科技部經濟學門評分參考原則

科技部人文司專題研究計畫審查須知及經濟學門評分參考原則 (2021 年2 月 4 日通過： 110經濟學門評分參考原則.pdf)

「研究成果」之評審，請綜合考量主持人所上傳之代表性研究成果及其所填列之「科
技部人文司專題研究計畫主持人研究成果表」（以下稱「研究成果表」）。代表性研究成
果須為近 10 年（2011 年 1 月 1 日至 2020 年 12 月 31 日）之研究成果（可含實作成果）
至多 5 篇(本)，2其中至少 1 篇(本)為近 5 年（2016 年 1 月 1 日至 2020 年 12 月 31 日）
之研究成果；超出年限之成果不列入評分。評分注意事項及參考原則如下：

• 請綜合考量代表性研究成果之創見及對學術、實務或社會之重要貢獻。代表性研究
  成果若有該領域重要專書或期刊刊載的論文（例如附件二之「經濟學國際期刊分等
  表」中 A+級以上期刊），請予以特別考量。
• 研究成果被評 85 分以上者須至少有一項代表性研究成果相當於「經濟學國際期刊分等表」中 A 級以上期刊之品質者。合作研究已為常態，但若為獨著，可酌予加分。
• 審查表第八項所指人體試驗／人體檢體之實驗或研究類型（主持人須檢附研究倫理審查通過文件，或於研究計畫執行前補齊），係指： … 得免送倫理審查委員會審查之研究計畫及倫理審查之相關說明如下：

 於公開場合進行之非記名、非互動且非介入性之研究，且無從自蒐集之資訊
辨識特定之個人。
 使用已合法公開週知之資訊，且資訊之使用符合其公開週知之目的。
 於一般教學環境中進行之教育評量或測試、教學技巧或成效評估之研究。

 

On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey

Pedro Dal Bó and Guillaume R. Fréchette

A growing experimental literature studies the determinants of cooperation in infinitely repeated games, tests different predictions of the theory, and suggests an empirical solution to the problem of multiple equilibria. To provide a robust description of the literature’s findings, we gather and analyze a metadata set of experiments on infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. The experimental data show that cooperation is affected by infinite repetition and is more likely to arise when it can be supported in equilibrium. However, the fact that cooperation can be supported in equilibrium does not imply that most subjects will cooperate. High cooperation rates will emerge only when the parameters of the repeated game are such that cooperation is very robust to strategic uncertainty. We also review the results regarding the effect of imperfect monitoring, changing partners, and personal characteristics on cooperation and the strategies used to support it.
Full-Text Access | Supplementary Materials

舊書新入

剛得獎的作者，熱騰騰

(書中提到，他的第一篇在 JF 刊出的大作，竟然是「破例」開門錄取的論文…因為大大不同於「效率市場假說」的傳統觀點)

樊沁萍教授的經濟實驗教材

以下這個網頁是樊沁萍教授的經濟實驗教材 (中文):

http://mail2.scu.edu.tw/~cpfan/xp_teach.htm

其中有述及風險決策 (彩券之設計與實驗)、供需均衡與PPF、談判、和公共財實驗

eBay.BIN2-每輪15回合.有時間(2009-碩專班)

M TimeSpan =15
V Next Timespan = if(OR(mod(simstep,15)=14, mod(simstep,15)=0), 15,5)
M StartTime = 0
M EndTime = 90
M InitialSteps=0
M TimeFormat = "回合#0"
M NumberFormat = "#,##0.##"
V myStep=SimStep
V NOTR=15
V NR=15
V TimeLeft=NOTR-mod(SimStep,NOTR)
V base = 0.5
V UpperInc = 1
V minCr0 = if(base+0.5*base*round(randbetween(0,UpperInc))1 & v0>=previous(price3)+minCR0 & previous(winner0)=0, previous(price3)+minCR0,NA)
V bid1=if(mod(simStep,15)>1 & v1>=previous(price3)+minCR1 & previous(winner1)=0, previous(price3)+minCR1,NA)
V bid2=if(mod(simStep,15)>1 & v2>=previous(price3)+minCR2 & previous(winner2)=0, previous(price3)+minCR2,NA)
V f_bid0=if(OR(bid0=na,bid0=none),-999,bid0)
V f_bid1=if(OR(bid1=na,bid1=none),-999,bid1)
V f_bid2=if(OR(bid2=na,bid2=none),-999,bid2)
V bidHistory=if(mod(SIMSTEP,15)=0,0,if(f_bid0=-999 & f_bid1=-999,previous(bidHistory),previous(bidHistory)+1))
p bidHistory.Label="出價次數"
V price1 = if(price3>=BIN_selected, if(previous(End1)=0 & End1=1, BIN_selected,NA), 0)
V price2 = if(OR(previous(Bestoffer)>=BIN_selected,price3>=BIN_selected), if(previous(End2)=0,BIN_selected,NA), previous(Bestoffer)*BestOfferAccept)
V BestOffer=if(formatSelected=2 & mod(simStep,15)>1, if(End2=1,NA,max(bid0,bid1,bid2)),NA)
V price3 =if(mod(SimStep,15)=0 & simStep=0,0,max(if(mod(SimStep,15)=1,minP,previous(price3)),bid0,bid1,bid2))
V price4 =if(mod(SimStep,15)>1,if(max(previous(price3),bid0,bid1,bid2)>=BIN_selected,BIN_selected,max(previous(price3),bid0,bid1,bid2)),minP)
V Price =if(formatSelected=1,Price1,if(formatSelected=2,price2,if(formatSelected=3,price3,price4)))
V SoldPrice=if(mod(simStep,15)=0,0,if(price>0,price,previous(soldPrice,0)))
P SoldPrice.label="成交價"
P BIN_selected.label="你設定的直接購買 BIN"
P BestOffer.label="此次賣方出價"
P myReward.label="當期獲利"
P acc_Reward.label="累計獲利"
V secondP=if(formatSelected>2,if(mod(SIMSTEP,15)previous(price),previous(price),previous(secondP))),price)
V winner0=if(mod(SIMSTEP,15)=0,0,if(max(f_bid1,f_bid2)1 & formatSelected=1,if(price3>=BIN_Selected,1,0),0)
V End2=if(mod(simStep,15)>2 & formatSelected=2,if(OR(price3>=BIN_selected,BestOfferAccept=1),1,previous(End2,0)),if(mod(simStep,15)=0 & formatSelected=2, BestofferAccept,0))
V End3=0
V End4 = if(mod(simStep,15)>1 & formatSelected=4 & price>=BIN_selected,1,0)
V Listfee = 0
V Comissionfee=0
V myCost=0
V myReward =if(OR(formatSelected=3,formatselected = 4 & price2,mod(simStep,15)=0),previous(BIN_selected,0),NA))
D BestOfferAccept=if(mod(simStep,15)>1 & formatSelected=2 & End2=0,{0,1},NA)
P BestOfferAccept.desc = {"拒絕","接受"}
P BestOfferAccept.label="接受此出價嗎?"
T Table 1 =if(formatSelected =1, {"soldPrice","BIN_selected","BestOffer","myReward","acc_Reward"},{"soldPrice","Price","BIN_selected","BestOffer","BestOfferAccept","bidHistory","myReward","acc_Reward"})
T Table 1.color = {"#CCCCCC", "#FFFFFF"}
T Table 1.Label = "Table 1. 拍賣紀錄"
M TextInformation =if(OR(End1=1,End2=1),"eBay.End.htm",if(formatselected=1, "eBay.format1.htm",if(formatselected=2,"eBay.format2.htm",if(formatselected=3,"eBay.format3.htm","eBay.format4.htm"))))
M TextInformation.Label = "拍賣主頁"

Moral Impossibility in the Petersburg Paradox : A Literature Survey and Experimental Evidence

Moral Impossibility in the Petersburg Paradox : A Literature Survey and Experimental Evidence

Date:	2010
By:	Tibor Neugebauer (Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg)
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crf:wpaper:10-14&r=net
	The Petersburg paradox has led to much thought for three centuries. This paper describes the paradox, discusses its resolutions advanced in the literature while alluding to the historical context, and presents experimental data. In particular, Bernoulli’s search for the level of moral impossibility in the Petersburg problem is stressed; beyond this level small probabilities are considered too unlikely to be relevant for judgment and decision making. In the experiment, the level of moral impossibility is elicited through variations of the gamble-length in the Petersburg gamble. Bernoulli’s conjecture that people neglect small probability events is supported by a statistical power analysis.
Keywords:	Petersburg paradox; economic history; bounded rationality; significance level; experimental economics
JEL:	B3

Equity and Efficiency in Multi-Worker Firms: Insights from Experimental Economics

Equity and Efficiency in Multi-Worker Firms: Insights from Experimental Economics

Date:	2011-05
By:	Abeler, Johannes (University of Nottingham) Altmann, Steffen (IZA) Goerg, Sebastian (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) Kube, Sebastian (University of Bonn) Wibral, Matthias (University of Bonn)
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5727&r=net
	In this paper, we discuss recent evidence from economic experiments that study the impact of social preferences on workplace behavior. We focus on situations in which a single employer interacts with multiple employees. Traditionally, equity and efficiency have been seen as opposing aims in such work environments: individual pay-for-performance schemes maximize efficiency but might lead to inequitable outcomes. We present findings from laboratory experiments that show under which circumstances partially incomplete contracts can create equitable work environments while at the same time reaching surprisingly efficient outcomes.
Keywords:	incentives, wage setting, equity, gift exchange, reciprocity, incomplete contracts, organizational economics, laboratory experiments
JEL:	J33

Size Matters – When it Comes to Lies

Size Matters – When it Comes to Lies

Date:	2011-05-17
By:	Gerald Eisenkopf (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany) Ruslan Gurtoviy (Department of Business Administration, University of Trier, Germany) Verena Utikal (Department of Economics, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany)
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:knz:dpteco:1114&r=net
	A small lie appears trivial but it obviously violates moral commandments. We analyze whether the preference for others’ truth telling is absolute or depends on the size of a lie. In a laboratory experiment we compare punishment for different sizes of lies controlling for the resulting economic harm. We find that people are sensitive to the size of a lie and that this behavioural pattern is driven by honest people. People who lie themselves punish softly in any context.
Keywords:	Lying, norm violation, punishment, experiment
JEL:	C91

Asymmetric obligations

 

Asymmetric obligations

Date:	2011
By:	Riedel, Nadine Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fziddp:282011&r=net
	We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the behavioral effects of obligations that are not backed by binding deterrent incentives. To implement such expressive law’ we introduce different levels of very weakly incentivized, symmetric and asymmetric minimum contribution levels (obligations) in a repeated public goods experiment. The results provide evidence for a weak expressive function of law: while the initial impact of high obligations on behavior is strong, it decreases over time. Asymmetric obligations are as effective as symmetric ones. Our results are compatible with the argument that expressive law affects behavior by attaching an emotional cost of disobeying the own obligation. —
Keywords:	Non-binding Obligations,Expressive law,Public goods,Experiment
JEL:	C92

The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment

The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment

此文已正式刊登於 Intl J. of Game Theory, 2012.

Date:	2011
By:	Normann, Hans-Theo Wallace, Brian
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:19&r=net
	Cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games can usually be sustained only if the game has an infinite horizon. We analyze to what extent the theoretically crucial distinction of finite vs. infinite-horizon games is reflected in the outcomes of a prisoner’s dilemma experiment. We compare three different experimental termination rules in four treatments: a known finite end, an unknown end, and two variants with a random termination rule (with a high and with a low continuation probability, where cooperation can occur in a subgame-perfect equilibrium only with the high probability). We find that the termination rules do not significantly affect average cooperation rates. Specifically, employing a random termination rule does not cause significantly more cooperation compared to a known finite horizon, and the continuation probability does not significantly affect average cooperation rates either. However, the termination rules may influence cooperation over time and end-game behavior. Further, the (expected) length of the game significantly increases cooperation rates. The results suggest that subjects may need at least some learning opportunities (like repetitions of the supergame) before significant backward induction arguments in finitely repeated game have force. —
Keywords:	Prisoner’s dilemma,Repeated games,Infinite-horizon games,Experimental economics
JEL:	C72