Plott, Charles R. “Industrial organization theory and experimental economics." journal of Economic Literature 20.4 (1982): 1485-1527. cenet.org.cn 提供的 [PDF]
==notes by yinung==
這篇是廠商理論相關的實驗文獻回顧, 包含完全競爭市場、寡佔、獨佔
Plott, Charles R. “Industrial organization theory and experimental economics." journal of Economic Literature 20.4 (1982): 1485-1527. cenet.org.cn 提供的 [PDF]
==notes by yinung==
這篇是廠商理論相關的實驗文獻回顧, 包含完全競爭市場、寡佔、獨佔
Charles R. Plott and Shyam Sunder “Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models." The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Aug., 1982), pp. 663-698.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1831348
JSTOR: The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Aug., 1982), pp. 663-698.
The study reports on the ability of competing models of market information integration and dissemination to explain the behavior of simple laboratory markets for a one-period security. Returns to the security depended upon a randomly drawn state of nature. Some agents (insiders), whose identity was unknown to other agents, knew the state before the markets opened. With replication of market conditions the predictions of a fully revealing rational-expectations model are relatively accurate. Prices adjusted immediately to near rational-expectations prices; profits of insiders were virtually indistinguishable from noninsiders; and efficiency levels converged to near 100 percent.
Robert Forsythe, Thomas R. Palfrey and Charles R. Plott (1982) “Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market." Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 3 (May, 1982), pp. 537-567. JSTOR |via CYCU
The time path of asset prices is studied within a stationary experimental environment. After several replications prices converge to a perfect foresight equilibrium. A sequential market having an “informational trap" and a futures market are also studied.
(下面方程式最後之數字是 for Experiment 1 & 2)
實驗 1 的結果
實驗 2 的結果
實驗 3 的結果
實驗 4 的結果
實驗 5 的結果
實驗紀錄表