machines, and inventory. Now in 2006, less then 20 percent of the market’s value is composed of tangible assets, with the 80 percent balance associated with intangible assets.

Ocean Tomo 300 指數 in 2006

On September 13, 2006, Ocean Tomo launched the Ocean Tomo 300™ Patent Index—the first equity index based on the value of corporate IP.

… First published on May 26, 1896, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), created by Wall Street Journal editor and Dow Jones & Company founder Charles Dow, represented the average of 12 stocks from various important US industries. … Nasdaq began trading on February 8, 1971
… On March 4, 1957, a broad, real-time stock market index, the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) was introduced.


patent enforcement

patent trolls

(refer to them more appropriately as Patent Licensing and Enforcement Companies or “P-LECs”)


Are teams prone to myopic loss aversion? An experimental study on individual versus team investment behavior*

Matthias Sutter (2007) “Are teams prone to myopic loss aversion? An experimental study on individual versus team investment behavior."Economics Letters, Volume 97, Issue 2, November 2007, Pages 128–132. DOI; ***

==notes by yinung==

此文之實驗研究細節,可參考 Team decision making under risk and myopic loss aversion 一文, or see 2005-Sutter-team decision-working paper

==original abstract==

Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been found to have a persistent influence on individual decision making under risk. In this paper I show that team decision making attenuates MLA, but that teams are also prone to MLA

Zero as a Special Price: The True Value of Free Products

Kristina Shampanier, Nina Mazar and Dan Ariely (2007) “Zero as a Special Price: The True Value of Free Products." Marketing Science November/December 2007 vol. 26 no. 6 742-757. doi: 10.1287/mksc.1060.0254. (link to PDF)

==original Abstract==

When faced with a choice of selecting one of several available products (or possibly buying nothing), according to standard theoretical perspectives, people will choose the option with the highest cost–benefit difference. However, we propose that decisions about free (zero price) products differ, in that people do not simply subtract costs from benefits but instead they perceive the benefits associated with free products as higher.

We test this proposal by contrasting demand for two products across conditions that maintain the price difference between the goods, but vary the prices such that the cheaper good in the set is priced at either a low positive or zero price. In contrast with a standard cost–benefit perspective, in the zero-price condition, dramatically more participants choose the cheaper option, whereas dramatically fewer participants choose the more expensive option. Thus, people appear to act as if zero pricing of a good not only decreases its cost, but also adds to its benefits. After documenting this basic effect, we propose and test several psychological antecedents of the effect, including social norms, mapping difficulty, and affect. Affect emerges as the most likely account for the effect.

Key Words:


The design of patent pools: the determinants of licensing rules

Lerner, J., Strojwas, M. and Tirole, J. (2007), The design of patent pools: the determinants of licensing rules. The RAND Journal of Economics, 38: 610–625. [doi] [PDF]


Patent pools are an important but little-studied economic institution. In this article, we first make a set of predictions about the licensing terms associated with patent pools. The theoretical framework predicts that (i) pools consisting of complementary patents are more likely to allow members to engage in independent licensing and (ii) the requirement that firms license patents to the pool (grantbacks) should be associated with pools that consist of complements and allow independent licensing. We then examine the terms of 63 pools, and show that licensing rules are consistent with these hypotheses.