An Experimental Study of Uncertainty in Coordination Games

Date: 2015-09-23
By: Ioannou, Christos A.
Makris, Miltiadis
Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Coordination games. The former assume that agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals to capture disperse information, whereas the latter model the number of actual players as a Poisson random variable to capture population uncertainty in large games. Given that their predictions differ, it is imperative to understand which type of uncertainty drives empirical behavior in macroeconomic environments with strategic complementarities. Recent experimental literature finds mixed results on whether subjects’ behavior is similar in Global and Common Knowledge Coordination games, and hence on whether idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals is an important determinant of subjects’ behavior. Poisson Coordination games have not been investigated experimentally. We fill this gap. Our findings suggest that uncertainty about the number of actual players may influence subjects’ behavior. Crucially, such behavior is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Poisson Coordination games.

A Fine Rule From a Brutish World? An Experiment on Endogenous Punishment Institution and Trust

==notes by yinung==

想法: 集體懲罰 (連坐法, 本文稱之為 collective punishment mechanism) versus 集體獎勵 對集體決策和個體決策之影響?

可以適用在小朋友身上? 或球隊成員身上 ==> 對幼童教育、企業組織、軍隊等不同主體之影響?

Q: 作者說, 連坐法顯著 increase trustworthiness, 且 to a lesser extent also trust; 不知 trustworthiness 和 trust 之間定義有何差異?

Date: 2015-09
By: H. Sun
M. Bigoni
By means of a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment mechanism within a one-shot binary trust game. The experiment comprises three games. In the first one, the only equilibrium strategy is not to trust, and not to reciprocate. In the second we exogenously introduce a sanctioning rule that imposes on untrustworthy second-movers a penalty proportional to the number of those who reciprocate trust. This generates a second equilibrium where everybody trusts and reciprocates. In the third game, the collective punishment mechanism is adopted through majority-voting. In line with the theory, we find that the exogenous introduction of the punishment mechanism significantly increases trustworthiness, and to a lesser extent also trust. However, in the third game the majority of subjects vote against it: subjects seem to be unable to endogenously adopt an institution which, when exogenously imposed, proves to be efficiency enhancing.
JEL: C72 C92 D72

An Experimental Study of Voting with Costly Delay

Date: 2015-09
By: Kwiek, Maksymilian (University of Southampton)
Marreiros, Helia (University of Southampton)
Vlassopoulos, Michael (University of Southampton)
A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority is reached. We study experimentally welfare properties of simple three-voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs. The resulting game is a form of multiplayer war of attrition. Our key finding is that, consistent with theoretical predictions, when voters are ex ante heterogeneous in terms of the intensity of their preferences the conclave leads to efficiency gains relative to simple majority voting. We also compare welfare properties of a static versus a dynamic version of a conclave. When social cost of waiting is taken into account, the dynamic conclave is superior in terms of welfare than its static version.
Keywords: voting, supermajority, intensity of preferences, war of attrition
JEL: C78 C92 D72 D74