Medical Insurance and Free Choice of Physician Shape Patient Overtreatment. A Laboratory Experiment

==Noted by yinung==


Date: 2014-09-30
By: Steffen Huck (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB))
Gabriele Lünser (University College London – Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE))
Florian Spitzer (Department of Economics, Vienna Center for Experimental Economics (VCEE), University of Vienna)
Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, Copenhagen University)
In a laboratory experiment designed to capture key aspects of the interaction between physicians and patients in a stylized way, we study the effects of medical insurance and competition in the guise of free choice of physician. Medical treatment is an example of a credence good: only the physician (but not the patient) knows the appropriate treatment, and even after consulting, the patient is not sure whether he got proper treatment or got an unnecessary treatment, i.e. was overtreated. We find that with insurance, moral hazard looms on both sides of the market: patients consult more often and physicians overtreat more often than in the baseline condition. Competition decreases overtreatment compared to the baseline and patients therefore consult more often. When the two institutions are combined, competition is found to partially offset the adverse effects of insurance: most patients seek treatment, but overtreatment is moderated.
Keywords: Credence good, Patient, Physician, Overtreatment, Competition, Insurance, Moral hazard
JEL: C91 I11 I13

有關用實驗進行 policy evaluations

Roth 的 papers

  • Roth, Alvin E. 2002. “The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation
    as Tools for Design Economics.” Econometrica 70 (4): 1341–78.
  • Roth, Alvin E. 2007. “Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets.” Journal of Economic Perspectives
    21 (3): 37–58.
  • Roth, Alvin E. 2008. “What Have We Learned from Market Design?” Economic Journal 118 (527):

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